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Recent unpopular reforms across Europe have invigorated a longstanding debate around what 
provokes welfare state change in advanced industrialized democracies. Is welfare state 
retrenchment a result of right-wing parties in power or is it simply a universal response to 
“problem pressures”? Might there be an interactive effect between these variables, in which 
right-wing parties use moments of pressure as opportunities to retrench? This study focuses on a 
set of the most theoretically intriguing of social welfare cutbacks: those demonstrably unpopular 
to the majority of the voting public and therefore most dangerous to politicians risky who voted 
out for unpopular policies. Using cross-national public opinion polls to identify a subset of 
demonstrably unpopular cutbacks (i.e. retrenchment to mandatory pensions for private-sector 
workers), this study conglomerates data on cutbacks to pension for 18 countries over 26 years, 
1990 to 2015. The logit regression, major fiscal-economic downturn is identified as a major 
determinant of unpopular social benefits retrenchment, whereas the partisanship variable is either 
weakly significant or in an unexpected direction, depending on specification.  A control, 
corporatism, is significant and positive. The study then explores the financial-economic 
downturn and retrenchment link, through case studies on France and Germany, identifying 
downturn as a critical moment or crisis that pushes politicians to engage in retrenchment. Thus, 
crisis is not so much an opportunity for right parties, waiting eagerly to retrench, but a restriction 
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Chapter 1: When and Why Does Unpopular Welfare State Retrenchment Occur? 
 
Introduction 
An aide of former U.S. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neil once famously warned that cutting back 
Social Security benefits is like touching the electrified “third rail” of a train track: politicians that 
come into contact with it risk political “death” at the next election (Safire 2007).  Many scholars 
emphasize this political danger when explaining why retrenchment1 (restricted eligibility or 
reduced generosity) of the welfare state (government-mandated social programs like 
unemployment benefits, social security, and sick pay) is unlikely. Some institutionalists (e.g. 
Taylor-Gooby 1985, Pierson 1996, Myles and Pierson 2001, and Brooks and Manza 2007) for 
instance, argue that citizens broadly disapprove of attempts to reduce these social benefits, 
and/or that sunk-costs2 and political feedback loops3 have pushed the roots of the welfare state 
deep into the social landscape of the Western nation, especially over the past 40 years. As a 
result, politicians in such countries, hoping to stay in power will either avoid cutbacks to the 
welfare state by “kicking the can down the road”, hide or obfuscate retrenchment, or place the 
burden on a minority of citizens (Pierson 1996).  
Recent cutbacks to social programs in advanced industrialized democracies seem to fit 
uncomfortably with the aforementioned expectations. From reforms in Greece, which included 
reducing benefits by between 15 and 44 percent (European Trade Union Institute 2018), to the 
Spanish government’s 2011 pension freeze, to France’s increase of the retirement age (Reuters 
2010), restricted eligibility and/or decreased generosity of welfare state programs were far from 
hidden, drawn millions of protesters to the streets, and were also placed, not on a public 
minority, but on a majority of citizens, thus drawing wide-scale disapproval. These more recent 
                                                     
11 For the purposes of this study, the terms welfare state retrenchment and cutback will be used interchangeably. 
2 E.g. the expenses in developing the welfare state 
3 E.g. one generation paying for the benefits of the previous 
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retrenchments are not unprecedented either. Broadly unpopular cutbacks triggering mass protest 
could also be found in France in 1995, Sweden in 1994, Austria in 2003, Germany and Italy in 
2004, and a number of other states since the end of the “golden age of welfare” (Esping-
Andersen 1994) in the 1970s and early 1980s. Despite public backlash and loss of political 
office,4 politicians enacting these unpopular policies often face the public with a seemingly 
brazen determination, stating, like Spain’s Prime Minister Zapatero, “We are going to have to do 
this, whatever it costs and whatever it costs me” (Edward 2011).  
 What factors explain these unpopular cutbacks? Is this retrenchment, as some 
institutionalists might argue, a logical response to some exogenous shock? (If yes, what kind of 
shock)? Does partisanship theory play a role, specifically that right-wing parties in power drive 
these retrenchments?  This study investigates these major explanations (controlling for other 
possible factors), and finds significant evidence for the exogenous shock explanation, in 
particular, the presence of fiscal-economic shock, in which countries in violation of 
internationally-recognized standards of sovereign fiscal health (i.e. European Stability and 
Growth Pact thresholds) and economic stability (recession, and unemployment thresholds) are at 
significant elevated risk for unpopular retrenchment. Through logit regression, this study 
examines determinants of the likelihood of unpopular cutbacks to government-mandated private-
sector workers pensions in 18 advanced industrialized countries of the OECD. The countries 
included represent all three “worlds of welfare”, thus including states with varied levels of 
benefit generosity and stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990), and a time frame encompassing 
over a quarter century during the post-golden age of the welfare state (1990 to 2015).  
Interestingly, while there is slight evidence for the partisanship explanation, it is not robust or in 
                                                     
4 One example of this is the 1994 removal of the Swedish Bildt government by an “electorate attached to welfare 
benefits” (Andersson 2016). 
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the expected direction.         
 Following the large-N analysis, the relationship between fiscal-economic shock and 
unpopular reform is then explored in two “on-the-line” cases.  The first case, that of France in 
the late 2000s, reveals that prior to the country’s recession and budgetary shock in 2009, there 
was not only a clear need for reform of private-sector workers pensions, but also pressure from 
the employer’s association for an increase in the retirement age. While the center-right Union 
pour un Movement Populaire (UMP) was willing to retrench other social programs (e.g. the 
special pension schemes) affecting only a minority of workers, it refused to cooperate with the 
employers association on any likely unpopular retrenchment, fearing large-scale public 
retribution at the polls. However, the shock of the global financial downturn, and the resulting 
threat of increased interest rates, impelled the French government to make a policy U-turn and 
urgently push for an increase in the minimum retirement age from 60 to 62 and the standard 
retirement age from 65 to 67 in order to signal structural stability to international investors. 
 The second case, a comparative analysis of the German left’s reaction (Social Democratic 
Party) during a major fiscal-economic shock in the early 2000s versus the German Christian 
Democratic Party’s response in a relatively short-lived and more minor downturn in the late 
2000s, again shows how the threat of investment and business exit due to a fiscal-economic 
downturn,  rather than whether the party is more right-leaning, is the major determinant of 
retrenchment. Whereas in the former case (in the early 2000s), the Social Democratic Party 
engaged in a series of unemployment and pension reforms (Agenda 2010),  in the latter case the 
more center-right-leaning Christian Democrats not only avoided retrenchment, but also sought to 
credit-claim through approving a minor eligibility expansion in pensions.  
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Scholarly Significance of the Problem 
It has become a well-known proposition in the welfare state literature that retrenchment is risky 
because, especially over the past 40 years, citizens of advanced industrialized countries have 
grown attached to pension, sickness, unemployment and other benefits (aspects of what is known 
generally as the “welfare state”) and have built powerful cross-class interest groups to support 
the protection of social programs (AARP as one well-known example) (Pierson 1996). The 
development of the welfare state appears to exemplify Pierson and Skocpol’s (2002) assertion 
that, “once established, patterns of political mobilization, the institutional “rules of the game”, 
and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate self-
reinforcing dynamics” (7).  
Furthermore, scholars highlight that retrenchment is risky (Pierson 1996) and therefore 
unlikely not only because publics of democracies desire the maintenance of the welfare state, but 
also because they have the ability to vote out politicians who reduce (or even threaten to reduce) 
coverage or generosity (Brooks and Manza 2007).  Unlike in authoritarian regimes, where 
leaders can force rapid policy change on the public without fear of electoral backlash, elected 
representatives in democratic states are, in theory, beholden to the public.  Even politicians who 
seek to sacrifice welfare state benefits for a “greater good” (e.g. to reduce national debt) are 
supposedly not immune from the threat of electoral punishment. This is in part because the 
public is likely to vote with a retrospective “negativity bias” (Vis 2010), punishing for negative 
results (like cutbacks), but not necessarily rewarding for positive outcomes (like reduced debt) 
(Campbell 1960, Key 1966, Meuller 1973, Bloom and Price 1975, Pacek and Radcliff 1995). 
Furthermore, any financial gains to most voters (as a result of benefit reduction) would often 
only occur in the long-run when the politician who implemented the initially unpopular decision 
could no longer profit (Rodrick 1996).   
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 Much of the welfare state literature therefore predicts that “candidates of competing 
parties will converge on policies that they believe are favored by the greatest number of 
constituents irrespective of their own ideological preferences” (Myles 2006, 489). That is, even 
the fiscally conservative “center-right” would likely avoid engaging in cutbacks (Jensen 2014).  
In a Downsian sense, politicians will shift their policy positions closer to the preferences of the 
median voter (Downs 1957) and simply defer retrenchment or use “blame avoidance” tactics, 
deflecting blame onto others, hiding cut-backs in vast bureaucratic procedure, framing small cuts 
in a ‘publically’ attractive ways, or placing the burden of the cut on a small and weak minority 
(Pierson 1994, 147). What they are not expected to do, however, is create sizeable and visible 
social cutbacks to highly popular programs, affecting a majority of the population. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
When do these instances of unpopular welfare state retrenchment occur nonetheless? To answer 
this major question, this dissertation answers two sub-questions about the dependent variable that 
are under-addressed in the literature. The first concerns the following: which welfare state 
retrenchments actually fit the definition of an unpopular cutback? The second question focuses 
on assessing the frequency of change in the dependent variable (i.e. how often do unpopular 
cutbacks occur?). Having first addressed the critical “dependent variable problem” (Clausen and 
Seigel 2004, 4), the study moves on to the third and final question of identifying and exploring 
the determinants of unpopular retrenchment, first through a large-N logit analysis, and then 
through two “on-the-line” case studies.   
Q1:  Which Retrenchments are Unpopular?   
The study seeks to understand the reasons behind the puzzling cases of unpopular retrenchment, 
i.e. those that are rejected by the majority of the voting public. “Not unpopular retrenchment” 
(cutbacks that are acceptable or tolerable to a majority of the voting public) are less theoretically 
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puzzling, as they are less risky, and therefore unsurprisingly likely to become a “go to” action for 
politicians seeking to reduce expenditures (Vis 2010) both in crisis and in the day-to-day 
operation of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 1994)5.  When investigating determinants of 
unpopular welfare state retrenchment, it appears at first glimpse the literature is replete with such 
research. However, as Giger (2012) has pointed out, much of this research (e.g. Gelissen 2000, 
Bonoli 2000, Pierson 1994, 1996, 2001, Lindbom 2001, Kitschelt 2001, Green-Pedersen and 
Haverland 2002, Brooks and Manza 2007, Vis 2010,) conflates retrenchment in general with the  
unpopular variety. However, these are two distinct phenomena, with the former including “not-
unpopular cutbacks” in its definition. Interestingly, when studies do differentiate types of 
retrenchment, it is more often along the lines of magnitude, rather than (un)popularity. Common 
concepts here include “minor” versus “major”, “radical”, or “significant” retrenchment.  
Steinebach, Knill, and Jordana (2017), for instance, comparatively examine reforms through new 
data from the European Commission “Consensus project”. Drawing on Hall (1993) they 
categorize “major” reforms as those altering the logic of the welfare state program (shifting the 
burden of risk from the state to the individual), and more “minor” reforms as those where risk is 
typically maintained by the state, but benefit generosity or coverage is altered.  However, again, 
major and unpopular retrenchment, though seemingly similar, are in fact very different concepts. 
As Blair (2014) has suggested and chapter two will demonstrate, some “minor” parametric 
retrenchment can nevertheless be unpopular. For instance, benefit rates decreases and retirement 
age increases that affect a majority contingent of the voting public, may be difficult for 
politicians to obscure, especially since these cutbacks are more obvious down-shifts within a 
familiar structure of earned and expected rights.    
                                                     
5 On the other hand, some argue (see Piven and Cloward 1971) that crisis brings about “counter-cyclical” 
compensatory effect to such beneficiaries in order to “regulate the poor”. 
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 Clearly then, general and/or major cutbacks cannot be proxies for unpopular 
retrenchment.  Which cutbacks, then, are actually unpopular? This study follows Kitschelt 
(2001) and Vis (2010) in its assertion that if we can assume voters are self-interested, then 
welfare state retrenchment affecting a constituency encompassing a majority of the voting 
population, will therefore be unpopular to the majority of voters. However, those cutbacks 
affecting less than a majority of the voting population, will not necessarily be unpopular to the 
majority of voters (Vis 2010). Indeed the hypothesis itself is not novel. Pierson (1994) for 
instance, notes cutbacks will more often be placed on small, less organized, groups of 
beneficiaries (Pierson 1994, 147) and scholars have sought to mainstream the concepts of 
unpopular (Kitschelt 2001) versus not unpopular reform (Vis 2010). However, there has been a 
less than rigorous testing of this hypothesis.  In one of the few studies that seek to measure 
unpopular (and not unpopular reform), Vis (2010) uses two operationalizations of “unpopular 
reform”; one more narrow measure that gauges change in unemployment replacement rates, and 
another broader measure, looking at “many aspects ranging from radical changes overhauling the 
welfare state to (minor) cutbacks in unemployment benefits” (77). Setting aside the issue of 
magnitude, this study questions whether unemployment benefit retrenchments can be considered 
unpopular, as the majority of the voting population tends to neither expect to benefit from this 
assistance—nor therefore be affected by cutbacks to it. Beneficiaries of mandatory pensions for 
private-sector workers, however, constitute a majority in most advanced industrialized countries, 
and therefore retrenchments that target this entire group, should likely be unpopular. In 
particular, the following hypotheses are tested through public opinion polls across three “worlds 
of welfare” (Esping-Andersen 1990):  
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H1:  Welfare state retrenchments affecting all beneficiaries of mandatory private-sector workers 
pensions will be unpopular. 
H2:  Welfare state retrenchment affecting all beneficiaries of unemployment benefits will not 
necessarily be unpopular.       
Once this foundation of the dependent variable has been established, it is then possible to shift to 
the second of the sub-questions, related to the dependent variable, that is, how much unpopular 
retrenchment has occurred since the 1990s? 
Q2: How Much Unpopular Retrenchment has Occurred?  
This is also an important sub-question in that the degree of variation on the dependent variable is 
the subject of some debate. Some scholars argue that the welfare state is expanding, others point 
out that is contracting, and others, like the aforementioned historical institutionalists, note that 
change at all is exceeding rare. How rare is this retrenchment? Recognizing recent contributions 
(e.g. the Comparative Welfare State Entitlements Database II, E.U. Consensus Data), but also the 
need for available data on unpopular social legislation (e.g. see Wenzelburger and Hörisch 
2015), this study amalgamates data on unpopular pension reforms from 1990 to 2015 in 18 
OECD countries and compares this data to available measures of welfare change to determine 
how much retrenchment has actually occurred in this 26 year stretch. In doing so, it shifts the 
focus of welfare state change from measures of that capture the moment of fiscal (social 
expenditure) or generosity implementation (replacement rates) toward a measure of the instances 
of retrenchment, which is most useful for determining the factors occurring at that time, and 
avoiding the incorporation of varied time lags. Equipped with a more solid understanding of 
unpopular welfare retrenchment and the frequency of its occurrence, the second half of the 
dissertation proceeds to the core question at hand.   
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Q3: When Does Unpopular Retrenchment Occur? 
The third and core question of the study is the conditions under which unpopular retrenchment 
occurs. Given that unpopular retrenchment has occurred across democracies, it is essential to 
engage the literature that discusses these explanations. While unpopular retrenchment per se has 
not been examined thoroughly, there is a vast body of literature debating the effects of both 
structural problem-pressures and “conflict” oriented partisanship explanations (Starke 2005) on 
retrenchment more generally.          
 On the first potential explanation (problem pressures), sluggish growth, hikes in 
unemployment, as well as a rise of globalization (Katzenstein 1985, Garret 1998) and/or aging 
populations have strained social and national budgets, pressuring politicians to retrench to 
maintain (or regain) economic competitiveness (Mosley 2000).   The longstanding debate has 
been further invigorated by more recent empirical, as well as additional theoretical, 
developments. Echoing earlier studies on the importance of crises in policymaking (e.g. 
Gourevitch 1984, Gourevitch 1986), a budding literature of case studies (Kuipers 2006, Starke 
2008, van Kersbergen, vis and Hemerjick 2014) and large “N” studies (Steinebach, Knill, and 
Jordana 2017, Steineback and Knill 2017) hints at the possibility that it is neither the incremental 
rise of unemployment, nor the increase in the aging population, but acute moments of fiscal-
economic downturn that trigger welfare reform6. That is, the effect of problem pressures is not 
continuous and linear, but rather, politicians will wait until a crisis point to take action.  
H3. Major Financial-economic downturn will increase the chances of unpopular cutbacks to 
private sector workers pensions. 
                                                     
6 Echoing divisions within the globalization literature, some highlight that politicians engage in compensatory, not 




In a second, more actor-centered lens, retrenchment is a result of the political stripe of the 
government in power (aka “partisanship” effects) (Allan and Scruggs 2004). That is, two 
countries might experience divergent social policy outcomes under different government types. 
Whereas more fiscally conservative parties would tend to support retrenchment, left parties, 
which contributed to the development of the welfare state (Korpi 2006), would tend to resist 
cutbacks. Some note there may even be a special effect of partisanship during financially 
strained moments. As Cusack (2001) puts it, “the critical difference is in the way these parties 
use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist 
parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal 
stances” (Cusack 2001). Schumacher, Vis and Van Kersbergen (2012) add that left parties that 
go against this trend and retrench the welfare state are punished electorally more so than the 
right.  Therefore, it might be reasonable to expect that the stronger the power of the right, the 
more retrenchment should occur (Hicks and Swank 1992), whereas the stronger the left, the less 
the retrenchment (e.g. see Hicks and Swank 1992, Garrett 1998, Rudra 2002, Allan and Scruggs 
2004). 
Granted, the prediction of how partisanship plays out has become slightly more complex 
(e.g. Starke 2005, Hausermann, Picot and Geering 2013), in what Hausermann, Picot and 
Geering 2013 call the “new school of partisan politics”.  As Starke (2005) notes in a state-of-the-
literature review, “the debate on the relevance of political parties… [is] still far from 
settled….what role do individual politicians, party competition, the structure of party 
organization, etc., play?” Arguing that “welfare state research can benefit greatly from adopting 
insights of electoral studies and party research” (240), Hausermann, Picot and Geering (2013) 
emphasize the need to investigate the role of new lines of conflict and new parties. Whereas, for 
11 
 
instance, the far-right might be traditionally grouped along with more pro-retrenchment right 
wing parties, this categorization may need to be reconsidered, given the “welfare chauvinist” 
nature of these parties (Schumacher and Van Kersbergen 2016). There is reason to question 
whether the passage of not unpopular retrenchment is more strongly linked to partisanship than is 
unpopular retrenchment. That is because while small beneficiary groups are often concentrated 
within a single party, those who stand to lose out from unpopular reductions (affecting a majority 
of the public) will be distributed among both or all political parties. Thus, in the latter case, both 
left and right may be more cautious in calling for retrenchment, lest they incur the disapproval of 
their constituents. While this may mean that party differences may have narrowed, given the 
propensity of the right toward a more fiscally conservative stance, this study hypothesizes the 
following:   
H4. A greater percentage of right party cabinet portfolios will increase the likelihood of 
unpopular cutbacks to private-sector workers pensions.  
Research Design 
This study seeks to answer the continued call for research “on two fronts…first [through] good 
descriptions and good measurements of the real extent of retrenchment – in cross-national, cross-
sectional and inter-temporal perspective and second [through] highlighting the motives for 
retrenchment and the causal mechanisms of retrenchment politics” (Starke 2006, 116). To do so, 
this dissertation will test these hypotheses through a mixed-methods research design. The first 
part of the dissertation is conceptual, definitional, and descriptive in nature, using public opinion 
polls as well as qualitative resources on welfare reform to construct the dependent variable and 
its measurement. The second part of the dissertation, focusing on the determinants of 
retrenchment proceeds according to a nested- analysis research approach. Lieberman (2005) 
develops nested-analysis as a way to unite the benefits of large-N statistics (LNA) and small N 
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intensive case study analysis (SNA). The strategy uses the LNA to assess whether 
generalizations can be made, and then uses these results to inform the selection of an SNA case, 
which then helps identify causal mechanisms (see chart adapted from Lieberman (2005) below). 
The strategy, which has been embraced by the discipline (e.g. Back and DuMont 2007, Fink 
2008, Leutgert and Dannwolf 2009; Lieberman 2009), begins with a preliminary LNA, in which 
the researcher employs either “multivariate regression analysis, fuzzy set/qualitative comparative 
analysis (FsQCA), bivariate/correlational analysis, or simply descriptive statistics to analyze 
scores on the dependent variable”  based on the data availability and the model itself (e.g. 
dichotomous or continuous, probabilistic or deterministic) (Lieberman 2005, 438). Then, if the 
LNA is robust, an “on-the-line case” (a case that fits the relationship) is chosen to flesh out the 
mechanisms (Lieberman 2005; Back and DuMont 2007). If the LNA results are not robust, an 
“off-the-line” SNA is also employed to determine why this is the case. Following this design, the 
dissertation will begin with quantitative (multivariable regression) analysis, which will test the 
afore-mentioned thesis linking fiscal-economic downturn, partisanship, and welfare state 
retrenchment. Per the nested-analysis approach, it will then move to two on-the-line case-studies 
to determine specific mechanisms.  
Chapter Outline 
The dissertation will test whether major financial-economic downturn and/or right-wing 
partisanship makes unpopular welfare state policies more likely. However, before examining 
when unpopular retrenchment happens, several key concepts must be clarified. First, it must be 
clearly established which reforms can be considered “unpopular”. To do so, the subsequent 
chapter (Chapter 2) draws on studies of public opinion polls to determine whether cutbacks to 
two different types of programs (i.e. unemployment and pensions) are unpopular. The following 
chapter (Chapters 3) is also foundational for the remainder of the dissertation. In particular, 
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asking when does retrenchment occur presupposes that it does, in fact, occur. The degree to 
which this is the case, however is a subject of much debate in the literature, associated with what 
is called the “dependent variable” problem. Therefore, Chapter 3 will introduce the reform data 
and compare it with corresponding social expenditures and replacement rates data. The 
subsequent chapter, Chapter 4, will then theorize on and test the relationship between major 
financial-economic downturn, partisanship and unpopular retrenchment using the data presented 
in Chapter 3. Having conceptualized, defined and identified the determinants of unpopular 
reform, the second part of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 5 then examines the “on-
the-line” case of France in the late 2000s recession to look at mechanisms of the financial- 
economic downturn and retrenchment relationship. It demonstrates that while politicians of the 
center-right Union Pour un Movement Populaire (UMP) were aware of the need to adjust private 
sector pensions (i.e. the retirement age), they resisted calls from the employers’ associations to 
do so right up until 2008, when they rapidly shifted toward retrenchment.  Chapter 6 then 
investigates another on-the-line case, of Germany, however, this time showing the rather weak 
effect of partisanship and the strength of major financial-economic downturn for pension 
retrenchment. It underlines how the Social Democratic party (SDP) retrenched in the early 2000s 
under conditions of a major fiscal-economic downturn, but a less serious one in the late 2000s 
did not elicit a similar reaction (or any unpopular retrenchment) from the more center-right CDU 
party. Chapter 7 then will then wrap up the analysis with conclusions and propose areas for 
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Chapter 2: Defining Unpopular Retrenchment: Which Cutbacks are Unpopular? 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in the opening chapter, this dissertation seeks to understand the reasons for 
unpopular welfare state cutbacks in advanced industrialized countries. Before doing so, however, 
it is essential to identify which reform measures are unpopular. While this endeavor would 
normally necessitate only a brief section in a methodology chapter, it is presented here 
separately. This is because though the mainstream welfare state literature tends to generalize 
retrenchment as unpopular, public opinion scholars point out that the way a question is framed or 
the conditions under which it is asked can make a difference in the respondent’s answer. 
Drawing on this scholarship, this chapter seeks to determine which benefit cutbacks are 
unpopular, regardless of framing or structural conditions, and which may be acceptable or 
tolerable to the average voter.  
To answer this question, this chapter begins by defining the concept of the welfare state 
and then explains how the welfare state literature defines an unpopular welfare cutback. To 
determine whether the mainstream’s generalization needs re-specification, this chapter examines 
public opinion polls on social reforms in one universal program (pensions) and one more 
targeted program (unemployment) across three cases approximating the different “worlds of 
welfare”: the United States, France, and Sweden. Building on recent scholarly observations that 
the oft-cited ISSP opinion polls capture only public approval of programs and spending—and not 
disapproval of reductions- this study shows through international and national public opinion 
polls that in the case of unemployment benefits, respondents sometimes do accept retrenchment. 
In contrast, respondents are unwilling to scale back private-sector pensions programs. The main 
assertion is that public (dis)approval is not a universal given nor contingent upon the program’s 
popularity or even its coverage. Rather public (dis)approval depends on the coverage of the 
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cutback. Cutbacks affecting a majority (e.g. all private sector workers’ pensions) are expected to 
hold up as unpopular across countries and despite varied framings. In contrast, cutbacks affecting 
a targeted group—even within a “universal” program--will not necessarily be unpopular. That is, 
under certain phrasings, cutbacks to unemployment benefits as well as public sector pensions 
will be acceptable to the public7. After an introductory section on the state of welfare public 
opinion literature, this chapter puts public support to a trade-off test: to see how well public 
disapproval against various reforms holds up when other issues (e.g. the deficit, military budget, 
etc.) are at stake.    
Casting Too Wide a Net?: Unpopular Retrenchment in Mainstream Scholarship                
To some, the concept of the “welfare state” conjures up the image of food stamps and other 
poverty-reduction programs. However, social welfare scholars understand the term in a broader 
sense. Briggs’ 2006 (16) for instance, provides an encompassing definition, seeing the welfare 
state as “organized power …deliberately used through politics and administration in an effort to 
mollify the play of market forces” (Briggs 2006, 16)8. Accordingly, numerous social programs 
fall under this broad welfare state umbrella, including pensions, unemployment, sickness, means-
test (poverty-reduction), maternity, paternity, disability, and many other benefits.  It essence, 
advanced industrialized countries have, albeit to varying degrees, “welfare states”. Cutbacks to 
the welfare state, defined here in terms of eligibility restrictions or generosity reductions are 
known as retrenchment9. The former can include restricting benefits based on income, age, or 
resident status. The latter can include direct benefit reductions, or extension of the pension base 
years, increase in taxes on benefits, or decreases in indexation or valorization.  
                                                     
7 While unemployment programs are generally universal, it is arguably a minority of the population that expects to 
benefit from them.   
8Note this usage is broader than the common U.S. conceptualization of the term welfare, which is often used to refer 
to only poverty-reduction programs like Medicaid, SSI, TANF, and SNAP. 
9 This therefore excludes increased contribution rates from the definition of retrenchment.  
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Much of the broader literature starts from the premise that retrenchment to the welfare 
state is generally unpopular (e.g. , Pierson 1994, 1996, Gelissen 2000, Bonoli 2000, Pierson 
1994, 1996, 2001, Lindbom 2001, Kitschelt 2001, Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002, Brooks 
and Manza 2007).  Pierson (1996) notes, for instance, that “…welfare state retrenchment 
generally requires elected officials to pursue unpopular policies …” (143).  Bonoli (2000) echoes 
this idea, arguing that “the general unpopularity of cuts in social programmes makes it difficult 
for governments to generate support for such measures” (37). Kitschelt (2001) too, assumes that 
“policies to pair back and redistribute social program benefits tend to be inherently unpopular” 
(265). Additionally, Vis, Van Kerbergen, and Hylands (2010) assert that “it is plausible to 
assume that cutbacks in benefit levels are usually unpopular as voters often react negatively to 
them” (80). In fact, the unpopularity of welfare state cutbacks is so prevalent that Giger (2012) 
has observed “it is a standard assumption in the welfare state literature that retrenchment 
initiatives are dangerous for governments” (691).  
These studies (e.g. Kitschelt 2001, Brooks and Manza 2006) often draw the conclusion 
that welfare cuts are inherently unpopular, from the many public opinion polls (e.g. ISSP) 
showing overwhelming support for the existence of social programs (Giger 2012).  Indeed, ISSP 
(2006) data show that in essentially every country in the survey (around 35 countries), a majority 
of respondents stated that it should be the government’s responsibility to reduce income 
differences between rich and poor. In fact, only in the United States, New Zealand, and the 
Czech Republic, Denmark and Australia, did the percentage of respondents who disagreed with 
this statement slightly exceed 40 percent. 
The European Social Survey (ESS) also reflects the strong support for the welfare state in 
the European Countries, with between 89 and 95 percent concurring that the welfare of the 
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unemployed is a government responsibility (ESS 2008).  Though some programs tend to have 
lower approval than others, across programs, countries, and time there is a clear majority in 
support of social programming. In the U.K., for instance, 100 percent of the population believes 
that the government has at least some responsibility to provide good care in this healthcare (some 
responsibility 5 percent, important responsibility 21 percent, essential responsibility 74 percent) 
(In Gilens 1999, 26). Even in the more welfare “conservative” United States, only one percent of 
the US public believes that the government has no responsibility for “looking after old people” 
(18 percent say some responsibility, 40 percent say important responsibility, and 41 percent say 
essential responsibility) (see Gilens 1999, 26). 
While there are many polls revealing public approval of the welfare state, this does not 
necessarily imply a clear cut conclusion about the public’s rejection of retrenchment. Public 
opinion research asserts there is nuance and even “ambivalence” with regard to the public’s 
welfare policy (dis)approval (Svallfors 2010). These scholars point out that the specific question 
asked of the public matters determines the unpopularity of retrenchment. Giger (2012) for 
instance, points out that ISSP data only show that program eradication is not supported by any 
public across Europe and North America, not that partial cuts are also unpopular10.  A 
Eurobarometer (2007) study, for instance, found that 53 percent of the EU-15 population finds 
the social welfare system of their country too expensive.     
 Yet, here still there is further nuance. The public may be willing to endorse reductions in 
general, but when it comes to naming specific programs to retrench, they may be more particular. 
Taylor-Gooby (2001) notes from ISSP data how individuals are willing to cutback social 
expenditures, and yet these same respondents often reject social services cutbacks (142). He 
                                                     
10 Giger (2012) investigates the relationship between “social policy cutbacks and how this influences people’s views 
of government” on the whole (691). 
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concludes not only that “responses to questions about attitudes to tax and spending depend on the 
context in which they are asked” (142), but also that “when attention turns from statements of 
approval of state responsibilities and policies to the finance of welfare provision, difficulties 
emerge. It is simply not clear which social groups are willing to pay for the services they 
endorse” (145).           
 Furthermore, conditions might matter in retrenchment acceptance or rejection. As 
Busemeyera and Garritzmanna (2017) point out, when questions about increasing educational 
spending in Europe are framed in terms of a policy or budgetary trade-off (as opposed to a 
simple question on approval of spending), “public support [for social investments] drops 
considerably”(871). Looking at two instances of unemployment benefit restrictions in Sweden 
and Germany, Davidsson and Marx (2012) also point out that these two “least-likely cases” of 
retrenchment occurred in Germany (Hartz Reforms as part of the Agenda 2010) and Sweden (in 
2006) because “in times of economic crisis, positive welfare state attitudes are conflicted with 
preferences for improvement of labour market performance”. They conclude from this that 
“parties’ and voters’ positions on social policy are far more volatile than is usually 
acknowledged by the welfare state literature” (519).  
The question of framing also appears potentially pertinent in the public’s perception of 
certain beneficiaries. As some scholars (e.g. Van Oorschot 2006, Schumacher, Vis, Van 
Kersbergen 2013) argue, Western publics make a distinction in the perceived “deservingness” of 
various beneficiaries, based on who they feel least “in control over [their] neediness” (Van 
Oorschot 2000).  Looking at European Values Studies survey research from 1999/200011 for 
instance, Van Oorschot (2006) finds that, regardless of welfare regime type, “Europeans share a 
                                                     
11 The question asked to what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: elderly people in your 
country; unemployed people in your country; immigrants in your country; sick and disabled people in your country? 
1 = not at all, 2 = not so much, 3 = to a certain extent, 4 = much, 5 = very much) 
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common and fundamental deservingness culture: across countries and social categories there is a 
consistent pattern that elderly people are seen as most deserving, closely followed by sick and 
disabled people; unemployed people are seen as less deserving still, and immigrants as least 
deserving of all (23)”12. Questions that are framed in terms of benefits for the “poor” or for 
“poverty alleviation” tend to skew results toward public sympathy and generosity, as these terms 
imply beneficiaries are more deserving and are experiencing circumstances outside of their 
control (see Gilens 1999). Yet, the public is often more skeptical of spending when the question 
is framed in less neutral or positive ways (e.g. see Slothuus 2007). For instance, the United States 
fits quite well with the OECD average expressed below, with about 10 to 15 percent of the public 
believing that the government is spending too much on the poor (between 1985 and 2013). 
Nevertheless, when the question is reframed in terms of spending on “welfare,” the percent who 
believe spending is too high fluctuates closely around 50 percent for the same period (and even 
reaching 60 percent in the early 1990s). As Gilens (1999) explains, this difference can be 
explained because the term “welfare” conjures up an image of perceived “un-deservingness,” 
whereas words like “poor” and “poverty” are more positive or at least neutral terms. Unlike the 
mainstream welfare state scholarship, the public opinion literature implies that the specific 
question asked can influence the outcome.  
Thinking of an “unpopular benefit cutback” as one rejected by at least half of the 
population then, is it still possible to identify certain “unpopular cutbacks” or does framing affect 
the outcomes so much that there can be no concretely “unpopular” benefit retrenchment? While 
the literature has provided some hints about the relative differences in program approval 
                                                     
12 As Palier (2006) notes, this difference may also come down to the source of funding. Unlike [means-test] social 
programs funded by state taxation, social contributions are perceived as a ‘deferred wage’ which will return to the 




(pensions and sickness programs are more popular than unemployment and means-test ones), 
what can we say about the absolute unpopularity of cutbacks to these programs? Are there any 
specific program cutbacks that garner at least majority disapproval regardless of framing?   
Hypotheses 
There is currently a vague picture of public preferences; it is still unclear on which specific 
cutbacks are demonstrably unpopular. This study, therefore seeks to investigate them in a 
systematic manner. In particular, building on the assumption that individuals will vote in their 
own self-interest, the chapter hypothesizes that cuts affecting a public majority will be 
unpopular, meaning that at least 50 percent of respondents will consistently disapprove of the 
retrenchment despite alternative question framing.  
The hypothesis presented below start from the premise that the mainstream literature’s 
explanation for why all welfare cutbacks are unpopular is too broad. The scholarship tends to 
note that social retrenchments are generally unpopular “because they tend to concentrate losses 
on specific large groups” (Galasso 2006, 53 on Pierson 1996). Indeed, retrenchment can be 
directed at a large majority, such as all those covered by Social Security or sickness benefits. 
Given that in most countries of the OECD the percent covered by these benefits is close to or 
equals 100, any cutback directed at such beneficiaries would need to contend with the 
disapproval of most citizens. However, retrenchment can also be targeted at public minorities, 
not just majorities. Retrenchment that reduces benefits for the low-income earners, the top 15 
percent income earners, immigrants and so on, are all minority-targeted cutbacks. For smaller 
programs that constitute only a “weaker constituency of self-interest” (Taylor-Gooby 2001, 139), 
the benefits of everyone in an entire program might constitute only a public minority cutback. 
For instance, in 2016 SNAP (“food stamp”) beneficiaries made up only about 13 percent of the 
United States population (USDA 2017) and so any reductions to this program would only affect 
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a minority.  While pensions programs are indeed universal programs, it is important to note that 
what matters in retrenchment (dis)approval is not the coverage of the program, but the coverage 
of the cutback (see chart below).  
 Program Benefits the 
Majority 
(e.g. Sickness or 
Pensions) 
Program Benefits a Minority  
(e.g. Means-Test or 
Unemployment) 
Cutback Targeted at Majority Unpopular   
Cutback Targeted at Minority Not Unpopular Not Unpopular 
Figure 1: Expectations of Unpopular Versus Not Unpopular Reform 
(Based on Vis 2010, Kitschelt 2001) 
In other words, even retrenchment of a broad universal program can be perceived as acceptable, 
if directed at a public minority (e.g. government workers, who constituted only 21.3 percent of 
the total workforce of the OECD in 2013 (OECD 2015).  Thus, this chapter revises the 
mainstream hypothesis, arguing that retrenchments are unpopular not because, but when they 
concentrate losses on majority groups.  
This chapter also draws on, and seeks to provide updated specification for, the literature 
on framing and situational effects in welfare state public opinion. In particular, it posits that 
question frames (on deservingness of beneficiaries) or conditions (e.g. varying worlds of welfare 
state, or economic trade-offs) have an effect on the relative acceptability of a cutback. However, 
this effect will have divergent effects depending on the size of the population affected by the 
cutback. For majority-targeted cutbacks, the effect is expected to be limited. That is, such frames 
and situations will not bring the rate of unpopularity of retrenchment below 50 percent (majority 
of the population). On the other hand, for minority-targeted cutbacks, framing and situation can 
drive the public to accept cutbacks. Alternative framing of the question will occasionally render 
the public amenable to retrenchment. Cutbacks affecting a public majority will be unpopular 
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whereas cutbacks affecting a public minority will not be unpopular. In hypothesis form, we test 
two benefits:  
H1:  Welfare state retrenchments affecting all beneficiaries of mandatory private-sector workers 
pensions will be unpopular. 
H2:  Welfare state retrenchment affecting all beneficiaries of unemployment benefits will not 
necessarily be unpopular.       
Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, the next section looks to determine which measures are unpopular, 
specifically that the majority of respondents reject the cutbacks regardless of the welfare state 
type or framing of the question (Kitschelt 2001 and Vis 2010). Not unpopular (Vis 2010) means 
that at least 50 percent of poll respondents accept the cutback. To get a sense of the public’s 
opinion, all polls considered are representative national samples from major national (e.g. Pew 
Center, IPSOS) or international polling agencies (European Social Survey, European Values 
Survey).             
 To test the conclusion across a wide range of welfare states, the chapter looks at countries 
that represent different welfare state “ideal types” of the three worlds of welfare capitalism 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). This is necessary as there is some evidence that the public of higher 
generosity social democratic states (e.g. Sweden) might be more resistant to retrenchment, 
corporatist states less so (e.g. France), and liberal welfare states even less (e.g. United States) 
(Svallfors 2010). To ensure that the conclusions hold across all welfare state types, this chapter 
looks at country cases representing a close approximation of the hypothetical welfare state “ideal 
types”: United States, France, and Sweden13.  Across the three program types, two kinds of 
                                                     
13 13 To briefly summarize, Esping-Andersen’s path-breaking “three worlds of welfare” capitalism identifies three 
“clusters” of welfare state that arise when plotting countries’ decommodification and stratification scores. 
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programs are investigated; one with broad universal coverage (pensions) and one that is targeted 
to a minority of citizens (unemployment programs).  
 Furthermore, while the ISSP provides data in specified years in its Role of Government 
series: 1985, 1990, 1996, 2006, and 2016, in order to put pension and unemployment cutback 
disapproval “to the test” it is important to also capture retrenchment disapproval in years where 
the public was asked to make trade-off decisions: e.g. should the country decrease the benefit in 
order to reduce the budget deficit?  Because these questions are usually only asked immediately 
following large-scale crises (i.e. recessions or budgetary deficits) these years must be included or 
assessed where possible (also due to longitudinal data constraints).  
The Case of the United States 
The United States is the first case to be investigated. Looking at pensions polls, there is a clear 
rejection of general reductions in Social Security. ISSP data, which is sourced in the United 
States through the General Social Survey, for instance, shows that the percentage of respondents 
agreeing that Social Security expenditures should be reduced is between 6 and 10 percent.  The 
percent of U.S. respondents that think Social Security spending is either about right or not 
enough, barely shifted, with 91 percent in 1989, 87 percent in 1996, 90 percent in 2000, and 91 
percent 2006.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Decommodification occurs, as Esping Andersen puts it “when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a 
person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (163). 
13 Stratification implies how the country orders social relations in the country. On the high end of stratification are 
the countries in which the welfare state “stigmatizes” recipients via a poor relief-derived, mean-tested social system. 
Other countries have a more corporatist tradition, in which individuals’ benefits are tied to their occupations (with 
state workers often having the better benefits, as a historic means of achieving loyalty to the state).  Finally, in the 
socialist tradition are countries which adopted a less stratified, more universalist benefit scheme, with flat-rate 
benefits, financed through general income tax. A less stratified system was a means for socialist government to 




Figure 2: Source General Social Survey 
Reductions to Social Security: Passing the Trade-Off Test 
Next it is necessary to test the robustness of these results under a more difficult scenario.  
Although an ideal experiment would allow for deficit test against each of the preceding data 
points, the United States was not in a deficit (or polling agencies did not ask the question) during 
many of the preceding years. However, the question was asked during especially trying times or 
when difficult budget decisions were on the table: the mid-1980s, the mid-1990s, and the late 
2000s. The chart below (from citation) shows again that despite the trade off, and the fact that a 
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Figure 3: Cutbacks in Order to Reduce Deficit, Sources: (Various, Roper Center iPoll) 
This budget—social security trade off question was asked in a variety of ways, but all showed 
reluctance to reduce expenditures. For instance, a CBS News Poll, in March 2013 gave 
respondents only two choices: to “favor” or “oppose” a proposal to decrease spending on Social 
Security reducing the budget deficit.  In this case, 18 percent favored a decrease in spending. 
However, a different survey around the same time, (generating the poll phrasing with the highest 
level of pro-retrenchment cutback response) gave respondents multiple options (i.e. major 
reductions, minor reductions, or no reductions to spending on...Social Security). In this poll, the 
sum of those supporting major or minor reductions was 40 percent in 2012 
(Kaiser/Harvard/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation). While showing higher support for 
retrenchment, these outcomes still did not reach the threshold of 50 percent and is therefore 
robust. In another poll respondents were asked to choose which major area of spending they 
would target for cutbacks to reduce the budgetary deficit (Ipsos-Public Affairs/Reuters Poll, Dec, 
2011). Only eight percent of respondents chose Social Security as their primary target. This low 
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confirming that the public is unwilling to decrease Social Security expenditure for the sake of 
another program (e.g. military etc).  
When the question is rephrased in terms of reducing benefits (as opposed to reducing 
spending), the percentage approving this decrease drops even further to around 25 percent 
approval (CBS/New York Times Poll 2011). Even among generally more fiscally conservative 
Republican voters and supporters of recently elected President Trump, the share of those who 
oppose future cuts to social security benefits is 68 and 72 percent, respectively, (Pew Research 
Center for the People & the Press Poll, 2016)   
Unemployment Benefits: Failing the Trade-Off Test 
The Unemployment benefits program in the US is targeted at a minority of beneficiaries, and 
therefore all cutbacks to such a program would affect a small constituency, ipso facto. It is 
therefore unsurprising that cutbacks for benefits do not stand up to various issue framings. 
Clearly, there is support for unemployment benefits. Only 21 percent of respondents approved of 
less or much less spending for unemployment benefits (General Social Survey 1990). Looking at 
the General Social Survey over time we see it is not highly popular to reduce benefits on 
unemployment, though more popular than cutbacks to Social Security.  
However, when rephrased in terms of reducing the budgetary deficit, this benefit does not 
have the robustness of support as does the general pensions system. Respondents were willing to 
cut back the spending. The chart below amalgamates General Social Survey data on percent 
approving of cutbacks, as well as polls available on Roper Center’s iPoll database that asked 
about reductions in unemployment benefits given the need to reduce the budgetary deficit. We 
can see that when the question is framed in terms of ameliorating budgetary issues, the public 
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becomes more willing to reduce unemployment spending. They are also willing to restrict 
eligibility under such circumstances.  
 
Figure 4: Sources: Various, RoperCenter iPoll   (See Appendix) 
Perhaps one of the most stringent changes affecting many unemployed individuals was the 1996 
with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Responsibility Act 
(PRWORA). While a change in the means-test system rather than unemployment benefits 
system, the public’s response is nonetheless telling as an example of the public’s willingness to 
cut back on targeted programs. The public was asked in 1997 about their agreement with the Act, 
specifically whether they agreed with the requirement of welfare recipients to work within two 
years of apply for benefits, “eliminate[ing] eligibility for most federal benefits for most legal 
immigrants until they become citizens, [and].. requir[ing] able-bodied adults who do not have 
dependent children to work 20 hours per week in order to be eligible for food stamps, and.. 
impos[ing] a five-year lifetime cap on welfare benefits whether or not a person can find a job 
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favored this cutback, showing yet more evidence that the public is occasionally in favor of 
retrenchment for such benefits.    
The Case of France 
France represents the corporatist welfare state type of the three worlds of welfare, with a medium 
level of decommodification. There is clear disapproval of pension cutbacks affecting a public 
majority, for instance retrenchment in publicly-administered pensions for private-sector workers. 
The ISSP data show that in 1996 and 2006, nearly half of the population wanted either more or 
much more spending on pensions. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that attempts to retrench have 
been unpopular.  In general, only 25 percent approved of an increase in the retirement age (see 
bar graph below). Furthermore, French public opinion polls show that the majority did not 
approve of the increase in the contribution period to 40 years in the Balladur plan (Le Monde 
1995).  
Unlike sweeping changes affecting large constituencies, when a public minority is 
targeted, the public is not necessarily against the cutback, even if it is a universal program like 
pensions. For instance, the French public is also more restrictive in that it believes that even 
those upper income contributors should benefit less/not at all, with 69 percent of the public in 
favor of tapered benefits for the rich. The 2014 post-recession survey found a clear division 
between those solutions that the French respondents found to be unacceptable (majority 




Figure 5: Source: Odoxa 2014 
Unemployment:  
Examining the opinions towards unemployment insurance, a declining, yet slight majority favor 
either the status quo or an increase in spending on unemployment benefits. ISSP polls for 
instance show that between 33.1 percent (in 1996) and 42.03 percent (in 2016) of respondents 
were willing to see a decrease in unemployment benefits expenditure.  
 
Figure 6:  Preference in Government Spending on Unemployment, Source: ISSP (2018) 
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However, when put to the test, retrenchment to unemployment benefits can become acceptable to 
the public. This is perhaps unsurprising considering the public’s perception of beneficiary 
“deservingness” is variable. For instance, according to an Ifop/Les Enquêtes poll in 2017, 58 
percent of the public believed that “the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to”.  
As a result, most of the public wanted increased benefit restrictions in concerning work search. 
Indeed, requirements on the unemployed had been in force for a while. According to the Pôle 
Emploi (2018), the agency administrating unemployment benefits, benefits could be reduced if 
the unemployed refused two offers of employment (among other refusals). This law, in place 
since 200814, was not unpopular. For instance, a follow up poll found that when asked if the 
unemployed should lose the benefit after refusing two offers of work, 62 percent of the public 
agreed (For instance, a Harris Poll revealed that 72 percent are in favor of increasing controls to 
verify that people who are receiving benefits are actively seeking work (Le Parisien 2012)). In 
addition, 56 percent of the French believe that the unemployed should have benefits revoked if 
they refuse two job offers, and 61 percent believe that unemployment benefits should become 
digressive (Ifop 2017). An even greater majority (84 percent) thought that there needed to be 
even greater reinforcement of control on the unemployed (ibid). A further 2017 poll found that 
the public vastly agreed with the retrenchment initiatives proposed recently by Emmanuel 
Macron. Mirroring the previous poll, 72 percent (Odoxa, Challenges, Aviva et 
BFMBusiness 2017) stated that the unemployment benefit should be suspended if the 
unemployed’s search for a job are judged to be insufficient and 63 percent agreed that the benefit 
should be suspended if the unemployed refuses two reasonable job offers. The public was also 
willing to tighten age restrictions; 53 percent of respondents agreed that the age at which 
                                                     
14 Décret n°2008-1056 du 13 octobre 2008 
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individuals can qualify for three years of unemployment insurance should be delayed from 55 to 
59 years of age.  Finally, not only is the French public willing to restrict benefit eligibility on the 
basis of job search requirements and age, but according to a Tilder-LCI poll, 53 percent of 
respondents also favored a reduction in the duration of unemployment benefits (LCI 2017). 
The Case of Sweden 
As a welfare state with a legacy of high benefit generosity, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is 
high rejection of pension benefits cutbacks. As Taylor-Gooby (2001) points out from 1996 ISSP 
data, 58 percent of the Swedish population was in favor of spending cuts to improve the 
economy, 59 of those were willing to see “social services” cutback as a result. However, even 
among those who prefer reductions in tax and contributions to more social spending in general, 
51 argue that they want increased spending on pensions benefits. Despite being exposed to 
various question framings over time, Swedish respondents rejected across-the-board benefit 
reductions. In Sweden, for instance, polls taken of the general public between 1992 and 2010 
never showed less than 60 percent of the public in support of increasing taxes if necessary to 
maintain benefits for elderly programs (Swedish Welfare State Surveys 1992, 1997, 2002 and 
2010). This shows that while much of the public may be willing to endorse reductions in taxes in 
general, in the context of pension reductions, it is not willing to reduce taxes, but increase them. 
Moving beyond spending, there is clear rejection of sweeping eligibility and benefits 
changes. As far as retiring as early as possible, even at the cost of the economy, only 32.7 
percent of the public disagreed (ISSP 2005) and 75.7 percent of the population said that they 
believe that those who retire early are “quite rarely” or “basically never” looked down upon, and 
89.1 percent of the population said the same about receipt of a public pension, implying that vast 
public support for these benefits. In a Eurobarometer (2001) study we see that only 12 percent 
approve of raising the retirement age.  Again there may be differences in terms of cutbacks on 
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benefits for smaller groups. Certainly, this does not imply elimination of benefits for any one 
group, as for instance demonstrated in a Eurobarometer poll asking whether “wealthy people 
should not receive state pension” (2001). 
 
Figure 7: Willingness to Pay more Taxes, Source: The Swedish Welfare State Surveys  
Unemployment:  
There is overall concern for the unemployed as well. On a scale from one to five, one being very 
high concern and five being no concern at all for the unemployed, countries in the European 
Values survey averaged around 2.5, indicating concern for the unemployed (EVS in Kersbergen 
and Vis 2014).  However, when the question is rephrased along more specific lines, we see that 
there are conditions in which the public is willing to see some cutbacks. As Davidsson and Marx 
(2013) note, as concern for labour market performance rose, the public had conflicting opinions. 
On the one hand, they supported the welfare state, but at the same time their “falling competence 
ratings for the SAP [Social Democratic Party]” (515) became indicative of their willingness to 
allow for the subsequent radical retrenchment of the unemployment system. The Conservative 


















At the same time, there is a skepticism about the usage of benefits with 64 percent 
agreeing that social reforms have gone too far and that people should manage more without 
benefits (64 percent agreed in 1994 and 55 percent in 1998) (Swedish Election Survey 1998-
2002). When asked if the unemployed should be restricted from some benefits if they refuse to 
take offered jobs”, 77 percent of Swedes agreed with this tightening of conditions (Andersson 
and Kangas, 2005, 22). These examples show that while the public may show surface support for 
maintaining spending or benefit levels for unemployment, its approval is more volatile and 
fragile when it comes to particular frames or situations.    
Generalizability and Conclusions 
The previous sections examined cutbacks in three “worlds of welfare”. Still, how generalizable 
are these outcomes? Additional OECD-wide data supports the broad conclusion that it is 
cutbacks affecting a majority that are unpopular. In a 1998 poll 83.9 percent of the EU-15 public 
wanted the same or more spending on broad programs healthcare. Only 5.2 percent wanted less 
spending in this area (Eurobarometer 1998). Furthermore, when asking the public within the 
context of a major financial downturn, and increasing the timeframe of reform out by nearly a 
generation (20 years in the future), a full two-thirds of respondents in the European Union still 
reject the idea that raising the retirement age is needed15 (Eurobarometer 2012).  
Likewise, in Finland, though politicians sought to increase the retirement age, the proposal is 
very unpopular among citizens, with 69 percent expressing disagreement.16  While data on the 
public’s view on early retirement cutbacks is limited, one would expect a similar rejection of 
cutbacks. For instance, as the UN report (UN 2008) concludes “almost everywhere in Europe, 
                                                     
15 Granted, there may be a time horizon (e.g. reforms at 40 or 50 years in the future) at which we start to see 
majority approval in for cut backs, as it no longer affects most of the population. However, at “20 years in the 
future” there were only a handful of countries in the sample where we see a very thin majority in approval of this 




“exceptional” early retirement has become the rule, while “normal” legal retirement age has 
become the exception, frequently a rather rare one (51). In Austria, for instance, 91 percent of the 
population retires before the official retirement age of 65.  OECD (2006) provides further 
evidence noting that, “in most countries, the effective age of retirement is well below the normal 
for receiving a full old-age pension” (31). For instance, the effective retirement age in the US is 
slightly under the normal retirement age, and in some countries e.g. Finland, the effective 
retirement age (61.9) is several years prior to the normal retirement age (65), as it is in Germany 
(62.7 effective retirement age versus 65 for normal retirement)17. House (2006) examination of 
2003 Eurobarometer survey found the preferred retirement age to be rather low at 58.1 years and 
expected retirement at 62.2 years, both lower than standard legislated retirement ages. In general 
therefore, it is likely that the public also views cuts to the early retirement age with skepticism at 
least and rejection at most. For instance, we see that after 2003 when the Dutch Belkenende 
center right “curtail[ed] the remaining avenues of early retirement” (Hemerijck and Marx 20), 
trade unions organized the “second largest post-war demonstration in the Netherlands” with 
nearly a quarter of a million participants in Amsterdam alone (Reday-Mulvey 2005, 134).  
This chapter sought to examine public opinion polls and literature to determine the 
degree to which the public supports retrenchment in a range of benefit areas. In contrast to the 
general welfare state scholarship, which views most or all retrenchment as unpopular, the chapter 
finds that certain reform measures are acceptable to the public under certain framings and 
contexts. In particular, cuts to poverty-reduction, unemployment, and other measures that target a 
public minority (e.g. public-sector pensions, or high-income pensioners) are not necessarily 
against the median voter. However, reforms to large and private-sector healthcare and pensions 
                                                     
17 Only in a few countries (e.g. Japan, Turkey and Korea) are the effective retirement ages higher than the normal 
retirement age.  
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programs tend to be much more unpopular. Furthermore, this rejection of reform to these areas 
holds even in times of economic, budgetary, and military crisis.  Thus, this chapter concludes 
that the general literature’s assumptions about the unpopular welfare state retrenchment are too 
broad. As for framing literature, framing seems to matter for broad retrenchment unpopularity, 
yet only in certain programs that target public minorities. This is not to say, of course that all 
unemployment or means-tested benefits are acceptable. Indeed, in some cases (e.g. the Hartz 
reforms in Germany), cutbacks were against the majority. However, this chapter shows rather, 
that the public is more accepting of cutbacks to unemployment benefits than to retrenchment to 
private sector workers pensions. Given these conclusions, the dissertation will now focus on only 
those cutbacks which are unpopular (i.e. retrenchment in pensions for private-sector workers) to 
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International Polls   
 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP):  
 
February 1985 – June 1986. Department of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University, Canberra; ZUMA, Mannheim; Eurisko, Ricerca Sociale e di 
Marketing, Milan; Social and Community Planning Research, London; National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, Ill.; Ifes, Institut fuer empirische 
Sozialforschung, Wien; Dr. Fessel + GfK, Institut fuer Marktforschung, 7,350 individuals, 
National survey, In Germany, West (FRG), Great Britain, USA: persons 18 years old and older; 
In Italy: persons between 18 and 74 years old; In Austria: persons 16 years old and older; In 
Australia: not specified. Wien  Austria (AT); Australia (AU); Germany (DE), West (FRG); Great 
Britain (GB-GBN); Italy (IT); United States (US); Mail, written and oral interview with 
standardized questionnaire  Role of Government. Question 1: What is your opinion of the 
following statement: It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in 
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income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. PLEASE TICK 
ONE BOX. Answers: Agree strongly (1) Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree 
(4); Disagree strongly (5). Questions 2, 3: Listed below are various areas of government 
spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government 
spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more” it might require a tax 
increase to pay for it. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH…. Old age pensions, 
unemployment benefits…. Spend Much More (1); Spend More (2); Spend the Same as Now 
(3); Spend Less (4); Spend Much Less (5); Can’t Choose (8).  
 
February 1990 – December 1991. NSSS, Research School of Social Sciences, Institute of 
Advanced Studies, Australian National University, in conjunction with Datacol; INFAS; 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago; TARKI, Budapest; 
EURISCO, Mailand; Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway;  14987 individuals, 
Lower age cut-off between 14 and 18 years, Australia (AU); Germany (DE); Great Britain (GB-
GBN); Northern Ireland (GB-NIR); Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Israel (IL); Italy (IT); Norway 
(NO); United States (US)   ISSP. Question 1: What is your opinion of the following 
statement: It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX. 
Answers: Agree strongly (1)  Agree (2);  Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); 
Disagree strongly (5). Questions 2, 3: Listed below are various areas of government 
spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say "much more” it might require a tax increase to pay 
for it. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH…. Old age pensions, unemployment 
benefits…. Spend Much More (1); Spend More (2); Spend the Same as Now (3); Spend 
Less (4); Spend Much Less (5); Can’t Choose (8). 
 
February 1993 – December 1998. Various National Firms. 32795 Individuals, Age: 18 years old 
and older 1996. Australia (AU); Bulgaria (BG); Canada (CA); Switzerland (CH); Cyprus (CY); 
Czech Republic (CZ); Germany (DE); Spain (ES); France (FR); Great Britain (GB-GBN); 
Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Israel (IL); Italy (IT); Japan (JP); Latvia (LV); Norway (NO); New 
Zealand (NZ); Philippines (PH); Poland (PL); Russian Federation (RU); Sweden (SE); Slovenia 
(SI); United States (US),  Mail, written as well as oral survey and telephone interview (CATI) 
with standardized questionnaire,  Role of Government.18 ISSP 1996 - "Role of Government III" 
Question 1: What is your opinion of the following statement: It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY. Answers: Agree strongly(1)  
Agree (2);  Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Disagree strongly (5). Can’t 
Choose (8). Questions 2, 3: Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please 
show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. 
Remember that if you say "much more” it might require a tax increase to pay for it. 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH…. Old age pensions, unemployment benefits…. 
Spend Much More (1); Spend More (2); Spend the Same as Now (3); Spend Less (4); Spend 
Much Less (5); Can’t Choose (8). 
 




February 2005 – February 2007. Various National Firms. Age: 18 years old (exception: Finland: 
15, Japan and South Africa: 16) and older. Australia (AU); Vlaams Gewest (BE-VLG); Bulgaria 
(BG); Canada (CA); Switzerland (CH); Cyprus (CY); Czech Republic (CZ); Germany (DE); 
Denmark (DK); Dominican Republic (DO); Spain (ES); Finland (FI); France (FR); United 
Kingdom (GB); Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Israel (IL); Japan (JP); Korea, Republic of (KR); 
Latvia (LV); Mexico (MX); Netherlands (NL); Norway (NO); New Zealand (NZ); Philippines 
(PH); Portugal (PT); Russian Federation (RU); Sweden (SE); Slovenia (SI); Taiwan, Province of 
China (TW); United States (US); South Africa (ZA); Mail, written or oral survey with 
standardized questionnaire,  
 
March 2005 – June 2008, Various National Firms, 48, 641 Individuals age: 18 years old and 
older, exclusion: Finland (15), South Africa (16), Sweden (17), Japan (16) and Russia (16); Face-
to-face interview, mail survey, self-completion questionnaire What is your opinion of the 
following statement: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in 
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes."((PLEASE TICK 
ONE BOX ONLY)) - ZA No. ZA4700 Question 1: What is your opinion of the following 
statement: It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX. Answers: 
Agree strongly(1)  Agree (2);  Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Disagree 
strongly (5). Can’t Choose (8). Questions 2, 3: Listed below are various areas of 
government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government 
spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more” it might require a tax 
increase to pay for it. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH…. Old age pensions, 
unemployment benefits…. Spend Much More (1); Spend More (2); Spend the Same as Now 
(3); Spend Less (4); Spend Much Less (5); Can’t Choose (8). 
 
February 2016- June 2018. Various Firms (including Pacte-CNRS), 36,546 individuals, Persons 
aged 18 years and older Exception: Finland (15 to 74 years), Japan (16 years and over), Latvia 
(18 to 74 years), Norway (18 to 79 years), Sweden (18 to 79 years), South Africa (16 years and 
over), and Suriname (21 to 74 years) Face-to-face interview: CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal 
Interview); Face-to-face interview: PAPI (Paper and Pencil Interview); Self-administered 
questionnaire: Paper; Self-administered questionnaire: CASI (Computer Assisted Self-
Interview); Self-administered questionnaire: CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interview) 
Telephone interview, ISSP-“Role of Government” 19ZA6900 PLEASE TICK ONE BOX. 
Answers: Agree strongly (1) Agree (2);  Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); 
Disagree strongly (5). Can’t Choose (8). Questions 2, 3: Listed below are various areas of 
government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government 
spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more” it might require a tax 
increase to pay for it. PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH…. Old age pensions, 
unemployment benefits…. Spend Much More (1); Spend More (2); Spend the Same as Now 








February 27- April 3, 1996. Eurobarometer 1996. 44.3, Health Care Issues and Public Security, 
National Samples, 1025 respondents in Belgium, 1000 in  Denmark,  2074  in  Germany  (1028  
in  west Germany  and  1046  in  east  Germany),  1006  in Greece,  1000  in  Spain,  1001  in  
France,  1004  in Ireland, 1098 in Italy, 595 in Luxembourg, 1023 in The  Netherlands,  1000  in  
Portugal,  1354  in  the United  Kingdom  (1051  in  Great  Britain  and  303 in  Northern  
Ireland),  1053  in  Austria,  1000  in Sweden  and  1002  in  Finland, International EU-15, 
Question: Do you think that the (nationality) government should spend more the same 
amount as today or less on health care? Answers: More (1), same amount (2), less (3), DK 
(4) N/A (0). [VAR 78 Q125] 
 
September-October 2001, European Opinion Research Group, 15,943 respondents, International 
scope (from EU-15 member states), Question: Given that the share of elderly people in the 
population is growing, many different proposals have been put forward. Please tell me for 
each of the following whether you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree...The age of retirement should be raised so that people work longer and 
spend less time in retirement.” Strongly Agree (1), Slightly Agree (2), Slightly Disagree (3), 
Strongly Disagree (4), DK (5) [Q67]. Special Eurobarometer Survey on Pension Policy and 
Pension Reform (Eurobarometer 161/Wave 56.1), 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3475/datadocumentation# 
  
September-October 2001, European Opinion Research Group, 15,943 respondents, International 
Scope (from EU-15 member states), Question: For each of the following statements, could 
you please tell me whether you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, or strongly 
disagree: Older people who have wealth or sufficient income from other sources should not 
receive a pensions from the state. Strongly Agree (1), Slightly Agree (2), Slightly Disagree 
(3), Strongly Disagree (4), DK (5). [Q62, #6] Special Eurobarometer Survey on Pension Policy 
and Pension Reform (Eurobarometer 161/Wave 56.1) 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3475/datadocumentation# 
 
June-July 2009, TNS Opinion & Social, 30, 343 citizens of 31 countries or territories, using 
national weighting procedure (i.e. 27 European Union Member States, and Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) QJ1a. 3. Question: For each of the following 
please tell me whether you think it applies to the (NATIONALITY) social welfare system. 
Your social welfare system…. is too expensive for the (NATIONALITY) society. Answers: 
Applies fairly well, Applies Fairly Badly, Neither (SPONTANEOUS), DK. Study: ZA4973, 
Eurobarometer 71.3.   
 
September- November 2011. TNS Opinion & Social at the request of Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. 31,280 respondents  aged  15+ in all 27 Member 
States and five non-EU Member States; namely Croatia, Iceland, FYROM, Norway and Turkey, 
face to face interviews, QB16: Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
official retirement age in (OUR COUNTRY) will need to increase by the year 2030? 
Answers: Totally Agree, Tend to Agree, Tend to Disagree, Totally Disagree, DK, 
Publication 2012, Special Eurobarometer 378: Active Ageing. 
 




September-December 2008. (Target period, but continued to Feb. 2011). Various, IPR 
Umfrageforschung, 56, 752 individuals aged 15+, residing in private households, regardless of 
their nationality, citizenship, language or legal status, in 25 European Union countries and 6 non-
European Union countries, face-to-face interviews. Question: People have different views on 
what the responsibilities of governments45 should or should not be. For each of the tasks I 
read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments 
should have. 0 means it should not be governments’ responsibility at all and 10 means it 
should be entirely governments’ responsibility….D18 …ensure a reasonable standard of 
living for the unemployed? Answers: Should not be governments’ responsibility at all 0- 
Should be entirely governments’ responsibility (10), Don’t Know (88), 6, 66 etc. = Not 
applicable; 7, 77 etc. = Refusal; 8, 88 etc. = Don't know; 9, 99 etc. = No answer, i.e. Missing 
data not elsewhere explained;. = Variable not relevant, not (Card 29). 
 
European Values Study:  
 
April 1, 2008- April 15, 2010. European Values Study, National Samples (162,713 total), 
National Samples, paper, computer assisted, and postal. (Varied by Country),  Question: to 
what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: Q84.B unemployed people 
in [COUNTRY]-5 other missing -4 question not asked -3 nap -2 na -1 dk 1 very much 2 
much 3 to a certain extent 4 not so much 5 not at all [v291 Q84B, Q84] 
 
July and August of 2015, TNS Emnid, 1, 000 respondents (1,007 in Germany), representative 
survey in the following eight EU member states: Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, telephone. If taxes and social security contributions 
were not sufficient to maintain the current level of public welfare benefits and services in 
your country, which of the following two options would you prefer: Increase taxes and 
social security contributions to maintain the current level of public welfare benefits and 
services (1); Maintain taxes and social sec. contributions at current levels and reduce 
current level of welfare benefits and services (2); Reduce taxes and contributions and 
reduce the current level of public welfare benefits and services (3) Increase taxes and 
contributions and increase the current level of public welfare benefits and services (4) 
Don’t know, no answer (9) 
 
National Polls:  
 
February, March, and April 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and (Apr-Nov) 2016. National Opinion 
Research Center [NORC], GSS interviewees: 1,534 in 1985, 1,470 in 1986, 1466 in 1987, 353 in 
1987 black oversample, 1481 in 1988, 1,537 in 1989, 1372 in 1990, 1,517 in 1991, 1,606 in 
1993, 2,904 in 1996, 2,832 in 1998, 2,817 in 2000, 2,765 in 2002, 2,812 in 2004 (half sample), 
4510 in 2006 (third of sample), 2023 in 2008, 2,044 in 2010, 1,974 in 2012, 2,538 in 2014 (half 
sample) and 2,867 in 2016 (Subpopulation/Note: Asked of half sample). Telephone interviews, 
National Adult Survey. The Each survey from 1985 to 2004, independently drawn sample of 
English-speaking persons 18 years of age or over, living in non-institutional arrangements within 
the United States. Starting in 2006 Spanish-speakers were added to the target population., 
45 
 
General Social Survey (GSS). Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, 
none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these 
problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too 
much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.) Are we spending too much 
(3), too little (1), or about the right (2) amount on... Social Security? And standard DK(8), no 
Answer (9), Not App. (IAP), Source: General Social Survey 1998, Feb, 1998) 
 
December 10 - December 12, 1984, Survey by Time. Methodology: Conducted by Yankelovich, 
Skelly & White, 1,024 Registered voters, telephone interviews.  People have also suggested 
making spending cuts in specific program areas in order to reduce the (federal budget) 
deficit. I am going to read you a list of programs. For each, please tell me whether you 
FAVOR spending cuts to reduce the deficit or OPPOSE spending cuts….Social Security, 
Q22A, Answers, Favor (1), Oppose (2), Not sure (Volunteered) (3), No Answer (0). Source: 
Time/Yankelovich, Skelly & White Poll, Dec, 1984) [USYANK.845702.Q22A] 
April 30 - May 2, 1985, Time, Conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly & White, 1,014 Registered 
Voters, telephone interviews. People have suggested making spending cuts in specific 
program areas in order to reduce the deficit. I am going to read you a list of programs. For 
each, please tell me whether you FAVOR spending cuts to reduce the deficit or OPPOSE 
spending cuts…..Social Security….Answers: Favor (1), Oppose (2), Not Sure (0). (Source: 
Time/Yankelovich, Skelly & White Poll, Apr, 1985) [USYANK.855714.Q09A] 
 
February 1990, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1,217 National 
Adults, personal interviews. Question: Listed below are various areas of government 
spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending 
in each area....Unemployment benefits Remember that if you say 'much more', it might 
require a tax increase to pay for it.)... Spend much more (1), spend more (2), spend the 
same as now (3), spend less (4), spend much less (5); Can’t Choose (8), No answer (9), N/A 
(IAP) (Source: General Social Survey 1990, Feb, 1990) [USNORC.GSS90S.R477G] 
 
February 1-May 1, 1992. Swedish Welfare State Surveys. TNS Sifo, Umeå University, 
Department of Sociology. Individuals aged 18-79 years and residing in Sweden, Question: Taxes 
are used for different purposes. Do you think that the amount of tax money used for the 
following purposes should be increased, remain the same, or decreased, do not know? 
...Support for the Elderly (pensions, care for the elderly).  Answers: should be increased 
(1), remain the same, or decreased, Do not know, Data missing? [SND 0489] 
https://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/study/snd0489 
 
November 8, 1994, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard School of Public Health, 
Conducted by KRC Communications/Research 1,203 National adults who voted Nov. 8, 1994, 
telephone interviews. Question: A number of policies have been proposed in order to reduce 
the federal deficit. If the next Congress decides to address the problem of the deficit, would 
you favor or oppose each of the following policies that might be proposed?)...Decrease 
spending on unemployment compensation (Source: Kaiser/Harvard Election Night Survey, 




November 8, 1994, Survey by Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard School of Public 
Health. Methodology: Conducted by KRC Communications/Research, based on 1,203 National 
Adults who voted Nov. 8, 1994, telephone interviews. Question: A number of policies have 
been proposed in order to reduce the federal deficit. If the next Congress decides to address 
the problem of the deficit, would you favor or oppose each of the following policies that 
might be proposed?)...Decrease spending on Social Security (Source: Kaiser/Harvard Election 
Night Survey, Nov, 1994) [USKRC.94ELEC.R061]  
 
January 26 - January 29, 1995, ABC News/Washington Post, 1,026 National adults, 
Subpopulation/Note: Asked of half sample, telephone interviews. In order to reduce the 
federal budget deficit, should the government cut spending on...unemployment insurance 
or not? If yes, cut, then ask: Should spending on that be cut a great deal or only somewhat? 
Answers: Cut a Great Deal (1); Cut only somewhat (2), Do not cut (3), DK/No opinion (8); 
NA/Refused (9). (Source: ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Jan, 1995) 
[USABCWP.5571.Q020K] 
February 26 - March 5, 1995, Reader's Digest; Conducted by Institute for Social Inquiry/Roper 
Center, University of Connecticut, 1,031 National Adults, telephone interviews. Question: 
There is talk in Washington about cutting back certain programs to reduce the federal 
budget deficit. I'm going to read you a list of areas where possible cuts could be made.) 
Should the federal government cut back spending...on Social Security? (Source: Reader's 
Digest/Institute For Social Inquiry Poll, Feb, 1995. [USISIROP.95READ.Q25] 
 
February 1 - May 25, 1996, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 2,904 
National adults, personal interviews, Sample: Subpopulation/Note: Asked of 1/2 sample. 
Question: Listed below are various areas of government spending. ...Unemployment 
benefits. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say 'much more', it might require a tax increase to pay 
for it.)...Spend much more (1), spend more (2), spend the same as now (3), spend less (4), 
spend much less (5); Can’t Choose (8), No answer (9), N/A (IAP), (Source: General Social 
Survey 1996, Feb, 1996 [USNORC.GSS96.Q680G] (View Citation). 
 
February 5 - February 6, 1997, Los Angeles Times, National Adult, 816 telephone interviews. As 
you may know, a welfare reform bill was signed last year by President (Bill) Clinton that 
requires welfare recipients to work within two years of applying for benefits, it eliminates 
eligibility for most federal benefits for most legal immigrants until they become citizens, it 
requires able-bodied adults who do not have dependent children to work 20 hours per 
week in order to be eligible for food stamps, and it imposes a five-year lifetime cap on 
welfare benefits whether or not a person can find a job. Do you favor or oppose the new 
welfare reform bill? Favor (strong) (1), Favor (some) (2), Oppose (some) (3), Oppose (4), 
N/Sure (5), Refused (6) (Source: Los Angeles Times Poll, Feb, 1997) [USLAT.020897.R42]20 
September 1-November 3, 1997. Swedish Welfare State Surveys. TNS Sifo, Umeå University, 
Department of Sociology. Individuals aged 18-79 years and residing in Sweden, Question: Taxes 




are used for different purposes. Do you think that the amount of tax money used for the 
following purposes should be increased, remain the same, or decreased, do not know? 
...Support for the Elderly (pensions, care for the elderly).  Answers: should be increased, 
remain the same, or decreased, Do not know? Data missing. [SND 0792] 
https://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/study/snd0489 
 
August 17, 1998, Holmberg, Sören University of Gothenburg, Department of Political Science 
Statistics Sweden, 1,437 individuals. Individuals aged 18-80 years, residing in Sweden and 
eligible to vote in the parliamentary election 1998, Swedish Election Study 1998, Question:  
V98_V165: Q.18B Social reforms have gone too far…Answers: Agree Completely (1), 
Agree on the Whole (2), Disagree on the Whole (3), Disagree Completely (4), DK/Refusal 




March 8 - May 14, 2002. Swedish Welfare State Surveys. TNS Sifo, Umeå University, 
Department of Sociology. Individuals aged 18-79 years and residing in Sweden, Question: Taxes 
are used for different purposes. Do you think that the amount of tax money used for the 
following purposes should be increased, remain the same, or decreased, do not know? 
...Support for the Elderly (pensions, care for the elderly). Answers: should be increased 
(755, 1), remain the same (281, 3) or decreased (11, 5) Do not know (27,8), Data missing 
(14,9). [SND 0779]  https://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/study/snd0489 
 
June 2002. TEMO, Sweden. 800 Swedes ages 16+, National Sample,  Telephone interviews, 
Question: “The unemployed should be encouraged to get jobs by tightening the  qualifying 
conditions to get unemployment benefits if the unemployed refuse to  take offered jobs” 
Answers: Totally Agree, Disagree, Totally Disagree, No Opinion/Do Not Know.  Citation: 
Andersson, Jan and Olli Kangas. 2005.  Universalism in the Age of Workfare: Attitudes to Basic 
income in Sweden and Finland.  In Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic 
Experience  Eds.  Nanna Kildal, Stein Kuhnle. New York: Routledge. Pp 112-12921. 
 
March 10 - August 7, 2006, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 4,510 
National adults, Subpopulation/Note: Asked of 1/3 sample, personal interviews.  
Question: Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether 
you would like to see more or less government spending in each area...Unemployment 
benefits Remember that if you say 'much more,' it might require a tax increase to pay for 
it....Spend much more (1), spend more (2), spend the same as now (3), spend less (4), spend 
much less (5); Can’t Choose (8), No answer (9), N/A (IAP), Source: General Social Survey 
2006, Mar, 2006. [USNORC.GSS06H.Q1180G] Dataset: USNORCGSS1972-2012 Variable: 
SPUNEMP 
 
March 5 - June 15, 2010. Swedish Welfare State Surveys. TNS Sifo, Umeå University, 
Department of Sociology, Individuals ages 18-79 years and residing in Sweden, self-
administered questionnaire: paper, Question: Taxes are used for different purposes. Do you 
think that the amount of tax money used for the following purposes should be increased, 




remain the same, or decreased, do not know? Answers: should be increased (1), remain the 
same (3) or decreased (5) Do not know (8), Data missing (9)? ...Support for the Elderly 
(pensions, care for the elderly). [SND 0904] 
https://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/study/snd0489 
 
January 15 - January 19, 2011, CBS News/New York Times, 1,036 National Adults, land-line 
and cell phones. Question: Currently, most Americans are scheduled to receive full Social 
Security benefits by age 67. But the money Social Security takes in from taxpayers is not 
enough to pay for the program in the long term. If you had to choose one in order to deal 
with this shortfall, which would you prefer: reduce the future benefits of Social Security 
recipients or raise Social Security taxes on people paying into the system? Answers: Reduce 
Benefits, Raise Taxes, Don’t Know/No Answer [USCBSNYT.012011B.R43] 
 
January 21 - January 23, 2011, Cable News Network/ Opinion Research Corporation, 1,012 
National Adults, telephone interviews. As you know, Congress may try to cut federal programs 
in order to reduce the budget deficit. Question: For each of the following programs, please tell 
me whether you think it is more important to reduce the federal budget deficit, or more 
important to prevent that program from being significantly cut....Pensions and benefits for 
retired government workers. Answers: Reduce Federal Deficit, Prevent Significant Cuts, 
No Opinion [USORC.012511B.R16I]  
 
April 7 - April 12, 2011, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International, 1,207 National adults, Subpopulation/Note: Asked of Form A half 
sample, telephone interviews: 803 respondents were interviewed on a landline telephone, and 
404 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 190 who had no landline telephone. Question: 
If Congress decides to reduce the deficit by reducing federal spending, I'd like to know in 
which areas you would be more willing to see spending reduced. For each area I name, 
please tell me if you would support major spending reductions, minor spending reductions 
or no reductions at all as a way to reduce the federal deficit.) To reduce the deficit would 
you support major reductions, minor reductions, or no reductions to spending 
on...unemployment insurance? Source: Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, Apr, 2011. 
 
December 8 - December 12, 2011, Reuters,  Ipsos-Public Affairs, 1,102 National Adults, 
telephone interviews on landline telephones and cellular phones. Subpopulation/Note: . Adds to 
more than 100% due to multiple responses. As you may know, the US (United States) federal 
budget has a significant deficit. Here are the main expenses of the government. In your 
view, which of the following areas can we afford to cut back on?...Defense spending, 
alternative energy development, law enforcement, education spending, Medicare benefits, 
Social Security benefits (Source: Ipsos-Public Affairs/Reuters Poll, Dec, 2011). 
[USIPSOSR.121411R.R8] 
 
13 au 16 mars 2012, Sondage Harris Interactive, échantillon de 1,948 personnes de plus de 18 
ans, à partir de l'access panel Harris Interactive (méthode des quotas), réalisé en ligne,  En 
contrepartie du versement des indemnités chômage, il faut augmenter le «contrôle pour 






November 29 - December 2, 2012, Survey by United Technologies, National Journal, Princeton 
Survey Research Associates International, based on 1,003 National Adults, telephone interviews. 
Sample: 601 respondents were interviewed on a landline telephone, and 402 were interviewed on 
a cell phone, including 198 who had no landline telephone. Now I have a few questions about 
some issues before the US (United States) Congress in Washington.)...I'm going to read you 
some government programs whose spending could be cut to help reduce the federal budget 
deficit. As I read each one, please tell me if you think spending should be cut back a lot (1), 
some (2), or not at all (3) to help reduce the deficit. What about...Social Security? [Don’t 
know/Refused (9)], (Source: United Technologies/National Journal Congressional Connection 
Poll, Nov, 2012). [USPSRA.120312CC.R04A] 
 
January 3- January 9, 2013, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard School of Public 
Health, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1,347 National adults,  807 respondents were 
interviewed on a landline telephone, and 540 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 253 
who had no landline telephone. Question: If the president (Barack Obama) and Congress 
decide to reduce the deficit by reducing spending on federal programs and services, I'd like 
to know in which programs you would be willing to see spending reduced. For each 
program I name, please tell me if you would support major spending reductions, minor 
spending reductions or no reductions at all as a way to reduce the federal deficit. To reduce 
the deficit would you support major reductions, minor reductions, or no reductions to 
spending on...Social Security? Answers: Major, Minor, No Reductions, Refused 
[USSSRS.13HEALTHC.R10B] 
 
March 20 - March 24, 2013, CBS News, 1,181 National adults, land-line and cell phones.                           
Question: I'm going to read you some suggestions that have been made to reduce the size of 
the federal budget deficit. Please tell me whether you would favor or oppose each of the 
following. In order to reduce the budget deficit, would you favor or oppose...reducing 
spending on Social Security? Answers: Favor, Oppose, Don’t Know/No Answer 
[USCBS.032613B.R35]  
 
March 20 - March 24, 2013, Conducted by CBS News, and based on 1,181 National Adults, 
telephone interviews; land-line and cell phones. Question: I'm going to read you some 
suggestions that have been made to reduce the size of the federal budget deficit. Please tell 
me whether you would favor or oppose each of the following.) In order to reduce the 
budget deficit, would you favor or oppose...reducing spending on Social Security? Favor (1), 
Oppose (2), DK/NA (9), (Source: CBS News Poll, Mar, 2013) [USCBS.032613B.R35] Q35 
September 6-9, 2013, 1,935 Individuals Representative of the National French Population Ages 
18+, Quota Method, Online Sample, Question : Les syndicats CGT, FO, FSU et Solidaires 
ont appelé agents et retraités à la mobilisation et à la grève le 10 septembre «pour rejeter le 
projet de réforme des retraites porté par le gouvernement Ayrault.» Quelle est votre 
attitude à l’égard de ce mouvement? Answer : Vous ... le soutenez tout à fait... le soutenez 
plutôt... Y êtes plutôt opposé... Y êtes tout à fait opposé…Ne se prononce pas. 
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France24 : http://harris-interactive.fr/opinion_polls/les-francais-et-la-reforme-des-retraites/ 
 
September 6-9, 2013. 1,835, 935 Individuals Representative of the National French Population 
ages 18+, Method of quotas, Online sample. Question: Etes-vous tout à fait favorable, plutôt 
favorable, plutôt opposé, ou tout à fait opposé à chacune des propositions suivantes pour 
financer le système de retraites par répartition? Options: A convergence vers un régime 
unique des différents  régimes de retraites, en fusionnant le régime privé,  celui des 
fonctionnaires et les régimes spéciaux Une hausse de la durée de cotisation jusqu’à 43 ans à  
l’issue de 2035 (contre 41,5 ans actuellement pour  une retraite à taux plein) ; L’accroissement 
des impôts des sociétés. Le recul de l’âge légal de départ à la retraite à 65 ans (contre 62 
actuellement) ; L’alignement du taux maximal de CSG (contribution  sociale généralisée) des 
retraités sur celui des actifs ; La hausse des cotisations salariales et patronales ; La hausse de la 
CSG (contribution sociale généralisée). Answers : tout à fait favorable ; Plutôt favorable ; Plutôt 
opposé ; Tout à fait opposé ; Ne se prononce pas. http://harris-interactive.fr/wp-
content/uploads/sites/6/2015/09/Results_HIFR_LCP_10092013.pdf 
October 2-3, 2014. Odoxa. 1,000 individuals representative of the French population, ages 18+ 
(Quotas method), internet survey. Question: Voici un certain nombre d’efforts qui pourraient 
être demandés aux Français a fin d’améliorer la situation de la France. Vous 
personnellement, dites-moi si vous seriez prêt à accepter cet effort : Conditionner les 
allocations familiales à des conditions de revenu ; Rendre dégressives les indemnités de 
chômage versées aux chômeurs ; Conditionner les aides au logement étudiant aux revenus de 
leurs parents ; Retarder d’un an l’âge du départ à la retraite ; Demander à tous les salariés de 
travailler deux heures de plus, enles payant au même salaire ; Réduire de 5% le montant des 
remboursements des dépenses de santé ; Instituer une franchise de 100 euros par an sur le 
remboursement des dépenses de santé ; Baisser de 5 % les pensions de retraites versées aux 
retraité, Answers : Oui, No, NSP,  http://www.odoxa.fr/sondage/barometre-de-leconomie-octobre-
2014/ 
Février 21-24, 2014, Ifop pour Les Enquêtes du Contribuable, Echantillon de 1003 personnes, 
Représentatif de la Population Française âgé de 18 ans+, En Ligne. Question : Les chômeurs 
pourraient trouver du travail s’ils le voulaient vraiment. Answers : Oui, tout à fait 
d’accord, non plutôt d’accord, plutôt d’accord, pas du tout d’accord.  In  « Les Français, La 
Politique Sociale et la Lutte Contre L’Assistanat ». Sondage exclusif Ifop/Les Enquêtes du 
contribuable n°4 « L’assistanat ruine la France ». 
 
March 17 - March 26, 2016, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Abt SRBI, 2,254 
National Adults, telephone interviews. 566 respondents were interviewed on a landline 
telephone, and 1688 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 983 who had no landline 
telephone. Question: Thinking about the long term future of Social Security, do you think 
some reductions in benefits for future retirees need to be considered, or Social Security 
benefits should not be reduced in any way? Answers: Some reductions in benefits for 
future retirees need to be considered, Social Security benefits should not be reduced in any 




April 5- November 9, 2016, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 2,867 
National Adults, Subpopulation Note: Asked of Half of Sample, Telephone Interviews, 
Question: Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether 
you would like to see more or less government spending in each area....Unemployment 
benefits Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for 
it.... Answers: Spend much more (1), spend more (2), spend the same as now (3), spend less 
(4), spend much less (5); Can’t Choose (8), No answer (9), N/A (IAP) (Source: General Social 
Survey 2016, Apr, 2016) Research. [USNORC.GSS16D.Q1400G], Dataset: USNORCGSS1972-
2016. 
 
31 mars au 3 Avril 2017. Sondage Ifop-Fiducial pour Public Sénat et Sud Radio, échantillon de 
1507 personnes inscrites sur les listes électorales, extrait d’un échantillon de 1600 personnes, 
représentatif de la population française âgée de18 ans+, Les interviews ont été réalisées par 
questionnaire auto-administré en ligne. Question: Voici un certain nombre de propositions 
que l’on entend parfois au sujet de l’emploi. Pour chacune d’entre elles,veuillez indiquer si 
vous series favorable ou oppose à ce qu’elle entre en vigueur après l’élection 
présidentielle…..La perte des droits aux allocations chômage après deux refus d’offres 
d’emploi…. Tout à fait favorable; plutôt favorable, plutôt pas favorable, Pas du tout 
favorable. “Le regard des Français sur les grands enjeux de l’élection présidentielle: L’emploi 
#5” 
 
13 au 16 Octobre 2017. Ifop pour l’Opinion et la Fondation Spinoza FD/RB/, 1,006 personnes, 
représentatif de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus, par questionnaire auto-administré 
en ligne, Concernant l’assurance chômage, êtes-vous d’accord ou pas d’accord avec les 
propositions suivantes ... ?....Renforcer le contrôle des chômeurs afin de s’assurer qu’ils 
recherchent activement un emploi.. Reponses: D’accord; Tout à fait d’accord; Plutôt 
d’accord; Pas d’accord; Plutôt pas d’accord; Pas du tout d’accord “Le climat social et 
l’opinion des Français sur de grands enjeux économiques” 
 
13 au 16 Octobre 2017. Ifop pour l’Opinion et la Fondation Spinoza FD/RB/, 1,006 personnes, 
représentatif de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus, par questionnaire auto-administré 
en ligne, Concernant l’assurance chômage, êtes-vous d’accord ou pas d’accord avec les 
propositions suivantes ... ?....Supprimer l’assurance chômage en cas de refus de deux offres 
d’emploi « raisonnables » en termes de qualification, de secteur d’activité et de périmètre 
géographique… Reponses: D’accord; Tout à fait d’accord; Plutôt d’accord; Pas d’accord; 
Plutôt pas d’accord; Pas du tout d’accord, “Le climat social et l’opinion des Français sur de 
grands enjeux économiques” 
 
13 au 16 Octobre 2017. Ifop pour l’Opinion et la Fondation Spinoza FD/RB/, 1,006 personnes, 
représentatif de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus, par questionnaire auto-administré 
en ligne, Concernant l’assurance chômage, êtes-vous d’accord ou pas d’accord avec les 
propositions suivantes ... ?...Renforcer la dégressivité de l’assurance chômage, c’est-à-dire 
diminuer proportionnellement dans le temps le montant de cette assurance. Reponses: 
D’accord; Tout à fait d’accord; Plutôt d’accord; Pas d’accord; Plutôt pas d’accord; Pas du 




October 18-19, 2017. OpinionWay pour Tilder-LCI ….1,002 National Adults, online (quota 
method), Question: favorables à la réduction de la durée d'indemnisation des chômeurs…. 
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Chapter 3: How Much Unpopular Retrenchment Has Occurred? 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter highlighted that while cutbacks targeting a public minority (e.g. 
unemployed beneficiaries) are not unpopular, those that target a public majority are (e.g. private 
sector workers more broadly, who will benefit from pensions). Before proceeding to the main 
question of when these retrenchments occur, it is necessary to investigate the frequency of their 
occurrence. This is because the extent of unpopular cutbacks is, itself, another major subject of 
debate in the welfare state literature. Whereas some scholars point out that, quite to the contrary, 
the welfare state is resilient or even growing, others argue that the welfare state is undergoing 
retrenchment. Even within the “retrenchment” camp there is disagreement as to precisely how 
much retrenchment is occurring. Existing datasets on legislative change provide a piece of this 
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puzzle but are incomplete. This chapter seeks to answer this question by comparing with two 
standard measures (pension expenditures and replacement rates), occurrences of legislative 
change in a major area of welfare state retrenchment: publicly administered pensions for private 
sector workers by assembling and analyzing a dataset on unpopular pension retrenchment 
legislation in 18 OECD countries from 1990 to 2015.   
Unpopular Retrenchment: From “Inevitable” to “Rare”  
At the outset of globalization, scholars made dire predictions that retrenchment would be 
pervasive and extreme (Rudra 2008); countries would engage in a cycle of aggressive cutbacks 
to maintain trade competitiveness on the global market. As mobile capital sought out the most 
business-friendly region, it was expected that countries would cut social welfare budgets to 
attract business, the direst of these theorists predicting a “race to the bottom” (ibid).  
Policymakers too, feared the end of the welfare state. As Michel Camdessus, Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund remarked in 1998, “If it is to survive, the welfare state in the 
industrial economies will need important reforms” (IMF 1998, author’s emphasis). Thus, no 
matter how popular welfare benefits were, external forces were expected to cause downward 
spiral in benefits.  
More recent literature, though, has debunked the fear that such problem pressures would 
lead to an apocalyptic “neo-liberal race to the bottom”, under even the most difficult of 
conditions (Pierson 1996). As Taylor-Gooby (2002) asserts, these “crises” of the welfare state 
are “substantially exaggerated as general representations of likely developments over the next 
two or three decades” (255). Drawing on evidence that no welfare program has ever been 
eradicated and public opinion polls showing widespread support for social programs, researchers 
have concluded that it is unlikely that any politician in a democratic state would be willing to 
risk his/her next term on the total uprooting of a social program (e.g. Taylor-Gooby 1985, 
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Pierson 1996, Myles and Pierson 2001, and Brooks and Manza 2007). In fact, some scholars 
(e.g. Pierson 1996) argue that the public gives politicians so little latitude to retrench, that non-
action or extremely minor and obfuscated retrenchment is the only option.  
While scholars now seem to have reached a consensus that the welfare state, though 
under pressure, is here to stay (Alber 1988) they still grapple with the question of how much 
retrenchment has occurred. Studies frequently highlight that welfare retrenchment has been still 
“significant” (Hay 2001, 40) or “substantial” (see Manow 2010, 279) and on the other hand 
“unlikely” (Pierson 1996) with some welfare states even basically “frozen” (Esping-Andersen 
1996). Yet, as Green-Pedersen (2004) explains, “To put it bluntly, the debate about explanations 
of variation in retrenchment cannot move beyond the stage of hypotheses before the dependent 
variable problem has been addressed, and the same goes for the debate about welfare state 
persistence or change” (4). 
Whereas case studies can provide in-depth information on a single case, what is needed is 
comprehensive, accurate, and applicable data on legislative changes in the social programs over 
time. However, herein lays the problem. As the subsequent section will demonstrate, while social 
expenditures have been the default measure in the past and provide a snapshot of overall welfare 
effort, in recent years, there has been an ever-growing call for comparative data that can quantify 
major changes in welfare state rights and measure their frequency. The next section will discuss 
these points in more detail before moving on to the data and analysis.  
Measuring Retrenchment through Social Expenditures: 
Those who tend to emphasize the resilience of the welfare state (e.g. Iversen and Cusack 2000) 
often point to government expenditures, transfer spending or consumption spending (Scruggs 
2007). Scholars have also sought to disaggregate general spending, through use of the OECD’s 
Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) database (OECD 2017), which provides social 
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expenditures data over time.  When examining these data, one would likely conclude that the 
“welfare state” has simply ballooned over time. The chart below highlights this spending growth 
in old age and survivors’ pensions (excluding private pensions).  Examining the data, we see that 
pension expenditures in the 18 OECD countries22 have increased from about six percent of GDP 
in 1980 to over eight percent of GDP in 2013. 
 
Figure 1: Source: OECD Old Age Social Expenditures Data (2017) 
Others however, point out that while spending data have their use in understanding the health of 
a country’s finances, and ease of comparability; these data have limitations as well.  As Clausen 
and Seigel 2007 put it, the use of social expenditure data as the default measure in defining 
change in welfare state is part of the “the dependent variable problem,” in which there has been a 
“noticeable absence of reflection on how to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure welfare 
state change” (4).  They note that changes in welfare spending are not so much a measure of 
                                                     
22 The data examine Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
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actual rights (for which voters fight), but of “welfare effort”. As Esping-Andersen (1990) states, 
“no one argues for social spending per se”, but for the maintenance or increase in benefits. This 
is especially the case seeing as expenditures can increase automatically without legislation of 
additional rights (e.g. because of an increased population of beneficiaries because of economic 
downturns or simply a growing elderly population). These measures do not “typically account 
for the size of the dependent population)” (Scruggs 2007).  When examining the benefits 
themselves rather than social expenditures, an entirely new picture emerges, one that illustrates a 
welfare state under much more pressure. 
Beyond Social Expenditures Data to Replacement Rates 
One of the largest challenges in the welfare state literature has been to create an indicator that 
can best capture welfare state change.  A pioneer of the welfare state benefits research, Esping-
Andersen advanced this research by examining industrialized countries’ welfare generosity based 
on two variables: de-commodification and stratification.  The first of the two describes the 
degree to which workers’ livelihoods are dependent upon the market, that is, how much they are 
“commodified” or “decommodified”. Decommodification occurs, as Esping Andersen (1990) 
puts it, “when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market” (163). Granted, decommodification is not a bivariate 
indicator, instead, countries fall along a scale with some countries being more decommodified 
(e.g. Finland, Norway, Sweden), and others less (United States, Australia, UK). In addition to 
this, Esping-Andersen measures countries’ welfare states in terms of their level of stratification, 
or in how it orders social relations in the country. On the high end of stratification are the 
countries in which the welfare state “stigmatizes” recipients via a poor relief-derived, mean-
tested social system. Other countries have a more corporatist tradition, in which individuals’ 
benefits are tied to their occupations (with state workers often having the better benefits, as a 
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historic means of achieving loyalty to the state).  Finally, in the socialist tradition are countries 
which adopted a less stratified, more universalist benefit scheme, with flat-rate benefits, financed 
through general income tax. A less stratified system was a means for socialist government to 
promote solidarity via “welfare for the people” (166). Therefore, it is important to examine the 
trajectory of benefit generosity as well.  
Based on Esping-Andersen’s conceptualization of decommodification, Allan and Scruggs 
(2004) moved beyond social spending through an alternative measure of welfare change (i.e. 
replacement rates). Replacement rates, or the percent of previous wages that is replaced by the 
social benefit, consider both the generosity of a social benefit, as well as measures of duration. 
Benefit reductions encompass several possible changes that affect the benefit formula, including 
less beneficial indexation (e.g. linking benefits to prices rather than wages), reducing the benefit 
rate (e.g. from 40 percent to 30 percent), or a change in the reference wage (e.g. from the 10 best 
years to including the entire wage history). Duration cuts shorten how long the benefit is to be 
paid out. Additionally, a generosity cutback could be increased taxation on the benefit itself, 
which would decrease the net benefit.  The ease of cross-national comparison as well as the 
focus on actual entitlements of both generosity and coverage makes this measure a more 
appropriate tool to examine the impact of the economy on the welfare state. 
These data have been updated as the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database 
(CWED) II, including up-to-date information on 33 countries23. The database provides estimates 
for two nominal household types (a single person with 100 percent of the Average Production 
Worker (APW)’s earnings and a married couple with two children with earnings of 100/0 percent 
of the APW). CWED II was created “to provide an essential complement to program spending 
data that is available from international sources like the OECD's Social Expenditure Data” 




(Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto  2013). CWED II’s calculation of program generosity for each 
country is based on both replacement rates (i.e. the percent of last net wage replaced by the 
benefit) and the coverage rate (i.e. what percent of the population is insured for a given benefit). 
The generosity index is a measurement of the replacement rate measured as a z-score from a 
standard average replacement rate multiplied by the coverage rate.  
What do pension replacement rates show in terms of retrenchment? To maintain 
consistency, the index here is averaged over the 18 countries during the period of 1970 to 2010 
for pensions. Replacement rates are calculated for several nominal households (the average 
production worker, “S100”, and a couple with two children earning the average production wage, 
“C100/0”). Below, pension generosity measures of 18 OECD countries are averaged to get a 
sense of the path of generosity over time. The data below show that generosity, while trending 
upward during the 1970s, has stagnated since the 1980s (though with a slight increase from 2000 
to 2010).    
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At first glance these data seems to cast doubt on the occurrence of cutbacks over the past several 
decades. There is a clear increase in pension generosity in the 1970s to the 1980s, as well as a 
more moderate rise in the early 1990s through 2000s. However, at a closer look the rise may 
have less to do with legislated benefit increases, than to other factors. Scruggs (2014), for 
instance, attributes the sharp growth through the 1970s to the 1980s to the maturation of the 
pensions systems. That is, as a new pension system phases in, it provides for more of an 
individual’s work history to be incorporated, just by virtue of the number of years of the 
system’s existence.  Furthermore, Scruggs notes that the modest rise in pension generosity is 
likely due, not to new generous legislation, but to the rising life expectancy of the elderly 
populations in OECD countries, which expands the de facto duration of benefits. Without these 
contributions to the rise in pension generosity, it is likely that pensions generosity would be 
stagnant at best, and potentially show decreases. Building on these hints that, despite rising 
pensions replacement rates, legislative cutbacks may have occurred, the next section proceeds to 
investigate how much retrenchment has occurred.   
From Replacement Rates to Instances of Reform  
This dissertation seeks to contribute to a better understanding of welfare state change by 
considering and introducing an additional measure of welfare state change i.e. instances of 
legislated unpopular pension reform24.  This is particularly useful in that unlike other measures 
of change, reform instances best reflect the moment of decision-making. This is important 
considering that the moment of reform and the implementation of benefit vary between 
legislation and implementation on a country and case basis. The chart below, for instance, shows 
retirement age reforms for a handful of OECD countries since the year 2000. Whereas some 
                                                     
24As opposed to proposals or drafts 
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retirement reforms were implemented nearly immediately after reform passage (e.g. France 
2010), others only start to be implemented over a decade after legislation (e.g. Japan 2000). 
There is a further variant lag during for the duration of implementation (from start to finish). 
Austria’s shift in pension base calculation from the best 15 to the best 40 years is slated for the 
gradual 23 year stretch between 2005 to 2028, whereas the Finnish reform to extend the base 
from the 10 last years to lifetime in 2005 was almost immediate. Additionally, examining the 
moment of reform passage allows us to “look down the road,” examining laws that have been 
passed, but not yet implemented (e.g. Denmark, Belgium, UK in the chart below), data points 
which are not yet fully captured by other generosity data.   
 
Figure 3: Calculations from Data. (Various Sources, see Figure 5) 
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While there is a clear need to establish a comprehensive and up-to-date dataset of the moment of 
unpopular reforms, there is a deficit in this area of research. Only recently has comprehensive 
data begun to emerge25. Most reform datasets that exist provide pieces of the data puzzle, rather 
than a comprehensive look unpopular pensions reform, as they have different foci, countries and 
years. This dissertation chapter therefore bridges the knowledge in these datasets into one 
comprehensive data source measuring unpopular pension policies over 26 years (1990 to 2015) 
in 18 OECD countries. The subsequent section will describe the parameters used to define an 
“unpopular pension reform (measure)” before then moving on to comparing how well each 
existing dataset captures these data.   
Scope Conditions: Major Unpopular Reform 
This section highlights the three criteria that make a reform eligible for inclusion in the dataset. 
First, the dataset examines reforms that are cutbacks, otherwise known as retrenchment. 
Secondly, the reform must also affect most of the population of a country (as developed in the 
previous chapter), and finally, the reform must affect eligibility or replacement rates.  
                                                     




Figure 4:  Defining a Major Reform 
Pension Cutbacks…. 
Having underlined the importance of developing a comprehensive measure of unpopular 
reforms, this section proceeds to build a measurement of this variable for pensions. Firstly, 
following the FRDB-IZA (2010), the data gathered here identify independent reform measures, 
rather than a reform, as a “collection of policy measures referring to a unique formally approved 
document”.  Many reform packages are a mixture of both increases and decreases in benefits. 
Though in some cases the number of cutbacks clearly outweigh the increases, in other cases it 
would be very challenging to determine if a pension reform is “on balance” positive or negative. 
Therefore, the dissertation looks at each measure independently.  Furthermore, the change must 



















describes how unpopular reforms are identified: cutbacks to programs that cover the majority of 
the population. 
…That Affect Most of the Population …. 
Looking at pension plans across the OECD, there are numerous specialized schemes for specific 
types of workers (e.g. civil servants, agriculture workers, and the self-employed). However, this 
dissertation focuses on cutbacks to large general schemes that affect most of the voting 
population: pensions for private-sector workers. The research homes in on those private-sector 
workers plans that benefit the majority, rather than again any specific minority of private-sector 
workers. Perhaps the most straightforward way to identify such programs is by using OECD’s 
tier system.   
The OECD’s tier system of pensions classifies pension programs according to three tiers, 
which each serves a different purpose: the first tier (mandatory adequacy programs), the second 
tier (mandatory savings programs) and the third (voluntary savings programs) (Pensions at a 
Glance, 2009). The first tier can be broken down into three types of programs: basic pensions, 
resource-tested pensions, and minimum pensions. In countries where it exists (i.e. Canada, 
Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) the basic pension 
is universal and is based either residency or number of years worked. Considering its universal 
coverage, broad cutbacks to this pension can therefore be expected to be highly unpopular, and 
so these programs are included. In terms of the resource-tested social assistance, this population 
coverage of this program varies. In countries where the means-test is high enough to allow for 
coverage most pensioners, cutbacks affecting most beneficiaries are unpopular. For instance, 
take-up rates (i.e. the proportion of retirees covered by the program) are higher than 50 percent in 
both Australia and Denmark. Countries that either do not have a resource-tested social assistance 
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program or are under the 50 percent take-up threshold are not considered here (e.g. SSI in the 
United States, where the benefit only covers a slim percentage of the population). Minimum 
pensions are linked to the second tier, and specify a minimum benefit based, not on income, but 
on the pension benefit itself. Though many countries have minimum pensions, not all cover more 
than a small percentage of the population. Only in Finland and in Sweden does the majority 
benefit from the minimum benefit.  
Unlike the first tier, the second tier is more straightforward in the sense that such 
programs cover most workers. They are therefore included in the analysis. The only exception to 
this is Ireland and New Zealand, which do not have a second tier. Finally, the third tier, 
voluntary pensions is excluded from the analysis both because as a generally nascent scheme it 
does not affect most workers in most countries, and, where it does, it is not undergoing 
unpopular cutbacks, but rather, mostly expansions. Having the subsequent section describes 
another scope condition. 
… Through Parametric Decreases in Eligibility and Generosity 
Building on Green-Pedersen (2002), this dissertation views pension retrenchment as “changes in 
social security schemes making them less attractive or generous to the recipients”. According to 
Schwartz (2006), there are four major categories of pension reforms that politicians can 
undertake. The first of these can be considered administrative, those that “focus on unifying 
multiple systems within a country, improving collection compliance, improving benefit service, 
individualizing databases, improving record keeping, and strengthening the eligibility criteria for 
disability, as well as aggregating contribution collection with tax collection” (Schwartz 2006, 
22). As second group of reforms are regulatory, helping to guarantee through surveillance that 
the funds contributed will be available when needed (22). While these first two reform types are 
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important for the functioning of pensions system, this dissertation is mainly concerned with, as 
Schwartz (2006) calls, “distributional implications” (ibid), those that negatively affect generosity 
and coverage.          
 Therefore, this dissertation focuses only on the two other categories of reform identified 
by scholars: systemic and parametric reforms. A systemic reform “involve[s] introducing a new 
type of pension system to replace or complement the existing system” (17) whereas a parametric 
reform is one that “maintain[s] the basic structure of the existing system while attempting, 
through changes in the different main parameters of the system, to increase the incentives to 
work for older workers or to reduce the budgetary cost of ageing” (EU Economic Policy 
Committee 2002, 2). This OECD (2005) Pensions at a Glance: Comparing Pension System 
Parameters, describes a basic rubric of parametric change. These reforms include the following: 
1) Increased retirement age 
2) Decreased valorization or indexation  
3) Decreased benefit rate   
4) Increased benefit taxation 
5) Increased assessment base 
 
These parameters guide the collection of the dependent variable, mirror those used in Starke’s 
(2008) case study of “radical retrenchment” in New Zealand: (i.e. “reductions in benefit level 
and duration…tightening of eligibility… and restriction of coverage”) (19). Systemic 
retrenchment too can also affect these distributional outcomes by altering the way that pensions 
are calculated. To the extent that these systemic changes create a negative outcome for 
beneficiaries’ coverage and benefit, they are also included in the research here. A few notes are 
in order as there is a great deal of nuance in pensions systems. As in the original publication for 
OECD (2005), increases in the early retirement age will be included as a parametric change here. 
However, this will focus only on voluntary early retirement based on (extended) contribution 
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length, rather than on the basis of involuntary early retirement (e.g. unemployment, disability)26, 
partial retirement, or other circumstances (e.g. physically demanding jobs), which often have 
their own early retirement age outside of the standard system and affect apply to a smaller 
population of individuals. The increase of the retirement age by life expectancy is counted as a 
single unique reform, separate from any (additional) set age increase (e.g. an increase from 65 to 
67).  Having identified the components of the definition of pension reforms, the next section 
looks at the time frame and countries included.   
Time-Frame and Countries for Inclusion 
As far as the timeframe and cases, the research looks at unpopular policies over 1990 to 2015, a 
26-year time frame that typifies the era of the “post-golden years of welfare”. Furthermore, it 
collects data on a set of 18 commonly analyzed advanced industrialized countries of North 
America, Europe and Asia, mirroring the original CWED I dataset (Allan and Scruggs 2004). 
Therefore, the data will examine Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, New 
Zealand, Canada, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland.        
Analysis of Existing Resources 
Using these parameters, data from many major data sources were used27. The first of these is 
FRDB-IZA (2010) website. The FRDB-IZA (2010) is a joint initiative of the Fondazione 
Rodolfo di Benedetti28 and the IZA, the Institute for the Study of Labor, in Bonn, examining not 
only pensions, but sickness benefit, in-work benefits, and unemployment policy reforms, to name 
                                                     
26 With the exception of Austria, which has a unique system of early retirement. 
27 Although not employed in the current study due to differing data structure and measurements, the author would 
like to deeply thank Dr. Juan Fernandez for sharing his data. 
28 The FRDB was established to “promote applied and policy-oriented research on labour markets and welfare 
systems in Europe” (2017). 
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a few. The FRDB-IZA database focuses on social and labor market reforms in the EU-15 
(excluding Luxembourg) over the period from 1980 to 2007.  
While the FRDB-IZA dataset provides an excellent springboard for establishing a 
compilation of standard pension reform parameters, a glance at additional resources (e.g. the 
International Social Security Administration, the “ISSA”) shows that that many other reform 
measures exist. Using this resource, a total of 22 reform measures were identified for the 
parameters established above out of the 120 that exist. Therefore, additional data collection was 
warranted to supplement the original source.        
 The ISSA provides another excellent source. Though the ISSA is not in dataset form, it 
provides a descriptive account of country reforms in a number of areas (e.g. sickness, disability, 
unemployment etc.). Thus, to supplement the FRDB-IZA data, this research collected qualitative 
data (ISSA) with the goal of summarizing and quantifying the number of reforms under the 
given parameters above.  While the ISSA does not provide as expansive a timeframe as the 
FRDB-IZA (ISSA data start around 1990-1995 and end around 2013), the former provides a 
complete set of countries (i.e. worldwide coverage). This allows for the examination of countries 
(e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States) that 
have not been party to the European Union but are still included in the present analysis.  Using 
the same guidelines for change, there appears to be insignificant overlap FRDB-IZA data, likely 
due to the differing time frames and country cases. In total ISSA adds many data points (47) to 
the dataset. 
Since both databases’ data collection end date predates that established in this research 
project, 2015, (FRDB-IZA in 2007 and ISSA in 2013), it is necessary to engage additional 
resources to gather reform measures in these latter years. To do so, the dataset uses LABREF 
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(2016) data, (which is also included in FRDB-IZA for years up to 2007). The LABREF Labor 
Market Reform Database is managed by the European Commission and compiles “enacted 
legislation” from the year 2000 to 2014 in nine areas of mostly active labor market policy. Three 
additional reforms were identified for the years 2007 to 2014 for early retirement ages from this 
data source.   
The dataset also draws on descriptive accounts of recent reforms from the OECD 
(Pensions Outlook) series. The OECD includes all advanced industrialized countries, and so all 
18 countries investigated here are covered by the publication.  Two publications within this 
series in particular (2012 and 2014 editions) have mapped out recent reforms across the OECD 
from 2007 to 2014 (OECD 2016)29. The OECD Pensions Outlook (OECD 2016) covers all 
aspects of the parameters established and adds 13 data points to the database.    
 Several other recent data sources were used. The Handbook of Western European 
Pension Politics, which examines Western European pension reforms from 1980 to 
approximately 2007, provides a wealth of data. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
completed a study on OECD countries and Chile from 1970 to 2004. This source identified 40 
data points. In addition, Fornero and Lo Prete (2017) compiled data from 21 advanced 
industrialized countries between 1990 and 2010, which also identified 40 data points. Finally, 
more than 40 national (and several international) sources30 were consulted to cross-check the 
dates and completeness of the datasets above. These later sources helped identify almost 20 
reforms that were not identified by any of the datasets.  
                                                     
29 Since this publication only goes up to 2014, the final year of the dataset was completed by also investigating 
recent news articles on changes in legislature. 
30 E.g. CES-Ifo DICE (2017) 
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Data Source Focus Countries Years # Cuts 
Identified31 
FRDB-IZA Social and Labor 
Market Reforms 
EU-15 1980-2007 22 
ISSA  Social and Labor 
Market Reforms 
Worldwide 1990-2013 47 
LABREF Social and Labor 
Market Reforms 
EU 2000-2014 3 
OECD Pensions 
Outlook  
Pensions Reforms OECD  Various  13 
Handbook of W. Eur 
Pension Politics 
Pension Reforms  West Europe 1980-2007 35 
GAO  Pension Reforms OECD + Chile 1970-2004 40 




National Level  Pension Reforms All 18 
Countries 
Various  1932 
Figure 5: Major Sources Used in Data Collection for Dependent Variable 
Evidence of Unpopular Retrenchment  
As the previous section hints, there are a fair number of instances of unpopular retrenchment. In 
total, 120 reforms were uncovered in the 18 countries, nearly 7 major unpopular reforms per 
country over the 26-year period from 1990 to 2015 period (inclusive). While at first glance, this 
may not seem like many reforms, if one were to assuming a political term of approximately 4 
years and even distribution of reform over country years, this would be as if every government in 
18 OECD countries underwent one highly unpopular reform during every period of tenure. 
Looking at these reform frequencies however, we can see that reforms seem to be more 
concentrated in certain years. There appear to be three major “waves” of pension reform. The 
first, in the early 1990s, peaking in 1994 and 1995, and declining again until a second (and more 
                                                     
31 Numbers do not sum to 120 because sources often identify overlapping data points. 
32 A thorough review of existing national level resources and international resources yielded several additional 
country data points above what the previous datasets showed. These additional sources include:  Parliament of 
Australia (2010); Parliament of Australia (2017); CesIfoDICE (2016); European Commission (2017) ; Eurofound 
(2015); De la Porte and Natali (2014); Social Security Administration (2013); Finnish Center for Politics (2017); 
Grangé (2017); Andersen (1997); CDG (1998); CADES (2017); Geraedts, Heller, and Harrington (2000); Eurofound 
(2013); Shen (2012); European Parliament (2012); Der Bundesrat (2018); Clausen (2007); Schludi (2005)   
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abrupt) peak in 2003, which declined until the most recent rise in unpopular reforms from 2009 
to around 2012. This supports, quantifies, and temporally extends the observation of Bonoli and 
Palier (2007), who described two waves of pension reform in the 1990s and the early 2000s 
(555) among five welfare states in the OECD.   
Figure 6:  Reform frequency from various resources (see Figure 5) 
Having shown the frequency of reforms over the 26-year period, the next section then breaks 
down the reforms by category, looking first at eligibility-oriented reforms (e.g. retirement age) 
and the second looking at four areas of benefit restricting reforms (i.e. indexation/valorization, 
taxation of benefits, benefit rate, and pension base) to discuss the degree of reforms in each. 
Retirement Age Increases               
Retirement ages have increased in many countries over the past 26 years, generally at first to 65, 
but then in the latter years after the mid-2000s to 6733.  Chart 1 shows these retirement age 
increases in 18 OECD countries.  From 1990 to 201534 there have been 46 retirement age 
                                                     























































































































increases in these countries, in early, minimum and full retirement ages35. Instances of reform 
span the length of the timeframe, with countries experiencing on average 1.7 reform years over 
the 26 years, so approximately one retirement reform year every fifteen years. On one side of this 
average, are countries like the United States, which did not experience any retirement age reform 
over the time period.36 On the other side of the average are countries like Italy which had five 
years of retirement age reform over the period. In Italy, for instance, increased its old age 
pension retirement age in 1992 from 60 to 65 (for those with 15 years of contributions up to 20 
years of contributions) then in 1995 moved the seniority pension from 52 to 57, which became a 
flexible system37. Ten years later in 2004, the seniority pension was adjusted again from 57 to 
62, and then again in 2011 from 62 to 65.3. The old age pension eligibility age was again 
changed from 65 to 67. (Afterward the age will rise with life expectancy and is expected to go to 
69 years and 9 months by 2050, however if this does not happen, there is still a guarantee that the 
age will rise to at least 67). Those with 40 years of contributions could retire at any age, though 
retirement in general became flexible between 62 and 70 years old.   
What is interesting about examining reforms is that they give us a look at changes 
coming in the future. The reforms in the later part of the 2000, for instance, are often not yet 
reflected in generosity data, as they have not been implemented yet. Though in many cases there 
is little to no gap between year adopted and the year implementation starts, in others the lag can 
be very long. Denmark’s reform in 2006 will take 18 years until implementation begins. 
                                                     
35 Though not shown here in the chart, it is possible to have multiple retirement age reforms in a single reform year, 
as a country can choose to alter minimum, full, and/or early retirement. Reform instances in which the retirement 
age is adjusted by life expectancy are also counted as a retirement age reform.  
36 The US did however, in this time frame, start the process of implementing a retirement age reform passed in 1983 




Figure 7: Calculations Based on Data Collected from Various Sources, See ex.Figure 5.   
United Kingdom’s reform in 2007 will not even begin to take place for another 17 years in 2024, 
and Italy will wait 10 years after its reform date to 2021 before the age begins to rise to 67. In 
addition to these retirement age reforms, a number of countries went to flexible retirement 
systems, which specify not a single fixed age, but a range in which retirement is possible.  Italy 
started this system in 1995 (57 to 65) and maintained the system through 2011, though with the 
ages shifted 5 years later to (62 to 70). Sweden also adopted a flexible age system in 1995, which 
was adjustable on an actuarial basis. The reform was implemented two years later in 1997. Yet 
another two Scandinavian countries followed in Sweden’s footsteps, Finland (in 2005) and 
Norway in 2010.  Many of these countries (whether with fixed or flexible ages) also have also 
passed measures to adjust the retirement age on an actuarial basis to take into account 
demographic changes. Denmark (in 2006) and Italy (in 2012) created precisely these links, based 
on life expectancy of the population. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, legislated in 
2014 that as of 2017, the government must review the retirement age every six years.  
 Some countries not only increased their retirement age, but later opted to accelerate the 
implementation of the reform. Granted, implantation accelerations are not counted here as major 
Retirement Age Reforms 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Australia X X








Italy X X X X X
Japan X X
Netherlands X X X








reforms, as they are only a shift in the timetable of an existing reform, rather than a new reform 
per se. Nevertheless, they are noteworthy in that it is a potential reaction to the country’s fiscal or 
other realities at the moment. For instance, in Italy the retirement age was shifted from 60 to 65 
in 1992 and set to be implemented fully by 2002. However, three years later (1995), the full 
implementation date was moved forward to 2000. Over the course of 2014 to 2015, the 
Netherlands too, shifted its implementation end date up sooner from 2023 to 2021. Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, and France have all followed suit in moving their retirement age changes into 
the more immediate future.     
Indexation and Valorization: 
Another area of reforms is that of indexation and valorization. In particular, the dataset reveals 
that there have been 33 instances of valorization and indexation retrenchment in the 18 countries 
investigated. In many cases, these have been shifts from wages (which have historically risen 
faster) to prices, or to some less generous version of prices.   Furthermore, just like for retirement 
ages, pension benefits can also be adjusted for sustainability or demographic factors. This 
represents a new genre of “indexation”. Many countries including Austria (1997), Finland 
(2004), Norway (2006), Sweden (1998), Germany (1997), Sweden (2009) added a 
demographic/life expectancy, or sustainability index, which are used to update pensions in 
payment according to the realities of the country. In some cases, e.g. in Finland the index is a 
life-expectancy “coefficient”.  In other cases, the country (also) has an index based on financial 
status.  Sweden’s “balancing mechanism” for instance, is based on the average value of the 
buffer fund over the past 3 years (changed in 2010 from the past 1 year, which was a de facto 
retrenchment).  In essentially all cases, these new indices provide a less than generous change of 
the pension in payment. 
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 It is important to note that while not identified as part of these 33 “parametric reforms” 
(as they did not make a long-term change to the parameters of the system); there have also been 
several temporary measures that were put in place under challenging conditions. First off there 
were freezes in the adjustment factor (usually for pensions over a certain threshold).  Indexation 
freezes were legislated in, for instance, Finland (1994), Italy (1993-1995, 2012), Austria (2011), 
France (1994, 2014), and Japan (2012). In other cases (rare increased benefit), the benefit is 
extended beyond the standard indexation. These happened for instance in Belgium (2008), 
France (2010), and Germany (2008), the latter of which saw indexation of 1.1 percent rather than 
under 2005 rules at .46 percent. 
Benefit Accrual/Rate Changes  
In addition to changes in retirement age and valorization/indexation, there have also been 
handful (i.e. 14) changes to benefit rates/ceilings. In Denmark, for instance, legislation (L314) 
passed in 1993 reduced the basic pension and in Sweden in 1994 it was established that both the 
basic pension and ATP pension would be decreased, by taking into account 98 percent of the 
pension base, rather than the full pension base. In the Pension Reform Act of 2000 passed in 
March 2000, Japan’s Employee’s Pension Insurance (EPI) accrual rate was legislated to decrease 
from .75 percent per year to .7125 percent per year. Germany followed suit in the 2001 Riester 
Reform, when the replacement rate was decreased from 70 percent to 64 percent38.  Austria then 
saw a reduction passed in 2003 bringing the accrual rate from 2 percent to 1.78 percent, and in 
the same year, Switzerland reformed its occupational pension scheme, by reducing the BVG/LPP 
conversion rate from 7.2 percent to 6.8. It furthermore legislated that the Federal Council could 
                                                     
38 This was later rescinded 
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reduce the interest rate on benefits, resulting in a reduction from 4 percent in 2003 to 1.25 
percent in 2016.   
Taxation of Benefits: 
There are also 14 instances of increases in taxation on benefits, which can be considered a net 
retrenchment, as taxation will reduce the final replacement rate of the benefit. The earliest of 
these in the timeframe examined is France in 1990, when the contribution sociale généralisée 
(CSG) was introduced at 1.1 percent of the benefit. This tax would increase once again (to 2.4 
percent) during the 1993 “Balladur Reform”, again to 3.4 percent under the Social Security 
Finance Act of December 27, 1996 and to 7.5 percent under Law n 97-1164 of December 19, 
1997 of Social Security Financing for 1998. France also added another general tax on the benefit 
through Ordonnance n.96-50 of January 24, 1996 called the contribution au remboursement de la 
dette sociale (CRDS) set at .5 percent. Both the CGS and the CRDS were taxed not on the entire 
benefit, but only on 95 percent of the benefit. Still, this percentage would increase in another 
retrenchment, when the Act of August 13, 2004 adjusted both CRDS and CGS to be taxed on 97 
percent of the benefit, and again to 98.25 percent in the Social Security Finance Act for 2012. 
While France had the most taxation reform measures, other countries also experienced change in 
taxation to benefits. In 1994 Germany added taxation on social security benefits for long term 
care, at .85 percent of the benefit, which increased to 1.7 in the Amendments to the German 
Social Security Code (SGB VI) 12/2003. The following year social security benefits, which were 
not taxable by income tax became fully taxable at the income tax rate. The 2008 law, the 
Regulation Establishing the Contribution Rates in the Statutory Health Insurance Scheme 
(Verordnung zur Festlegung der Beitragssätze in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung) (2008), 
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increased long-term taxation rates on pensions to 8.2 percent.                         
Extension of Assessment Period: 
In addition to the aforementioned reform measures there have also been 12 instances of pension 
base assessment extensions, in which there is an increase in the number of years on which the 
pension is based. These represent a cutback in that they increase the number of years considered, 
thereby decreasing the final generosity of the benefit by including into the pension calculation 
more years of likely lower wage history. The is most clear when the average takes into account a 
higher number of “best” years, as France where, the “Balladur” reform shifted the calculation 
from the best 10 to the best 25 years. However, the total replacement rate can also be shifted 
down by including more “last” years in the calculation. For instance, it is typically the case the 
workers earn their highest income in the latter years of their career. Therefore including more 
preceding years in the calculation brings the total generosity of the benefit down In Italy, for 
instance the “Amato reform”, which “reduced the net pension liabilities by more than 100 
percent of GDP” (IMF 2007, 13) expanded the assessment base from the last 5 years of earnings 
to the last 10 years of earnings for the older beneficiaries and from the last 5/10 years to lifetime 
earnings for younger beneficiaries. This can also be completed in another sense by starting 
accrual from age 18 rather than age 23 (again, typically a lower wage point).  
Country  Year Before Reform After Reform  
Italy  1992 Last 5/10 Lifetime  
Italy  1992 Last 5  Last 10  
France  1993 Best 10  Best 25 
Austria  1993 Last 10 Best 15 
Sweden  1994 Best 15 years  Lifetime  
Finland  1995 Last 4  Last 10  
Canada 1997 Last 3 Last 5 
Netherlands 2000 Final Pay  Average Pay  
Finland  2003 Accrue from Age 23 Accrue from Age 18 
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Finland  2003 Last 10  Lifetime  
Austria  2003 Best 15 Best 40  
Norway  2009 Highest 20  Lifetime  
      Figure 8: Estimations of Base Year Changes, Based on Agglomerated Data Sources 
A few descriptive examples from CWED 2 (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2013) show how these 
reform changes data compare with changes in replacement rates. Looking at the chart below, we 
see that all three countries (United States, France and Sweden) experience retrenchment starting 
in 1980s that affects pension benefit generosity (in this case for the average earner in each 
country). This 1980s downturn is most abrupt for the United States and for Sweden. Within the 
period covered by the reforms data above (1990 and after), there is a corresponding and 
continual tapering in generosity for France and Sweden and reduced benefit replacement rate in 
the United States. In the case of the United States, there is no parametric change in the 1990s to 
the 2015 period that is responsible for the shift. While the country passed retirement age reforms 
in 1983 that are to be phased in 2000 to 2027, these changes are not reflected here as the 
replacement rates calculations take into account the legal age as the retirement age standard, 






























Figure 9: Source: Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto (2013) 
changes to the instances of reform in the early 1990s (i.e. changes to the pension base), which 
would decrease generosity. The 1993 Balladur reform, increased the reference period from the 
best 10 to the best 25 years to be phased in from 1994 to 2008, which matches the gradual 
downward trend in the chart, showing benefit implementation. In the case of Sweden the 
replacement rates also mirror, though in a gradual sense the changes after early 1990s, when the 
country shifted to a Notional Defined Contribution system, implementing a number of 
retrenchment measures. Among these, the system that was previously based on best 15 years 
would now take into account lifetime earnings, and the pensions were to be adjusted to take into 
account rising life expectancy and income growth. 
Conclusion 
Responding to the scholarly need for a quantitative assessment of retrenchment frequency, this 
chapter provided a major inclusive and comprehensive look at 5 major areas of unpopular 
cutbacks to publicly-administered pensions for private sector workers. This chapter has shown 
that there have been 120 major unpopular private-sector workers’ pension reform measures in 18 
OECD countries over two and a half decades. These reforms affected retirement ages, indexation 
and valorization measures, benefit/accrual rates, taxation on benefits, and pension base changes. 
To get a sense of the frequency of the reforms, were they equally distributed they would appear 
approximately once every political term. Nevertheless, these reforms appear to have occurred in 
series of waves peaking in the mid-1990s, around 2003 and following the late 2000s economic 
downturn. Having identified the degree of variation on the dependent variable, it is now possible 
to examine the factors that may affect the frequency of these reforms. The next chapter (Chapter 
4) examines these factors through regression analysis.  
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Chapter 4: When Does Unpopular Retrenchment Occur?: 
An Analysis of Pension Reform in the OECD 
 
 
When do politicians make unpopular cutbacks, given that these leaders are beholden to the 
public for re-election? Scholars have varied explanations, from the structural “push” side and the 
actor-centered “pull” side (Kitschelt 2001).  To answer this question, this chapter considers both 
of these major explanations. On the structural push side, scholars have frequently looked at 
fiscal-economic problem pressures, however mainly as slow-moving continuous variables. Only 
recently have studies begun to examine the effect of acute crisis on reform (Steinebach, Knill, 
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and Jordana 2017) and still fewer studies look at the specific effect of a fiscal-economic 
downturn on unpopular retrenchment measures. Hypothesizing that it is acute downturn- rather 
than incremental structural shifts that trigger unpopular reform, this chapter develops an 
indicator of financial-economic downturn and tests its significance for unpopular retrenchment. 
The chapter also tests the effect of partisanship to determine if it is right-wing parties that drive 
these major instances of unpopular retrenchment, or if there is little difference between parties in 
this area. Using regression analysis, this chapter seeks to re-examine the effect of financial-
economic downturn and partisanship on the likelihood of one major type of unpopular reform-
unpopular pension retrenchment measures- in 18 OECD countries over 26 years (1990 to 2015).  
The “Push” of Problem Pressures 
The large body of literature that discusses reasons for retrenchment reflects the discipline-wide 
debates over the roles of structure and agency (Hall and Taylor 1996, Heclo 2008). On the 
structural side, when asked to “round up the usual suspects” (Schwartz 2001) contributing to 
welfare state retrenchment, the first alleged culprits tend to be “problem pressures.”  These are 
exogenous economic and demographic factors that are said to place stress on the welfare state 
budget, sometimes even to the point of threatening the functioning of the system (Vis and Van 
Kersbergen). In their purest form, functionalist explanations propose that “social policies are the 
unmediated response to social and economic pressures. Potentially intervening forces 
…are…either neutral towards or fully determined by socio-economic change. Welfare states do 
what they need to do in the face of socio-economic challenge” (173).   
A standard social policy challenge discussed in the literature is the slow-moving 
“structural” pressures challenging the welfare state’s sustainability in general, and pensions 
especially. This pressure can come from restricted financial inflows (taxes or contributions) 
and/or excessive financial outflows (benefit payouts). On the inflow side, scholars point out that 
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a slowing economy and increasing structural unemployment threaten the welfare state (Huber 
and Stephens 2001). This trend is essentially the reverse of what was documented in the welfare 
state development literature; a burgeoning post-war economy, which allowed rich industrialized 
nations to channel funds into social programs for unemployment, sickness, old-age, and other 
social services (Wilensky 1975). These early functionalists saw economic growth as “the 
irreplaceable foundation of the traditional welfare state” (Pierson 1996, 133), which allowed 
“capital investment, the stimulus to support economic activity at all levels, [the] secur[ity of] full 
employment and the foundation of resources for increased expenditure on health, education, 
welfare and social services” (Pierson 1996, 133). Just as economic growth could explain the rise 
of the welfare state, the slow contraction of the economy over the past 40 years has created 
tension on these same social services, argue many scholars, as the tax and contribution bases to 
support the welfare state have started to dry up (Huber and Stephens 2001, Taylor-Gooby 2001).   
 At the same time many countries have experienced another “sea-level” change that has 
affected both “inputs” and “outputs”, the demographic balance. Just as demographic change was 
deemed to play a role in the rise of the welfare state, by creating new needs (Wilensky 1975), 
this same factor is expected by some to continue to shape the welfare state in the post-1970s 
period.  One of the most important of these is the progressive aging of the population in 
advanced industrialized states, due to rising life expectancies and lower birth rates.  The 
population of people over age 80 in Europe, for instance, is expected to double by 2050 (EPRS 
2017).  In a pay-as-you-go welfare model, where each generation funds the benefits of the 
previous, this demographic change means that there are fewer economically active individuals 
supporting a larger pensioner pool (Esping-Andersen and Sarasa 2002).  Castles (2004) points 
out that governments and analysts (including the World Bank, the OECD, the CSIS) are quick to 
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raise the alarm about the consequences of ageing populations, specifically the potential impact 
on the budget of sick pay and pensions plans. As the dependency ratio becomes increasingly out 
of balance, there is expected to be a large increase in public spending, without the same level of 
financial inflow from contributors. For instance, the public expenditure related to age (i.e. 
pensions, health care, long-term care and education) stood at 24.6 percent of GDP in the EU, and 
is predicted to rise by nearly 2 percentage points between 2013 and 206039. According to 
scholars, this factor should put pressure on politicians to rebalance programs according to new 
demographic realities and secure the budget. Granted, a larger elderly population should also put 
pressure on politicians to keep commitments (Taylor Gooby 2001, 37), and possibly even 
increase welfare state transfers (especially in pensions)40. However, at the same time the increase 
in the dependency ratio is expected to “reduc[e] the willingness of the working-age population to 
[accept] higher taxes and transfers” (Razin 2001, 294)41, making the effect, on balance, a 
negative one (i.e. an increased dependency ratio leads to reduced transfers and taxes).  
Finally, in addition to demographic changes, others point out that global changes can 
have an impact on the welfare state, i.e. globalization. While some suggest that globalization 
may actually have a compensatory effect42, most “problem pressure” theorists, see globalization 
as a force for retrenchment rather than increased taxation and spending (e.g. Cameron 1978, 
Katzenstein 1985). This has much to do with structural pressures from the wider global market. 
First, the gradual increase in import-export competition can affect the employment market by 
“provok[ing] concern about levels of taxation …and social insurance contributions that bear 
directly on labor costs” (Taylor-Gooby 2001, 16).  The fluctuation of economic balance and 
                                                     
39 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/structural_reforms/ageing/pdf/memo_2015_ageing_report_en.pdf 
40 See Welfare States Under Pressure 
41 http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/conf/conf46/conf46j.pdf 
42 Unlike the downward pressure discussed above, as Garrett (1998) asserts, economic pressures actually produces 
political incentives for politicians to protect those “adversely affected by market dislocations” (11). 
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increased unemployment coming from these global pressures can also erode the cohesive unions 
that push for welfare increases (Taylor-Gooby 2001,21). As Bonoli (2007) notes, “during the 
postwar years, low-skill workers were predominantly employed in the manufacturing industry. 
They were able to benefit from productivity increases because of technological advances so that 
their wages rose in line with those of the rest of the population” (499).     
 However, when deindustrialization began, and jobs began to be outsourced, these low-
skilled workers were left with lower wage service sector positions, or unemployment (Bonoli 
2007). While the dire predictions of a “race to the bottom” have not materialized, scholars still 
assert that countries are expected engage in a cycle of aggressive cutbacks in order to maintain 
competitiveness in trade on the global market. As mobile capital goes to the most business-
friendly region, it is expected that countries should continue to cut their social welfare budgets to 
attract business. This may have an influence not so much in the sense of a “race to the bottom,” 
however it is likely to put a cap on the degree of taxation that can be undertaken to remedy 
problems with old age or sickness benefits, making it more likely for politicians to consider 
cutbacks.  Granted, some empirical investigations of this factor have not proven significant (e.g. 
Allan and Scruggs 2004).  To summarize, slow-moving “crises” have put pressure on welfare 
states across the OECD and scholars often predict that these will have an effect on the likelihood 
of retrenchment. Indeed, retrenchment is more likely than in the golden-age of welfare, yet can 
these factors predict moments of reform in the current period?  
From Gradual Change to Acute Downturns: 
This chapter posits that while these slow-moving factors are often an underlying cause for 
pension vulnerability to unpopular reform, it is acute moments of fiscal-economic downturn that 
trigger such change. As the previous section introduced, the literature has examined a number of 
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“push-side” problem pressures that may affect the chances of retrenchment (e.g. declining 
growth, growing deficits). These factors are seen as continuous variables: i.e. a very small x unit 
shift in the economy, or the demographic imbalance, or trade will is expected to lead to a y unit 
change in spending or replacement rates. However, given the colossal political will (and public 
backlash) involved in enacting such unpopular legislation in pensions or sickness, it is unlikely 
that such a small shift in slow-moving variables like globalization or structural unemployment 
will result in a major unpopular change. What is critical instead is a much greater sense of acute 
downturn.  Most of the literature welfare states in most OECD countries have experienced 
significant pressure by the imbalance between contributors and beneficiaries. Yet, despite these 
challenges, politicians seek to deflect blame and will often pass the burden of the systemic 
pressures onto the next administration (Pierson 1996). This is said to exist because the public has 
become attached these benefits and will electorally punish any politicians who try to retrench the 
welfare state (Brooks and Manza 2007).  In addition, new cross-class welfare beneficiaries 
including pensioners, disabled individuals, and healthcare recipients have emerged as “veto 
players” who support social programs (e.g. AARP).        
 Because of these new entrenched interests and public opinion, the welfare state has 
become a “third rail” issue of politics, despite the constant incremental rise of the old-age 
dependency ration or slow downshifting of the economy in most OECD countries, and despite 
the fact that the pension spending makes up nearly a fifth of all general government spending in 
many of these countries (e.g. in 2010 pension spending was 22.2 percent in Austria, 21.2 percent 
in France, and 26.9 percent in Italy).         
 However, this is not to say that retrenchment is impossible. Certain fiscal and economic 
moments may heighten the demand for action and yet simultaneously restrict the room for 
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alternatives to retrenchment. On the economic side two factors may matter for creating the need 
for action. Recessions, for one, appear to be a clear marker to the public and politicians of a 
pivotal point that would be difficult to downplay to the public. Green-Pedersen (2001) describes 
how a recession in Denmark “crisis awareness” (Petersen et al. 1996) among voters and the 
understanding that some action was needed for recovery. Schludi (2005) states that the “short-
term pension cutbacks” in Sweden were also “largely enacted as a response to the dramatic 
economic …crisis in the early to mid-1990s” (97). Aside from recession, large scale increases (at 
least a percentage point in a given year) of unemployment rates are another major indicator of 
economic imbalance, with a sharp increase in the unemployment rate within a single year as one 
understanding of major economic downturn (OECD 2012).  
On the financial side, the budgetary markers of the Maastricht Treaty may also be seen as 
points of major downturn which, when passed, trigger the need for immediate action. Members 
of the European Union must annually report their expected fiscal plans vis a vis certain fiscal 
standards (the “preventive arm”) and may face sanctions for non-compliance (the “dissuasive 
arm”). Although the Maastricht Treaty fiscal thresholds of 60 percent of GDP for debt and 3 
percent of GDP for deficit are standards that apply legally only to the European Union countries 
and are periodically breached, they are important not so much because of their punitive effects or 
threat of punishment, but because they are more broadly, international norms of fiscal health, in 
which the major threat to governments is the immediate flight of investment. Mosley (2000) 
describes in her interviews of investors, the 3 percent GDP threshold was held by almost all 
interviewees as a critical marker of fiscal health internationally and therefore their willingness to 
invest in a given economy. Investors consider these markers because they fear that a country 
with high deficit and debt may try to inflate their way out of economic problems in the future.  
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Therefore, “government that adhered to [the budgetary] rules [of the Maastricht Treaty], quickly 
gained credibility with financial markets” (Mosley 2003, 68). Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that 
financial institutions such as IMF, also takes 60 percent of GDP as a common cutoff for 
“moderate” debt, urging countries that are above this level to “balance budgets and pare back” 
(Farnsworth and Irving 2011, 17).  This Maastricht standard is furthermore highlighted in recent 
economic literature on advanced industrialized countries in Europe and beyond (see Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2010, who describe debt above 60 percent as “high”). 
When a country crosses these economic and fiscal thresholds, it is expected that 
politicians in power will be pushed to immediate action, as these standards relate directly to 
public opinion and a politician’s electability. A broad and well-established literature, “economic 
voting” shows that that voters (who also prioritize the economy in crisis moments (Singer 2011, 
Singer 2013), will punish incumbents for a poor economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007)43   
On the fiscal side, increased debt and deficit that provoke higher interest rates, can produce such 
high unemployment, low investment and low growth (Mosley 2000). Therefore “if we assume 
that democratically elected governments are motivated by a desire to remain in office (that is, 
they are office-seeking), and that voters respond to economic conditions, we can expect all 
governments to be sensitive to the economic impact of changes in interest rates” (ibid, 764).  
Indeed case studies, such as Schludi (2005) seems to support this case:  “Italy was experiencing 
extraordinary short-term pressure to meet the financial convergence criteria laid down in the 
Maastricht Treaty, which only allowed for a budget deficit of 3 percent of GDP…given the fact 
that Italy’s budget deficit in 1997 still exceeded 7 percent of GDP, drastic steps were needed to 
                                                     
43 It is important to note that certainly, retrenchment is not “the only game in town”  (Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005, 
177). A study of social reforms during the recent recession, for instance, revealed that “retrenchment featured 
prominently on the agenda everywhere, but nowhere by itself” (Vis, Van Kersbergen, Hemerjick 2014). Increased 
compensation for those who lost jobs and wages during the recession, still did occur, but rarely. 
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reduce the budget deficit, including new pension cuts, most notably seniority pensions” (Schludi 
2005, 118). Looking at pension privatization measures in European countries, Hennessy (2014) 
points out that perhaps “Maastricht-induced pressure may be seen as a way of overcoming the 
time inconsistency problem political invariably confront, namely incurring costs in the present to 
realize a collective good—in this case, a reduced social security pension deficit—in the future” 
(33). While concurring with the logic of this statement, this chapter argues that the pressure of 
Maastricht criteria is not only restricted to Maastricht signatories, but can impact other 
economically advanced democracies. 
At the same time that these factors create an impetus for change, their mutual presence 
restricts alternative options available to politicians to regain credibility. For instance, countries 
experiencing major deficit will seek to signal to investors that they are able to pay debt, however 
if the country is simultaneously in recession, the promise of short-term growth (and even the 
promise of longer-run growth) is not a credible solution to exit a major debt situation. Thus 
politicians must consider other options, such as fiscal consolidation to signal their commitment 
to investors44.  Similarly, if a country is experiencing an unemployment spike or growth 
downturn, the government may seek to boost demand through stimulus measures, however if the 
country is simultaneously breaching the deficit and debt thresholds, this may become a 
prohibitive option. Thus, echoing the words of Mosely (2000), with less “room to move”, 
politicians may turn to the reduction of non-wage labor costs (including contributions and 
taxation) and corresponding benefits, to reduce unemployment and stimulate economic growth (     
)45.  In fact, as one of the largest-ticket budgetary items, pensions are frequently in the spotlight 
                                                     
44 Add citation 




for cutbacks, a way to balance the overall budget (see Wilson 2000).  In the words of Karger 
(2014),  
“there is a general belief among may European policymakers that the current debt problem in 
some Eurozone countries is caused by the unsustainable levels of governmental spending 
required to maintain overly generous welfare state programs, a bloated public sector, overly 
generous pension levels, state subsidies, and low user fees for services. Their proposed solution 
lies in implementing stringent austerity measures designed to discipline debt-ridden governments 
by cutting public budgets, reducing the number of public sector workers, curbing social benefits, 
and sharply narrowing the scope of the welfare state” (33).    
 
Given that the solutions available to them are fewer, parties should be more likely to engage in 
retrenchment under this scenario. In particular, a downturn makes public and urgent what 
politicians may have been hide or avoid, making “blame avoidance” more difficult.  This 
dissertation therefore hypothesizes the following about structural and acute crises over the 1990 
to 2015 period:  
H1: Large-scale financial-economic downturns should increase the likelihood of unpopular 
retrenchment 
The “Pull” of Partisanship:  
Moving from the “push” of structural factors, this section looks at the “pull” of partisanship. The 
traditional partisanship scholarship highlights that whereas the left tends to be more of a 
sustainer of the welfare state, the right is more prone to retrenchment. The roots of this 
assessment go back to the development of the welfare state, which, these scholars argue, was 
never a given, simply based on economic demand. Instead, they note that the growth of the 
welfare state hinged on the left, or more specifically, the strength of the left—an idea 
summarized in the well-known46 “power-resources” model (Allan and Scruggs 2004, Esping-
Andersen 1985; Garrett 1998; Hicks 1999; Hicks and Swank 1992; Iversen and Cusack 2000; 
Korpi 1983). According to this model, established by Walter Korpi in the 1980s, left parties and 
                                                     
46 The “power-resource model” has become one of the leading, if not the “leading approach in comparative politics 
to explaining patterns of welfare state expansion” (Pierson 1996, 150). 
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unions, representing the working class, engaged in “institutionally mediated [democratic] power 
struggles” (Zutavern and Kohli 2010, 174) using their “power resources,”47 (Korpi 2006, 77) to 
determine the distribution of resources. Welfare states emerged when these left-parties and labor 
movement representatives had greater power resources, because in these cases state 
representatives were more likely to side with the left, and bring about promises of welfare 
benefits (87). Esping- Anderson (1990) likewise points out that “the nature of class mobilization 
(especially of the working class); class-political coalition structures; and the historical legacy of 
regime institutionalization are at the heart of welfare growth (Esping-Andersen 1990, 18-34). 
Scholars of party mobilization e.g. (Hicks and Swank 1992) support this argument (that left and 
center parties are more welfare-friendly). Unlike the left, right parties, they note, have 
historically have tended to slow the growth of the welfare state. Castles (1982) for example, 
argues that the degree of unity of right-wing parties determines left strength and the success of 
social policies. Many scholars posit therefore that partisanship effects, which were was so 
prominent in the pre-1970s period, are still present today although less intensely. Researchers 
(Iversen and Wren 1998, Garrett 1998, Rudra 2002, Allan and Scruggs 2004, Hicks and Swank 
1992) argue that left parties (more than right parties) are concerned with the eradication of 
inequalities and the support of labor.  Right parties, in contrast, after the end of this “golden age 
of welfare” have attempted to cut back benefits (Amable, Gatti and Schumacher 2006) and could 
do so without fear of retribution from the electorate (Schumacher, Vis and Van Kersbergen 
2013). Even if the public broadly rejects cutbacks in pension benefits, it is more likely supporters 
of the right who would be willing to cutback in the name of fiscal reconciliation.   
                                                     
47 That is, the “characteristics which provide actors—individuals or collectivities—with the ability to punish or 
reward other actors” (e.g. in the form of public and wage-earner support, high integration, coordination, and intra-
party support) (Korpi 2006, 77). 
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While the partisanship thesis has been a mainstay of the welfare state literature, recent 
literature highlights that parties frequently do not act in the expected manner. The reasons for 
these shifts are, as scholars note, because of changing public preferences (Hausermann 2001) 
over the past few decades.  Whereas pension issues used to be dominated by one social cleavage 
(labor versus capital), with the former more “welfare friendly” than the latter,  new-post-
materialist issues have emerged (Hausermann, Picot and Geering 2013), creating new “cross-
cutting” values (Hausermann 2010) that split libertarians and authoritarians with traditional 
values (see Kitschelt 1994). Hausermann (2010) for instance shows that these splits occur along 
lines of labor market insiders and outsiders. Women, for instance, who were left out of 
traditional “insider” pension benefits are more likely to support liberal values as opposed to 
traditional values, and will have different pension demands than the average male production 
worker.   
Granted, in two party systems still dominated by a single social cleavage, the traditional 
left-right partisan dynamics may still be significant (Hausermann, Picot, and Geering 2013). 
However, in multi-party systems, these new preferences crystallize through emerging parties 
with unique platforms: i.e. populist and green parties.  As the authors note, “cleavage-based 
considerations change the expected orientations and strategies of parties through polarization and 
fractionalization of the party system, parties arguably become representatives of more specific 
groups, so that we would expect their policy preferences to be narrower”.  Therefore, in these 
systems, the “average production worker” may drift from the center-left (and occasionally from 
the center-right) toward the far right (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015, Hausermann, Picot and 
Geering 2013) when this is a viable option that appeals to the voter’s particular preference. 
  Given their status supporting traditional welfare insiders, these far right supporters (and 
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their parties) are expected to support pro-pension policies48.  Unlike center-right market-liberal 
parties that may be more willing to cutback for the sake of improving the economy, the far right 
is more “conservative” on the social side, and therefore is expected to espouse a nationalistic and 
anti-immigrant welfare “chauvinist” policy (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). They are 
predicted to highlight sustained or even increased benefits for their “deserving” beneficiaries, 
while simultaneously rejecting pension benefits for “undeserving” outsiders. We can see this in 
populist party platforms. The National Front wrote of immigration as a threat to its essential 
pension system, “a great risk that we will no longer be able to pay our pensions and, above all, 
that we will see disappear our thousand-year old identity and the French people itself." (Betz 
1993, 417).  The FPO in Austria too, performed well in the 1990 elections among workers, 
employees, and pensioners (421) and when the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) voters refused a 
pension retrenchment bill in a 2004 referendum (628), elites of the party then, alongside the left, 
also refused to compromise to cut pensions. As Alfonso and Papadopoulos (2015) put it, “While 
such reform compromise [to retrench pension benefits] was passed in the Council of States, 
where [the center-right] FDP and CVP hold a majority, it was ultimately defeated in the lower 
chamber by a blocking coalition of Social Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party. For the 
Social Democrats, this reform involved too many measures of retrenchment and not enough 
opportunities for workers in strenuous occupations to retire early. ” For the far right, the “cuts in 
the adjustment of existing benefits to inflation (benefitting ‘insiders’ of the scheme)” were unfair 
(Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). Even those Danish and Norwegian Progress parties, which 
advocated many free-market policies, “…came out in support for higher pensions…” (Betz 1994, 
110).  Given their tendency to support traditional beneficiaries of pension plans, far right cabinet 
                                                     
48 Generally speaking, however at times (Hausermann  2010) they may compromise on these traditional pension 
politics issues in reform coalitions to make gains in other areas of pensions policy, and/or engaging in office-seeking 
behavior (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015) to the detriment of vote-seeking behavior.  
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portfolios are subtracted from the total right measurement, and the following hypothesis is 
proposed:    
H2: The higher the percentage of center-right wing cabinet portfolios (minus far-right), the 
higher the likelihood of unpopular retrenchment. 
Data and Methods  
Acute Fiscal-Economic Downturn: 
This dissertation posits that while they put pressure on the pension system, slow-moving 
structural factors are largely insufficient to spur reform and must be supplemented by a crisis.  It 
seeks to identify those moments that are almost undeniable moments of downturn for each 
country, that cause politicians to reassess the situation and put potential cuts back on the table. 
This variable of crisis is therefore a combination of two aspects of crisis: fiscal crisis and 
economic crisis, and is an additive index of 0 to 4 points.  On the fiscal side a crisis will be when 
a country no longer meets the deficit avoidance requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) of the European Union49, whose guidelines are seen as a standard international definition 
of healthy finances, which might affect pensions (Natali 2008)50. The SGP definition identifies 
countries as having poor fiscal policy if their deficit is higher than 3 percent of GDP. This acute 
measure of crisis is expected to have an impact. Net lending/net borrowing as a percent of GDP 
data were gathered from the OECD.  If deficit is higher than 3 percent of GDP then it gains a 
crisis point, if not then it does not (0). If a country breaches the 60 percent threshold then it gains 
an additional crisis point (1).  Data on debt were gathered from the International Monetary Fund, 
as General Gross Government Debt as a percent of GDP. 
                                                     
49 The SGP entered into force in the late 1990s 
50 Natali (2008) describes several European cases (e.g. Belgium) where adherence to the SPG/ EU treaty may have 
affected pension policy options. 
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While countries may cross over the fiscal line, they will be in heightened “crisis” when 
also hit by a recession. While there is debate over what precisely constitutes a recession in a 
country, one common definition is at the country experiences at least two consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP growth (Layton and Banerji 2003). These recession years will be denoted as 1 and 
in years where there is no recession, there will be no crisis point for this factor (0). This is 
established from OECD quarterly data (OECD 2011). While negative GDP growth is an 
excellent indicator of recession, as Layton and Banerji (2003) mention, other factors should be 
taken into account when measuring such a crisis. This dissertation also considers unemployment 
at a rate of at least 1 percentage point increase as a major indicator of economic crisis. Countries 




This chapter also seeks to gauge the importance of partisanship for the likelihood of reform. To 
do so, this dissertation uses a partisanship measure often employed in the literature on welfare 
state politics, strength of the right as measured by the percent of the cabinet that is filled by right-
wing party members. The data for this variable span from 1990 to 2015, and were gathered from 
Armingeon’s Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS). For robustness checks, far right parties’ 
cabinet portfolios are subtracted from the total right wing share (using Swank 2013) , as these 
parties may not expected to seek to decrease traditional pensioner benefits.  Furthermore, the 





The first independent variable seeks to capture the vulnerability of the pension system. One 
common measure of such vulnerability is the old age dependency ratio, used to get a sense of the 
balance (or imbalance) between contributors and beneficiaries. In particular it is the “ratio of 
older dependents --people older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64.  Data 
are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population” (World Bank 2017). 
A ratio of .25, therefore would imply that 25 dependents are being supported by 100 workers (or 
for every 1 dependent there are four workers supporting him/her). A higher old-age dependency 
ratio indicates that more dependents are being supported for the same number of workers, while 
lower ratios indicate the opposite. Existing studies hint that as the ratio rises, the pressure on the 
pension system (and thus the likelihood of reform) should increase, a claim that this dissertation 
chapter seeks to test.  Data were collected from the World Bank (2017) and measure age the 
dependency ratio, that is the elderly population as a percent of the working-age population. 
Corporatism: 
The final variable to be taken into account in this regression analysis is corporatism. Corporatism 
can be understood as “the co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of the national 
economy by the state, centralized unions, and employers (these latter two co-operating directly in 
industry), presumably to the relative benefit of all three actors” ( Siaroff 1999, 177). Siaroff 
(1999) states that those without such coordination are called “pluralist” states.  One common 
example of corporatist activities is wage bargaining (Ehrlich). It is expected those countries that 
have a lower corporatist score will experience more retrenchment than countries with a higher 
corporatism score. While Siaroff (1999) offers data up to 1990s, the need for data into the late 
2000s requires additional data. Corporatism is therefore operationalized using the new and 
updated measure from Jahn (2014), who details trends in corporatist arrangements in 24 societies 
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between 1960 and 2010. For this study data from 1990 to 2010 are used51. Corporatist scores 
2010 and 2015 are linearly extrapolated on previous data using the “epolate” command in 
Stata52.  
Veto Points: 
The final control is institutional veto points. In this literature, institutions act as brokers between 
parties. Lijphart (1984), for instance, pointed out that the major difference in outcomes could be 
traced to the majoritarian versus consensus democratic structure. Whereas majoritarian 
democracies can permit a single party to rule, consensus democracies require more cooperation 
between parties, lessening the chances of change, in this case unpopular social cutbacks. A 
“competing typology” (Immergut 2010) is that created by Persson and Tabellini (1999), who 
argue that it is both the electoral system and the regime type that matter in affecting the 
outcomes. They point out that in countries with proportional representation systems, the ideal for 
politicians is to win the most votes, thus catering to the larger public opinion. This should result 
in favoritism for entitlement programs across the country. However, single member district 
systems should promote distributive policies focused in a single district.  The view that electoral 
systems or presidential regimes matter for welfare state outcomes has been supported by a 
number of scholars including Cusack et al. 2007, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, and Hubert and 
Stephens 2001).  Because some see these constitutional variables as too static (Immergut 2010), 
others have focused on the more “dynamic” indicators, like veto points. The veto point literature 
focuses on aspects of a system more generally that can serve to allow or “block a change to the 
                                                     
51 Corporatism: Detlef Jahn: http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/data.html 
Stata files:  
Jahn, Detlef (2014). "Changing the Guard: Trends in Corporatist Arrangements in 42 Highly Industrialized Societies 
from 1960 to 2010." Socio-Economic Review, online first: August 26, 2014. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwu028 
52 Ipolate corporatism year,  gen(corpnew)  [epolate] . “If epolate is specified and if (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) cannot be 




status quo” (Tsebelis 1995).  These can range from single versus multi-party government, to 
bicameralism or federalism, as investigated by Obinger et al. Within the context of the welfare 
state researchers like Bonoli (2001) note that “radical and unilateral reforms are more likely to be 
put forward in political and institutional contexts of strong power concentration” (264).  This 
dissertation takes into account a summation of several variables that measure these 
“constitutional structure veto points”,  including federalism, presence of presidentialism, single-
member districts, degree of bicameralism, the use of referenda in policy-making, presence of 
judicial review, degree of authoritarianism. These data were collected from the Comparative 
Welfare State Data Set (2014) for the years 1990 to 201153. 
Methods:              
Having identified the variables and the data to be used in the analysis, this section moves on to 
the methods. The analysis seeks to determine the impact of each variable on the likelihood of 
reform measure occurrence in 18 OECD countries over 26 years. A logit model is employed as 
reform is measured as a dichotomous variable (0 for no reform, 1 for reform) in a given country 
year.  While logit models do not entail the same assumptions of the classical linear regression 
model, it is however essential to consider the factor of time. Though controlling for time effects 
is often addressed through the incorporation of time dummy variables (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 
1998), there are several drawbacks to their use, including inefficiency; with 26 time periods, the 
model here for instance, would require 26 time dummies. Also, as Carter and Signorio (2010a) 
point out, “if the data-generating process is temporally dependent, then the use of a model such 
as logit with only a linear xb specification is inappropriate since it implies a constant hazard” (4).  
The model therefore draws on Carter and Signorino’s (2010a) innovation to include t, t-squared, 
                                                     
53 There is very little within (over time variation) in each country’s institutional veto points structures. 2012-2015 
are assumed to be consistent with 2011 values in all countries.   
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and t-cubed in the model, where t equals the duration of time since the previous reform, and 
following Carter and Signorino’s modelling procedures, per their web appendix (Carter and 
Signorino 2010b). As t values early in the dataset depended on the identification of data points 
preceding the observation window (i.e. the most recent reform was prior to 1990), additional 
sources were used to identify these pre-1990s reforms, especially the Handbook of West 
European Politics (Ellen Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze 2007). Years since last 
reform were traced back to the starting point of 1980, which is a commonly designated as the 
“starting point” of major reform pressures.   
Results  
 
The results show that crisis is significantly related to reform likelihood. As crisis level increases, 
the likelihood of reform also increases. As the chart below shows, the logit regression reveals 
crisis is significant at the .004 level, in the expected direction. The second chart shows the 
predicted probabilities  for crisis. As crisis levels rise, the likelihood of reform in a given   
 
Figure 1: Logit Regression Analysis 
108 
 
country-year increases from slightly over .05,  steeply through crisis levels 2 and 3 to nearly .3, 
where the fourth level then increases the retrenchment probability slightly, capping at around .3.    
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities for Crisis Impact on Reform Probability  
What is also interesting in the regression is that total right is not robustly significant in the 
expected direction, implying that there is no significant difference between parties in terms of 
likelihood of reform. Robustness checks that excluded the far right from the definition of the 
right, still left the partisanship variable at level insignificant at the p level of .05, though 
significant around .10 level. In this specification (with far right excluded), the interaction effect 
is significant, however not in the expected direction. In general, this study does not lend strong 
support to the partisanship hypothesis for private-sector workers pension retrenchments.   
 Though this outcome seems to more support the institutionalist argument of partisan 
convergence; it is important to note that this lack of a clear partisanship relationship may be 
restricted to unpopular cutbacks. As discussed earlier in the dissertation, cutbacks targeting a 
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public minority may be more politicized (i.e. driven by center-right). Taking a cue from the 
recent literature on partisanship, a separate regression was performed to isolate only liberal right 
wing parties (excluding both center-right leaning Christian Democrats and populist parties), 
however this too was insignificant. To take a closer look at this variable, the graph below shows 
for each major instance of reform, what percent of the cabinet was left, center or right (with gaps 
in the graph signifying independent parties, or in rare cases, missing information). Indeed, there 
were a handful of cases of right-dominated governments, though many more of right and center 
led governments. At the same time there were also numerous instances of left-led and left-center 
coalition-led governments in retrenchment years.   
 
Figure 3: Control of Cabinet during Unpopular Reform Year 
The chart shows a combination of all right parties together, however even taken separately in 
terms of liberal rights, we see there were only three governments where the reforms were led by 
a majority of purely market-liberal right parties (as opposed to “conservatives”): Denmark 2006, 
110 
 
Netherlands 2012, and Belgium (2015).  More details on the executive (and executive party 
family) are provided in the Appendix below. While large N data is not broken down by party 
family, it is also useful to get a sense of how this plays out. Thus, the following chart was 
computed to show average partisan composition by party family across all reform years.  
Party Family  % 
Social Democratic  28.81 
Left Socialist  0.411 
Communist 0.86 
Green  1.668 
Left Liberals  0.092 
Agrarian  0.898 
Religious  17.01 
Center Liberals 3.017 
Right Liberals 8.147 
Conservative  26.17 
Right Populist  3.276 
Agrarian 0.292 
Ethnic  0.86 
Other  8.488 
Figure 4: Composition of Party Family (based on Armingeon et al. 2018a, 2018b) 
We can see that while conservatives held, on average, approximately 26 percent of seats during 
reform years, nearly the same was true for Social Democrats (who held an average of 28 percent 
of seats), a balance also reflected in the chart above.  These outcomes lead credence to the thesis 
that traditional partisan relationship is much weak in the recent past (1990-2015) when it comes 




This chapter tested number of different theories present in the welfare state literature that seek to 
explain retrenchment. On the one hand there are “push” theories that describe “problem 
pressures” facilitating retrenchment and on the other, are actor-centered “pull” explanations 
highlighting the political stripe (partisanship) of the actors themselves (Kitschelt 2001). On the 
push side, the effect of economic problem pressures will increase the likelihood of unpopular 
retrenchment as they hit higher levels of critical acute “crisis”. On the pull side, the data shows 
an expected relationship corresponding with traditional partisan explanations, it is not 
significant, which appears to support the historical institutionalist claims. Having discussed the 
relationship of crisis and retrenchment in a large N context, the subsequent chapters seek to 
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Executive Party Family  Executive 
Denmark  1990 1 Social Democrats 
Nyrup Rasmussen I 
(SD) 
France 1990 1 Social Democrats Rocard II (PS) 
Netherlands  1991 1 Religious Center Lubbers III (CDA) 
New Zealand  1991 2 Conservative Right  Bolger I (NP) 
Italy  1992 5 Social Democrats Amato 
Denmark  1993 1 Social Democrats 
Nyrup Rasmussen III 
(SD) 
Belgium 1993 1 Religious Center Dehaene I (CVP) 
Austria  1993 2 Social Democrats Vranitzky III (SPÖ) 
France 1993 2 Conservative Right  Balladur I (RPR) 
Germany  1994 1 Religious Center Kohl V (CDU) 
Sweden  1994 6 Moderate Party  Bildt I 
Australia  1994 1 Social Democrats Keating II (ALP) 
Japan 1994 2 Social Democrats Murayama I (SDP) 
Finland  1995 4 Social Democrats Lipponen I (SDP) 
United Kingdom  1995 1 Conservative Right  Major II (CON) 
Italy  1995 5 Technocratic Gov Dini 
Belgium 1996 2 Religious Center Dehaene II (CVP) 
France 1996 2 Conservative Right  Juppé II (RPR) 
Germany  1997 2 Religious Center Kohl VI (CDU) 
Netherlands  1997 1 Social Democrats Kok I (PvdA) 
France 1997 1 Social Democrats Jospin I (PS) 
Canada 1997 1 Liberal Center  Chrétien I (LIB)  
Australia  1997 2 Conservative Right  Howard I (LIB) 
New Zealand  1998 1 Conservative Right  Shipley II (NP) 
Netherlands  2000 2 Social Democrats Kok II (PvdA) 
Austria  2000 1 Religious Center Schüssel I (ÖVP) 
Japan 2000 3 Conservative Right  Obuchi (LDP) 
Germany  2001 3 Social Democrats Schröder I (SPD) 
Switzerland  2003 3 Liberal Right   Couchepin I (FDP) 
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Germany  2003 2 Social Democrats Schröder II (SPD) 
Finland  2003 4 Social Democrats Lipponen II (SDP) 
France 2003 2 Conservative Right  Raffarin II (UMP) 
Austria  2003 3 Religious Center Schüssel II (ÖVP) 
Netherlands  2004 1 Religious Center Balkenende III (CDA) 
United Kingdom  2004 1 Social Democrats Blair II (LAB) 
Germany  2004 1 Social Democrats Schroeder II (SPD) 
France 2004 1 Conservative Right  Raffarin (UMP) 
Italy  2004 1 Conservative Right  Berlusconi II (FI) 
Japan 2004 1 Conservative Right  Koizumi I (LDP) 
Austria  2004 2 Religious Center Schüssel II (ÖVP) 
Norway  2005 2 Religious Center Bondevik II (KRF) 
Switzerland  2005 1 Social Democrats Leuenberger II (SPS) 
Denmark  2006 4 Liberal Right  
Fogh Rasmussen II 
(LIB) 
United Kingdom  2007 2 Social Democrats Blair/Brown I (LAB) 
Germany  2007 1 Religious Center Merkel I (CDU) 
Germany  2008 1 Religious Center Merkel I (CDU) 
Sweden  2009 1 Conservative Right  Reinfeldt I (M) 
Australia  2009 1 Social Democrats Rudd I (ALP) 
Norway  2009 5 Social Democrats Stoltenberg III (DNA)  
Italy  2009 1 Conservative Right  Berlusconi IV (FI) 
United Kingdom  2010 2 Conservative Right  Cameron I (CON) 
Austria  2010 1 Social Democrats Faymann I (SPÖ) 
France 2010 3 Conservative Right  Fillon II (UMP) 
Belgium 2011 1 Social Democrats Di Rupo I (PS) 
Ireland 2011 2 Religious Center Kenny I (FG) 
Denmark  2011 1 Liberal Right  
Løkke Rasmussen I 
(LIB) 
Italy  2011 3 Technocratic Gov Monti I (Ind.) 
Netherlands  2012 2 Liberal Right  Rutte I (VVD) 
Finland  2012 3 Conservative Right  Katainen I (KOK) 
France 2012 1 Conservative Right  Fillon (UMP) 
Canada 2012 2 Conservative Right  Harper III (PC) 
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Finland  2013 1 Conservative Right  Katainen I (KOK) 
Finland  2014 1 Conservative Right  Katainen I (KOK) 




Chapter 5: Crisis and Retrenchment: France in the Great Recession 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined factors influencing retrenchment of private-sector worker 
pensions and identified economic downturn as a determinant. This chapter details the 
relationship through an investigation of the French government’s reaction to the late 2000s 
recession. While there was already pressure to increase the effective retirement age, politicians 
of the left and right delayed doing so. Recession, however, impelled politicians toward 
retrenchment efforts by exacerbating a fiscal imbalance, specifically creating short-term 
disequilibrium and long-run uncertainty that generated concern and warning among financial 
institutions. This caused a crisis among French politicians in power who feared a decrease in 
sovereign creditworthiness and therefore borrowing power. In an effort to reassure international 
markets, the government engaged quickly and vocally in structural adjustment efforts that 
included a retirement age increase.  
Path Dependent Institutions  
On June 16, 2010, French labor minister Eric Woerth officially rolled out the government’s 
proposal to increase the minimum retirement age from 60 to 62 and the full retirement age from 
65 to 67. The highly unpopular reform triggered mass union-led demonstrations that garnered 
participation in the millions (Reuters 2010a). The announcement caused support for the Union 
pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) leadership, already waning from the effects of the crisis, 
to tumble to its lowest since the party took office (Le Monde 2010a). Undeterred, the 
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government urgently pushed the bill through and by late 2010 the UMP had succeeded in 
increasing the retirement age, but at a major cost. By then, Prime Minister Francois Fillon and 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s were low, for the latter, the lowest yet in his presidency (Meeus 
2010). Sarkozy lost the next election, becoming the first single-term president of France since the 
1980s.   
The government’s abrupt increase of the retirement age is theoretically intriguing, as 
there is a strong pull toward the status quo in pension politics of advanced industrialized 
democracies.  Institutionalism has long emphasized the path dependency of institutions in 
general (Collier and Collier 1991, Ertman 1997) and social schemes in particular (Pierson 1996), 
due to self-reinforcing and positive feedback mechanisms or increasing returns. In pay-as-you go 
systems, with each generation funding the previous (as is the case in France’s General Regime), 
benefit reductions, retirement age increases, and initiatives in general that cause a “double 
payment problem” are publicly criticized as violations of intergenerational fairness and social 
rights (Lynch and Rhodes 2016). Thus, reform is exceeding difficult and pension schemes are 
predicted to have a strong institutional “stickiness”.      
 Corporatist countries like France have historically epitomized this stasis, leading scholars 
to assert that, despite external pressures, the French welfare state has been “frozen” (see Vail 
2004), a model of the “eurosclerosis” common to continental social systems (see Palier 2010). 
The design of the pension system reinforces public support for the status quo. Because it is 
financed through social insurance contributions rather than general taxation, the French pension 
schemes “[instill] a sense of individually earned contractual rights”,  resulting in strong national 
legitimacy (Esping-Andersen 1996, 68) and, unlike Bevridgean systems that smooth inequalities 
through flat-rate payments, the earning-related benefits of Bismarckian-style systems like France 
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mirror the contributor’s income status in the labor market. These characteristics generate a public 
understanding of pensions as an extension of previous wages, making retrenchment particularly 
challenging. Thus, while population ageing, sluggish growth, and heightened structural 
unemployment have put great pressure on its welfare system’s finances, governments of both the 
left and the right have usually resisted reform to balance the system (Kitschelt 2001, 300).  This 
tendency led Kischelt (2001) to conclude that “if demographic pressures…or levels of 
unemployment mattered most, then countries such as France, Italy, and Germany should have 
long engaged in a vigorous policy effort to reshape their social policy programmes covering 
pensions, health care, and labour market policies” (304).                                              
Economic Crisis Creates a Critical Juncture         
Nevertheless, while pension systems are difficult to reform, scholars suggest that institutional 
change can occur at “critical junctures” (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, Cappocia 2015), or 
formative moments, which determine new institutional paths (Pierson 1996). While it is possible 
to reach a critical juncture solely through a gradual accumulation of pressure to a tipping point, 
critical junctures often emerge through an exogenous shock (Cortell and Petersen 1999), which 
creates a crisis (Gourevitch 1986), or a “great upheaval” marked by a sense of danger, urgency, 
chaos, and uncertainty (Gourevitch 1984), a moment in which leaders do “not have a sufficiently 
clear view of the future” (Cappocia 2015) as assumptions that once held for sustainability are no 
longer applicable (Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005). This jarring experience provokes efforts to 
relieve uncertainty and pressure, pushing politicians to undergo change (Hogan and Doyle 2007) 
where they “reflect anew on ways of rearranging their social world” (Gourevitch 1984, 360) and 
consequently, bring new concerns or “issues once temporarily resolved back on the agenda” 
(Gourevitch 1984, 21-22).  
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Recession is one exogenous shock that can trigger a heightened likelihood of pension 
retrenchment, especially when a country is already under fiscal pressure. Politicians tend to focus 
their attention on what they perceive to be the public’s primary concern. It has been shown that 
in times of crisis, the public prioritizes the economy rather than other issues like social benefits 
(Singer 2011, Singer 2013).  
To establish short-term economic stability and also to avoid cyclical effects from 
becoming structural, politicians are pushed to reassure international financial markets of the 
country’s solvency and credit-worthiness, in order to secure low interest rates for sovereign debt. 
Increased deficit and especially debt levels are concerning to investors, in and of themselves, 
especially when countries surpass commonly prescribed debt limits. For instance in EMU 
countries have promised to restrict debt to 60 percent and deficit to 3 percent. These fiscal 
limitations are credible warning posts to countries, not solely because such states can be issued 
warnings by the European Union (e.g. initiation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, or issuance 
of a fine), but because these standards are also accepted by financial authorities and investors 
worldwide as standards of basic fiscal health on which to base economic decisions (Mosley 
2003). Investors fear that a country with such high deficits may try to inflate their way out of an 
economic downturn in the future, thus “government that adher[e] to the rules [of the Maastrict 
Treaty], quickly gained credibility with financial markets” (Mosley 2003, 68). 
Nevertheless, moderately high levels of debt alone may not always be sufficient to trigger 
poor ratings or punishment from markets. For instance there credit rating agency (CRA) 
assessments may have a certain “stickiness”, where CRAs often err on the side of positive scores 
to avoid the reputational consequences of a “bad call” (Uribe-Tiran and Mosquera 2018, 4). 
Furthermore, aspects of debt that might cause alarm (such as implicit debt, i.e. future unfunded 
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pension liabilities) are not fully accounted for in assessments (Van Langen 2014). Most 
importantly, however liabilities are only one side of the debt leverage equation: growth “from 
core operations which is available for the payment of debt service” (Fitch 2016) is also a major 
determinant. As long as a country’s economy continues to grow, and taxes and contributions can 
be collected for the servicing of debt, a country can retain some credibility in international 
financial markets.   
Recession, however, provides a major financial stress or litmus test on a country’s 
leverage to pay sovereign debt, by increasing government expenditure through the triggering of 
automatic stabilizers and stimulus measures. Perhaps more dauntingly, a drop in growth and 
increase in unemployment rapidly dries up cash flows that could be used to service existing debt, 
or to avoid accruing additional debt.  Recession therefore brings not only acute budgetary stress, 
but also an uncertainty about the future, as past predictions for growth (and thus budgetary 
stability) are called into question.  To assuage heightened uncertainty among financial actors, 
politicians must send immediate signals to financial markets that a country will re-establish 
growth and reduce debt burdens54. Retrenchment to unfunded pension systems, which comprise a 
large component of a country’s budget and whose disequilibrium is clearly exposed in a 
downturn, can be used to send such a signal.  
A History of Pensions Pressure in France….                                       
The French pension system was already under a number of structural pressures prior to the Great 
Recession. First, benefit levels were high (Esping-Andersen 1995, 11) having climbed from a 
replacement rate of around 45 percent of net wages in 1970 to around 60 percent in the late 
                                                     
54 Whereas crisis is often seen as an opportunity structure opening for eager politicians (especially of the right) to 
justify preferred reforms to a large welfare system, in the context of highly unpopular private sector pensions, it is 
more of a narrowing of room to maneuver that pushes hesitant leaders to consider austerity options they would have 
preferred to avoid. Thus, crisis politics of the welfare state may vary depending on the type of benefit in question.  
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1990s (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2017)55 contributing to high social expenditures.  In addition, 
rising life expectancy and falling birth rates made for a climbing dependency ratio, that is, a 
growing imbalance in contributors vis a vis recipients of the social benefits system. The 
percentage of the population of 64 to the working population (ages 15-64) rose from at 18.64 in 
1960 to 25.98 in 2009 (World Bank 2017) and with the retirement of the baby boomer 
generation, the ratio was only expected to grow to 42 percent by 2025 and 58 percent by 2050 
(IMF 2010)56. Furthermore, like the other countries of the OECD, growth had slowed since the 
post-war “golden years”, while structural unemployment had risen. At a steep 7 percent in the 
1960s, growth had slowed to around only 2 percent since the 1990s, and since the early 2000s, 
the unemployment rate lingered at nearly 10 percent (World Bank 2016).     
 It was not only the economic stagnation that put pressure on the welfare state, but the 
government’s early responses as well.  
 
Figure 1.  Source: OECD 2017a 
                                                     





















Attempting to deal with structural economic problems in 1980s, the French government engaged 
in practices of “labor shedding”, in which women and seniors were incentivized to leave the job 
market in order to reserve scarce jobs for younger male workers (Esping-Andersen 1996). In one 
such reform, Francois Mitterrand lowered the retirement age from 65 to 60, worsening an already 
downward sloping effective retirement age (see Figure 1).      
        The rising costs of generous benefits and eligibility for an ageing population, paired 
with the gradual evaporation of contributions base, created a budgetary problem for pensions, 
what French termed the “trou de la Secu” (hole of the Social Security system) (Sachs and 
Wyplosz 1986). 
 
Figure 2. Source: Acoss 2014   
Pensions deficits for instance, had reached as deep at approximately 10 billion Euros in the early 
1990s and more than 15 billion Euros in the mid-2000s.   
…Yet Resistance to Reform 
Despite these challenges, governments of both the left and the right hesitated to make large and 
























generally increased contributions, it was not until an early economic shock in 1993 paired with 
these pre-existing deficits and new international constraints in the early 1990s, that politicians 
had no more room to maneuver (Mosely 2000), and were pushed to consider other options 
(Palier 2000). As Palier (2000) points out, “only when the social security deficit ha[d] become 
too great to be financed through another social contribution rise (after 1992) in a context of 
economic recession (i.e. 1993) and when the economic constraints of the European Single 
market and single currency became stronger, the French government decided to opt for 
retrenchment in the social protection system” (121).  The new EMU “convergence criteria” 
alongside the effects of the recession essentially “amplified the need for budgetary consolidation 
and thus the necessity of cost containment measures in the public pensions system” (Schludi 
2005, 194). Drawing mainly from the Socialist government’s 1991 White Paper retrenchment 
proposals, the “Balladur” Reform of 1993 not only increased taxation, but changed the base of 
the full pension from the best 10 years to the best 25 years over the course of 1994 to 2008, 
increased the number of qualifying years from 37.5 to 40 to be implemented 1994 to 2003, and 
changed indexation from wages to prices for five years (195). While slowing the pace of the 
rising pensions costs, the “Balladur reform [was] not enough to stabilize private sector pension 
costs in the face of demographic ageing” (212)57.           
    By the early to mid-2000s, with the beginning of the retirement of 
                                                     
57 To mitigate the effects of the deficit, the government generally proposed increases to earmarked social taxes, the 
Contribution of the Reimbursement of the Social Debt (Contribution au Remboursement de la Dette Sociale or 
CRDS) and the Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG). CRDS and later, a part of the CSG were transferred to an 
autonomous fund created in 1996 called the Caisse D’Amortissement de la Dette Sociale (CADES), whose goal it is 
to “finance and extinguish” social debt transferred to it from social funds (managed by ACOSS) through periodic 
(typically annual) parliamentary votes on the Loi de Financement de la Sécurité Sociale (LFSS).  CADES, along 
with the CRDS, were originally set to expire in 2009. As the social deficit and debt rose, however the government 
increased resources through these social taxes, and pushed the end date until 2014. Introduced in 1990 at 1.1 percent 
of 95 percent of income, the CSG was increased in 1993 to 2.4 percent, again in 1996 to 3.4 percent, and again in 
1997 to 7.5 percent. In 1996, the CRDS was added at .5 percent and both CSG and CRDS were increased to taxation 




the baby boomer population it was more than ever clear that pensions would need reform. As 
President Jacques Chirac noted in 2002, “everyone is aware of the fact that the age of cessation 
of activity needs to be gradually raised….it is normal that we postpone the age of cessation of 
activity. It is not at all a legal obligation, of course, it is a reality that must be encouraged, it is 
the interest of everyone, of those who can and want to work longer "(Vie Publique 2002). In the 
context of a “near recession” and deficits and debt in excess of EMU limits, the French 
government initiated the first major private sector reform in 10 years, the “Raffarin” Reform of 
2003, which shifted indexation and valorization permanently to prices and increased the number 
of qualifying years from 40 to 42, while also aligning the public sector pensions and creating a 
penalty for early retirement.           
 Despite these changes, and the fact that the long term projections were less dire, the 
reform did not bring the system into long-term equilibrium. Instead, the 2003 reform aimed to 
establish near-equilibrium only in the short and mid-term (until approximately 2020), at which 
point other reforms would be necessary.  Furthermore, the effective expected retirement age of 
those born between 1960 and 1980, originally predicted to increase 2.5 to 3 years by 2045 




Figure 3. Source: COR 2007 
Despite the rapidly approaching (dis)equilibrium of 2020, on the eve of the late 2000s recession, 
The president, who had previous boasted that he had voted for retirement at 60 years (INA 1993, 
his emphasis) (Toulouse7 2010), avoided making any indication before election-- and any move 
after election—to retrench private sector pensions. Granted, recent scholarship (i.e. Bezes and 
Lidec 2015) has argued that Sarkozy’s spending cuts after the recession were “not a reaction to 
the 2008 crisis, but…formulated in the mid-2000s, introduced in Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 
electoral platform and implemented soon after his election” (7). It is true that Sarkozy’s 
advocated spending cuts in many areas of the budget. This is perhaps unsurprising given that in 
2007, the France was travelling along the cusp of the European Monetary Union minimum fiscal 
health standards (e.g. a debt level of 60 percent of GDP and 3 percent deficit), and the EMU was 
reporting before the major fiscal-economic downturn that: 
France is at medium risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.  
The budgetary position in 2007, as estimated in the programme, albeit 
improved compared with last year, still constitutes a risk to sustainable 
public finances even before the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing 






















the Treaty reference value. Progress with budgetary consolidation would 
contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances.   
(EurLex 2008)  
 
Nicolas Sarkozy was acutely aware and using a variety of measures to respond to the budgetary 
situation just before the major fiscal-economic downturn. During his campaign and immediately 
after, he pushed to reduce expenditures, through for instance, replacing only 1 out of every 2 
public sector workers and reforming the special pension schemes for SNCF and other workers to 
match the contribution period regulations of the private sector established in 1993 and 2003. 
  Yet, while he was willing and vocal about making adjustments to programs that only 
affected a public minority, he was resistant to reforming the major private sector pensions plan, 
CNAV. During the 2007 Presidential campaign, for instance, while heavily criticizing the 
imbalance in the special regimes, he reiterated that the private sector pensions system was in 
balance until 2020, and that he had no need to find additional resources for the private sector 
workers pension. Even after his election, and just months prior to the recession, when the 
MEDEF employer union pressured the center-right to increase in the retirement age in 2007, 
President Sarkozy asserted that “the right to retirement at 60 years old must stay” (Wakim 2010), 
that the system was in balance until 2020, and that he had no intention or mandate to increase the 
retirement age (RTL May 27, 2008; Vie Publique 2008).  
Imbalance and Uncertainty 
 
Pensions 
The economic ripple effect from the bursting of the housing market bubble in the US, and the 
subsequent bankruptcy of major American firms, soon made its way into the French economy, 
which declared a recession in October 2008. The recession had both a direct and indirect effect 
on accelerating pressure for pension reform. Directly, while economic downturn-borne pension 
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outflows were moderate, decreased growth and increased unemployment caused contributions to 
the social security system to plummet. The COR report of April 2010 predicted that, even in the 
best case scenario (unemployment at 4.5 percent), the pensions contribution pool would take 
around 10 years to rebound to pre-crisis contribution levels (i.e. 267,500,000 in 2022 rather than 
2013, as previously expected). Under pessimistic assumptions (a stagnant 7 percent 
unemployment after the crisis), the 2007 pre-crisis level would never be achieved and France 
absorb the losses structurally with a long-term gap of 750,000 fewer contributors.     
 This contribution deterioration led to a major budgetary imbalance in the short-run and 
uncertainty in the long-run. The deficit, at 27 billion Euros, was the greatest in the social 
system’s history (Le Monde 2010c) and the French Stability Program’s 2009-2012 report warned 
that “at a like-for-like perimeter, pension spending should rise on average, by almost 2.5 billion 
per year during the period from 2009 to 2011” (French Stability Programme 2008, 21). Pension 
debt, which comprised from 2003 to 2007 less than 30 percent of the State spending increase, 
“now absorb about 70 percent of the room for maneuver left by an increase in expenditure 
limited to inflation” (ibid). The long run view of pensions sustainability was unclear, and the 
country’s annual pension deficit could potentially 114 billion Euros if no reform was to be taken 
by 2050 (BBC 2010).  The COR annual report, issued on April 14, 2010, added fuel to the fire, 




Figure 4. Sources: COR 2007, COR 2010, COR 2012 (COR 2018) 
The COR’s reports showed that whereas the Fillon Reform in 2003 had corrected the system 
from an untenable deficit approaching -4.5 percent of GDP back to around 1.5 percent of GDP, 
the major downturn made it unclear whether much of the Fillon reform gain would be lost in the 
long-run. On the one hand, optimistic predictions (projection in green) had recovery return the 
pensions system to its 2007 deficit level, while pessimistic projections (in red) meant that the 
recession would have a lasting effect on the deficit level (i.e. the recession growth losses would 
become structural), and the system would approach -3 percent of GDP in deficit.   
  The uncertain levels of deficit most importantly threw into question the issue of 
social debt, as the deficit is transferred annually to the social debt fund, CRDS. While originally 
politicians sought to end the CRDS by 2014, it became clear that this was not an option and that 
the payment of debt would continue indefinitely. The chart below shows that, while debt levels 



























Euros were added to the debt. While amortized debt had already fallen short of original 
expectations, the fisal-economic downturn added a tremendous short-term burden.    
 
Figure 5. Source:  Securite Sociale (2014) 
Furthermore, the sovereign pensions reserve was hurt by the recession. France had established 
this trust fund under the Jospin government in 2001 (the Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites, or 
FRR) (Pino and Yermo 2010) to supplement pensions between 2020 and 2040 with an expected 
sum of 150 billion by the start of this payout period (Global Investment Center 2015). However, 
these funds valued at 34.5 billion Euros in 20075859.  Nominal return on investment plunged from 
12.6 percent in 2005, to 11.2 percent in 2006 to 4.8 percent in 2007 to -24.9 in 2008 (Pino and 
Yermo 2010)). As the FRR board noted in early 2009, “This sudden deterioration is a direct 
consequence of the global crisis in capital markets, in particular that of the global equity markets 
which declined by 42 percent over the last year” (FRR 2009). In the short-term pensions health 
was unstable and in the long-run it was uncertain.  
General Budget Pressure 
The recession also created pressure on pensions through its impact the general budget.  Growth 
dropped from 2.4 percent in 2007 to -2.9 percent in 2009, unprecedented since the 1990s (see 


































































chart below). Automatic stabilizers, triggered by loss of growth and increases in unemployment 
created a spike in spending. General government expenditures, for instance, increased from 53 
percent of GDP in 2008 to 56.8 percent of GDP by the next year (OECD 2018).  
 
Figure 6. Source OECD 2018  
Stimulus measures compounded the budgetary strain. The government approved stimuli for both 
the French banking sector and the general economy. In a first move, the French government 
provided a bailout to Dexia, a lender to local authorities, with a loan of 3 billion Euros, and 
provided 5 billion dollars toward the solvency of two banks, Casse d’Epargne and Banque 
Populaire.  Although large, these stimulus measures were just drops in a much larger bailout 
bucket, as in October 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy announced a total of 360 billion Euros to save the 
banking industry (OECD 2009). To jumpstart growth, the next month another 20 billion Euros 
was set aside for the creation of the Strategic Investment Fund, to invest in technology that could 
jumpstart economic growth.  Two months after France went into recession in October; on 
December 4, 2008 the French government announced a recovery plan stimulus of 26 billion 
dollars, 1.3 percent of France’s GDP (Reuters 2012), which mainly benefitted infrastructure and 

















































































































to the major automobile manufacturers, and implemented an automobile discount incentive to 
incentivize consumption. Temporary tax relief for local business became permanent in 2010, the 
replacement rate for unemployed former part-time workers was temporarily raised from 50 to 60 
percent of previous wages and the government created 100,000 subsidized job opportunities 
(OECD 2009). The government also contributed  2.8 billion dollars for social benefits, including 
one-off benefits for the unemployed (Vie Publique 2009), those who lost work hours, all 3.8 
million RMA beneficiaries, carers of children, those with disabilities and the elderly, among 
others.  
 
Figure 7. Source: OECD 2017  
As a result of the stimulus, and especially the effect of automatic stabilizers, the budgetary 
deficit went from skating along the edge of EMU and international financial standards to 
blatantly violation it, at more than double the deficit limit. As the figure above shows, debt also 
ballooned, approaching 100 percent of GDP. In addition to current financial stress, previous 
projections for the future lost validity. For instance, in its submission to the European Union 
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through growth that was estimate in a pessimistic scenario at 2.5 percent growth from 2009 
onwards, and a more optimistic scenario in which “annual  growth  will  already  reach  3%  in  
2009  while  underlying  potential growth will become gradually stronger and also reach 3% by 
2012” (European Commission 2008). 
…Warnings from International Markets and Regulators  
Before the dust had settled on the bank bailouts, there were already rumblings in the financial 
markets and the European Union that France’s debt was no longer just concerning, but 
significant and dangerously high. First, not only was France’s budgetary imbalance a clear 
violation of the Stability and Convergence Program standards, which limit debt to a 60 percent 
GDP ceiling and deficit to 3 percent of GDP, and while the European Union pressured France to 
decrease its debt/deficit to within limits by 2013, there did not seem to be means of 
accomplishing this scenario without major cutbacks. As ….reported, “government gross debt is 
estimated at 77,4 % of GDP in 2009, up from 67,4 % in 2008…Medium-term debt projections 
that assume GDP growth rates to gradually recover to the values projected before the crisis, tax 
ratios to return to pre-crisis levels and include the projected increase in age-related expenditure 
show that the budgetary strategy envisaged in the programme, taken at face value and with no 
further policy change, would not be sufficient to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio by 2020” 
(European Commission 2010). 
The European Union assessed the Stability and Convergence programs for and initiated the 
corrective arm of the excessive deficit procedure reporting on treaty violation for Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Latvia, and Malta in February 2009, specifically warning that “France 
should further reform the pension system as planned [earlier in the year] which would contribute 
to long-term fiscal sustainability”, referring to France’s signaled intention in its post-crisis plan 
to  “consolidate[e]…public finances through a restrictive stance, especially in 2010” (European 
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Commission 2009). The European Union’s recommendation as a result of the assessment was to 
implement the EU Recovery Plan,  structural adjustment measures in 2010, decrease the debt to 
GDP ratio, and take “additional measures” suggested in the General Review of Public Policies 
including “implement[ing] the structural reform programme in particular as regards the 
sustainability of the pension system.”  
International financial actors also were concerned about these unsustainable levels of debt in 
its budget in general and pensions in particular. By 2010 France’s risk premium or the spread 
between the 10 year French government bond and the Eurozone benchmark German bond was at 
its highest since the start of the euro, “suggesting that traders [were] already anticipating a 
downgrading” (The Economist 2011). Whereas the 10 year yield spread was approximately 0 in 
2006 to over 60 basis points in March of 2009. Credit Default Swap spreads also jumped over 20 
basis points (Arghyroua  and Kontonikasb 2011, 36).      
 The flight of investment from struggling and downgraded Eurozone countries, who 
regulators said needed to reform “sizeable” shares of social benefits (Oakley and Hope, 2009), 
served as a warning for the French government: reform or suffer a similar outcome. Aside from 
these secondary cautionary tales, financial regulators and international organizations, began to 
issue direct warnings to France. An IMF staff report noted, “France cannot risk missing its 
medium-term fiscal targets given the need to strengthen implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and keep borrowing costs low by securing France's AAA rating". The OECD joined 
the call to reduce public spending and especially pensions spending, noting that "achieving the 
deficit target of 3% of GDP by 2013 requires additional measures" (Mathieu and Sterdyniak 
2011).  S&P’s credit analyst, Marko Mrsnik echoed concerns stating that “if, after the return of 
economic growth, France does not address the large imbalances in its budget and the 
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comparatively high gross debt, then the rating comes under pressure". Moody’s too, joined in the 
warnings, noting “if the upward trend in debt continues, the government’s distance to downgrade 
could erode to the point where it generates ratings implications”. 
Crisis and the Rush to Reassure Markets 
The stress and uncertainty of the downturn, along with the risk of losing credibility in financial 
markets, caused a crisis for the French government. While avoiding retrenchment was a prime 
focus outside of crisis, during the crisis, the government’s focus shifted to economic and 
financial stability. As Nicolas Sarkozy put it succinctly, “If I lose the AAA score, I’m dead”, 
suggesting that France would fall victim to higher interest rates, stifling its ability to borrow, and 
thus the recovery of the French economy, on which his re-election depended. As he would 
emphasize later, when challenged on the pension reform, the fate of other Eurozone countries 
was a pivotal lesson for the French government: 
Our Greek friends, like our Portuguese and Irish friends, pay dearly, 
especially the Greeks, [due to] the incompetence of previous governments 
that did not want to recognize that when efforts are made in time, disaster is 
avoided. That's the situation they are in. And it is no coincidence, you see, if 
France is protected from all these risks, if its rating is preserved and if 
France can borrow at very low rates ... Greece borrows for 2 years at 30 %. 
At 30%! France borrows around 3%...To reverse the pension reform… 
would mean the explosion of debt, the explosion of deficits and the 
impossibility for France to finance [its debt] (Vie Publique 2011).  
 
These high risks pushed the government to immediately consideration of new options. For 
Nicolas Sarkozy and the UMP, that option was clear: heed international calls to reform the 
growing structural debt, in particular pensions, which were a large part of the debt and the focus 
of financial institutions60. The UMP engaged in a U-turn on the level of private sector pensions, 
in order to communicate stability to investors instead of speculative panic.  He would soon 
                                                     
60 The IMF, for instance, specifically advised in its Mission Concluding Statement for France in 2009 to “rais[e] the 




reiterate that if "France will lose all influence if it loses its AAA rating ... This is why the 
pension reform will be of great magnitude (Le Monde 19 March 2010).      
 The French government got immediately to work (Revauger 2013). The French Stability 
Plan of December 2008, for instance, announced that it would not wait for the periodic pensions 
reviews originally planned in 2012, “but to schedule a new dialogue in 2010 in order to look at 
ways to improve the employment rate of older  workers and the financial sustainability of 
France's retirement system” (French Stability Programme, December 2008). In its subsequent 
Stability Plan the government proposed structural adjustment of more than 4 percentage points of 
GDP over the period from 2010 to 2013 to reduce the deficit to 6 percent by 2011, 4.6 percent in 
2012, and less than 3 percent of GDP by 2013. It furthermore emphasized that the “no-holds-
barred approach will be taken to restore equilibrium. [and that] decisions [would] be handed 
down and enacted before the end of the year” (European Commission 2009). 
As part of this no-holds barred approach, Nicolas Sarkozy broke tradition and became the 
first French president to directly address a joint session of parliament in 136 years (C-SPAN 
2009). Addressing lawmakers on June 22, 2009, he declared, “we will…reform the pension 
system. 2010 will be an important year in that regard. Everything will have to be questioned—
the age of retirement, the length of contributions to the retirement system. All possibilities will 
be considered. The various stakeholders will make proposals and I will not close the debate 
before I even open it, but when the time will come to make a decision mid-2010, have no doubt, 
the French government will make the hard decisions” (ibid). 
The government ordered the organization of a series of conferences and meetings to 
assess and respond to the overall debt situation, but also to send an immediate signal to markets 
that structural adjustment planning was underway. January 28, 2010, L’Elysee organized a 
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conference on public deficit and debt organized by the President. According to Yves Bur, UMP’s 
social account specialist in the parliament, “the conference sends a signal to Brussels and to 
financial markets from which we borrow: Paris understands the gravity of the situation and is 
engaging in a virtuous process…the heavy deficit has more than tripled with the crisis….The 
area that is the most urgent is that of retirement. The crisis accelerated the degradation of the 
accounts: we have attained in 2010 the deficit level predicted for 2020.  If nothing is done, in 
2050 we will have an annual deficit of 70 billion Euros” (Les Républicains 67 2010)61   
Those on the left corroborated, albeit more skeptically, that these measures—and the 
reform itself- was about sending a signal to the markets. According the Socialist President of the 
Financial Committee of the Assembly, “what the President of the Republic has decided on 
pensions, it is not for the French, it is to reassure the markets and rating agencies" (Europe 1, 
2011).  An interview with Jean-Claude Mailly General Secretary of Force Ouvrière, one of the 
main trade unions seemed to support this idea as well “The rush of the government proves that it 
is under the influence of the financial markets. The drastic policy of reducing deficits and the 
announcement of the pension reform are only intended to reassure investors. This may restore 
confidence in the stock market, but this will translate in France by austerity measures and cuts in 
social spending” (Capital 2010)         
 While the center- left publicly and loudly protested the change of an increase in the 
retirement age for all; it too, recognized the gravity of crisis and the need to act immediately to 
reform the system. Previous commissioner for the Socialist Jospin government, Jean-Michel 
Charpin, reported from one of the established high level meetings (Mercredi de Retraite) that 
“the text is more subtle than the reading that journalists have made…The PS accepts the 
expertise of the Council of Orientation of the pensions [COR]. And it accepts the increase in the 
                                                     
61 In 2015 the UMP party was renamed Les Républicains. 
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duration of contribution specified in the Fillon Act from 2003 until 2020…and the discussions on 
this point [to reform] from 2025” (Lhaïk 2010).  Marisol Touraine, PS deputy, argued that in 
particular, the response should address both structural and crisis-born deficit: “This demographic 
variable is not the only thing that can explain the current deficit. The latter has been aggravated 
by the crisis. It is therefore necessary to respond to both the demographic challenge and the 
deficit was born of the crisis. For the demographic challenge, we propose demographic 
measures, and I have already said, we favor the duration of contribution. For the deficit that was 
born of the crisis, which will decrease, we favor the contribution of capital income” (Le Monde 
2010e). Indeed, while the Socialist Party broadly rejected the retirement age increase and vowed 
to reverse it up election, the party would later only return these social rights to those with long 
working careers, and would continue retrenchment by lengthening the contribution duration from 
41.5 to 43 years.   
The government very quickly rejected the left’s idea of increased taxation on capital 
income, concluded that the only solution was to increase the retirement age. While not focusing 
on the crisis push, a recent study (Revauger 2013) noted that the government was in a large rush 
to shift the increase the retirement age to return to equilibrium by 2018. The decision came by 
ruling out several options. First, citing the General Director of the IMF, Nicholas Sarkozy 
echoed that in order to create growth, the duration of work years should be increased and tax 
increases should be avoided. Increased taxation, the UMP argued,  would inflate labor costs at 
precisely the time when France needed to spur growth, and cutting back on pension benefit rates, 
pitching it as an unfair reform to beneficiaries, who had already made economic decisions on the 
basis of expected benefits (Revauger 2013, 177). Furthermore, the reform had to be immediate 
(177). This need for immediate response is evident from the UMP discussion on the options: “To 
142 
 
fill the gap, the quickest way is to lower the legal retirement age. The possibility of a change 
from a purely opaque distribution system to a notional point system will not solve any problem. 
It only makes the system more individually intelligible, but does not answer the real problems: 
the age of retirement, the contribution period and the amount of pensions”. Not only was process 
of choosing the reform type rapid, so was the legislative process. Barely a year had passed 
between the initial announcement to the National Assembly that pensions would need reform and 
when the official government proposal was issued increase the early retirement age from 60 to 
62 by 2018 and the full retirement age from 65 to 67 by 2023 (BBC 2010).  Despite the public 
opposition and a series of protests in which millions flooded the streets between May and 
October, the UMP did not hesitate. With little parliamentary objection to overcome from the 
Socialist Party or other detractors, On October 27, 2010 the bill passed the parliament and the 
law was signed and in effect by early November.  
Conclusions:   
This chapter detailed the French government’s decision to increase the minimum and full 
retirement ages during the late 2000s fiscal-economic downturn in France. In line with 
predictions of path dependent predictions, the study shows that prior to the downturn neither the 
left nor the right took initiative (or dared) to increase the retirement age, despite the dire health of 
the pension system. While this non-crisis period seems to mirror the expectations of the “frozen” 
welfare state literature, an emerging recession exacerbated budgetary stability and created 
uncertainty in both pensions and general budget indicators. As financial markets and regulators 
started to issue warnings, and neighboring countries’ experiences (e.g. Spain and Portugal) 
offered proof of the need to reform, the French government entered a state of crisis, fearing that 
it might lose its AAA rating.  Attempting to assuage markets, the French government heeded the 
advice of financial regulators and international organizations to decrease spending back to 
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Maastricht limits by 2013 and to alleviate the largest structural burden: pensions spending. While 
clearly communicating its intentions to the international financial markets, the UMP rushed to 
create credible change and push the reform through, despite large public protest. The chapter 
provides evidence that while structural pressures may tip off a crisis, acute economic downturn 
served as the push and proximate cause of reform. 
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Chapter 6: Crisis and Unpopular Retrenchment: 
A Comparison of German Pension Policy in the Early and Late 2000s 
 
“No one is excited about this…[but] occasionally, unpopular measures have to be implemented 
anyway – and, by the way, I’m not greeting these measures with enthusiasm either. But they are 





Building on conclusions from Chapter 4 that fiscal-economic downturn is associated with 
retrenchment (irrespective of party in power), this chapter investigates the mechanisms of this 
association. Examining two moments in German post-reunification history, the chapter shows 
how major fiscal-economic downturn in the early 2000s pushed a social democratic government 
to engage in unpopular welfare state retrenchment, whereas a more shallow and brief national 
downturn in the late 2000s did not provoke unpopular cutbacks by the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) party. In the first of these cases, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) came to power 
in 1998 with a mandate to reform the stagnant German economy, yet a promise to protect 
pensions through the suspension of unpopular pension retrenchment passed by the CDU. Five 
years later, in the midst of a major economic and fiscal downturn, the SDP not only reversed its 
retrenchment suspension, but created even deeper cuts (e.g. Hartz and Rurup reforms) as part of 
the larger Agenda 2010 reform program. These reforms were triggered by a major recession in 
2002 and 2003, which not only undermined the government’s credibility, creating a need for 
immediate action to repair the ailing economy, but also provoked a fiscal downturn which 
constrained the government’s options for responding to the recession. Unlike this dire scenario, 
seven years later, during the global recession, Germany emerged relatively unscathed. Despite 
the welfare state’s continued vulnerability and the presence of a more center-right-leaning 
Christian democratic party, the government had the room to avoid any major reform to private 
sector workers’ pensions, therefore engaging in an effort to out credit-claim the left, through 
minor expansions in eligibility, making earlier retirement more accessible to those with long 
working careers.                     
Case #1: Germany in the early 2000s  
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Germany as The “Sick Man of Europe 
During the golden age of welfare, Germany, like other industrialized countries, channeled 
burgeoning contributions and taxes into welfare programs like unemployment, sickness, old-age, 
and other social services (Wilensky 1975). Programs widened in coverage and deepened in 
generosity. The “two big parties”, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), catered to increased demand for benefits and “competed over who 
would best meet this demand and could claim credit for expanding the welfare state… [by] 
mak[ing] comprehensive proposals that appealed to broad sections of the electorate” (Picot 
2012).             
 However, this period did not last throughout the 1970s and in the subsequent decades a 
raft of social and economic changes took hold in Germany, as elsewhere in the industrialized 
world.  By the 1990s, the major industrial exporter had been diagnosed the “sick man of Europe” 
(Politico 2016), facing “three main economic policy problems: high unemployment, high 
government deficits and the need to reform pensions” (Harlen 2002, 62). After the unification of 
Germany, unemployment rose sharply from 4.8 percent in 1990, to 8.4 in the wake of the 1993 
recession, to nearly one of every ten job seekers by the time Schroeder was elected Chancellor in 




Figure 1. Source: Armingeon et al. 2017 
In addition to unemployment, and partially as a result of it, rising debt and deficits were also of 
concern.  At a time when Germany had to “borrow heavily and raise taxes in order to finance 
unification” (Taberner 2004, 5), it was under growing pressure from the European Union to stay 
within the boundaries of the Growth and Stability Pact, or face the financial penalty, as well as a 
loss of credibility (as the country had helped establish these fiscal boundaries). Debt as a 
percentage of GDP had been hovering just below the threshold point of 60 percent for several 
years, and deficits violating the treaty also occurred periodically, especially in moments of 
economic strain.           
 The third, and longer-term, issue was the rising cost of pensions in the presence of a 
dwindling contributions base. Shifting demographics, in the form of an aging population and 
falling birth rates put pressure on the social security system. In 2000, for instance, the elderly 
population made up 23.5 percent of the total population, yet this percentage was expected to rise 
to 37.4 by 2040, bringing the old age dependency ratio from .38 to .72, and corresponding 

























over the same period (CSIS 2003).  Early solutions to the projected spending hikes focused on 
increasing contribution rates, which nearly doubled from 10 percent in 1954 to 19.5 percent in 
2003 (Streeck and Trampusch 2005). However, by the 1990s these measures already appeared 
insufficient. Periodic pension reforms, such as the Blum I, and II, in 1989 and 1997 respectively 
and Riester Reform provided some adjustment to the pension pressure, through a shift from gross 
to net indexation, an (ultimately temporary) reduction of the replacement rate, and the creation of 
a subsidized third pillar pensions system to provide the option of private pensions contributions. 
However, as a whole Germany was caught in lingering state of “Reformstau” or reform stall or 
jam on both pensions and well as economic and general fiscal health.          
An Electoral Promise Challenged 
The public was acutely aware of these problems, as well as previous governments’ foot-
dragging. Responding to public demand for change, the SPD’s Gerhard Schroeder ran and won 
on a platform of reducing unemployment and in 1998 promised to bring unemployment below 
3.5 million by the next election in September 2002 (BBC 2002). Yet, at the same time, the party 
also vowed to protect pensions, and even proposed (and then enacted upon gaining office) a law 
removing some pension retrenchments passed by the previous administration (Heinrichs 2003, 
11). After a 1998 victory, Schroeder set to work to address unemployment through the Alliance 
for Jobs, which aimed to bring together leaders of the peak associations to create more flexible 
and conducive labor conditions. Yet, before the arrival of the next election, the Alliance of Jobs 
initiative failed due to lack of compromise between workers’ and employers unions.   
  Furthermore, already weakened by global shockwaves from a post-9/11 investment 
slump and the aforementioned structural pressures, Germany shortly thereafter went into full-
scale recession as the new Euro increased the cost of exports, reducing demand for German 
products (Tran 2003).  As profits dropped, German companies laid off hundreds of thousands of 
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workers, ratcheting up an already high unemployment rate by another percentage point to nearly 
10 percent by 2003 (BBC 2001). The DAX, the stock market index of the 30 major German 
companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, plunged. Bankruptcies were triple as many 
as ten years prior and five times as many as 25 years before (IFO 2003).  At the same time, the 
threat of business exit was severe and the 22 top German business leaders, as well as a number of 
utility companies, and insurance companies had threatened to remove investment from Germany 
if Schroeder did not lower corporate taxes.  
Schroeder’s election year promise to reduce unemployment to 3.5 million, juxtaposed 
with the unemployment rolls of 4 million and rising, threw the government’s credibility into 
question. Schroeder’s 1998 election promises now seemed haunting: “if we are not successful in 
significantly lowering the unemployment rate, then we would neither deserve to be reelected nor 
would we even be reelected” (Collier 2004). For the government in general and for Schroeder in 
particular, who had “staked his career on reinvigorating the stagnant economy” (BBC 2003b), 
the recession made a “mockery” of his campaign promises (Camerra-Rowe 2003). The economic 
downturn had a major effect on the popularity of the government, which started to suffer in 
public opinion polls and at state elections (Hancock et al. 2018), portending challenge at the next 
federal election. The government needed to regain credibility and so “with its back against the 
wall” the left, which had experimented in its first term with “third way” policies to lower the 
unemployment rate, but had promised no additional major social reforms, now went full speed 
ahead. 
The Need to Act, Yet Little “Room to Move”62  
While the recession created the impetus for immediate action, the budgetary downturn 
constrained policy options, which were already limited given that monetary policy rested in the 
                                                     
62 Mosley (2000) 
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hands of the European Central Bank, which initially resisted lowering interest rates. When the 
ECB finally did so, German banks were “quick to make clear that they would not be passing on 
the benefits of cheaper money to the rest of the economy: they are, they say, too tightly squeezed 
themselves to afford it” (The Economist 2003).  The idea of increasing consumer demand 
through large-scale stimulus spending alone was also not an attractive option. Finance Minister 
Hans Eichel reported that due in part to rising unemployment, tax revenues were down by 8.7 
billion euros, leaving a 15 billion euro shortage (BBC 2003). This left the country in a precarious 
fiscal situation, one that resulted in a “legal challenge” from the European Union over breaching 
both the deficit and debt levels of the European Union Stability and Growth Pact (BBC 2004).  
Eichel made it “unmistakably clear that there was no room for any deficit-financed programs” 
(Seeleib-Kaiser 2003, 12) and, as a result, “budgetary pressures mean[t] the government has less 
flexibility than it would like” (Economist 2003). Furthermore, so sensitive was the budgetary 
issue that the Social Democrats and Greens’ attempt to bring forward to 2004 the 15.6 billion 
Euro tax cuts set for 2005, caused major opposition (especially among Christian Democrats) in 
the mediation committee of the upper house of parliament, given concerns of breaching the 
Maastricht treaty deficit limits for the upcoming year. In the end, the opposition was able to 
bargain Schroeder’s tax cuts down to 7.8 billion dollars (DW 2003b).  
To reduce non-wage labor costs, the government focused on reigning in social programs. 
The SPD stepped up an economically liberal agenda inspired in name and goal by the Lisbon 
Strategy, a European Union strategy agreed upon in 2000 to boost employment and prosperity in 
the Eurozone. In March 2003 the administration announced what would become the signature 
reform of its tenure, Agenda 2010, which outlined four major areas of reform: relaxing 
employment dismissal rules, reduced bureaucratic procedure, the provision of low-interest loans, 
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and the largest area, the “modernization of the social welfare state” (Funk 2003).  The 
SPD/Green coalition made clear its intention to engage in a series of labor market and pensions 
reforms, subsequently creating two commissions headed by academics and social partner 
appointees as an “icebreaker” strategy for reform (Schulze and Jochem 2007, 693-4). One 
commission was headed by Volkswagen executive, Peter Hartz and went to task on studying and 
proposing labor market reforms. The other, the Rurup commission, was created by Federal 
Minister of Health and Social Security, Ulla Schmidt and was headed by economics professor 
Burt Rurup (Collier 2004), mainly focused on pensions and health benefits system.  The 26 
member Rurup commission met for the first time in December 2002, yet it soon became 
apparent, though, that the process, especially for the Rurup commission, was extremely hurried, 
and was an “awkward fit for the Agenda 2010 timetable from the beginning”, due to the chances 
of final recommendations coinciding with election 2004 (ibid). In fact, the original report was 
not expected to be presented by the commission until the fall of 2003 (ibid). However, the 
government, concerned by the “unexpectedly high unemployment and the poor performance of 
the German economy with extremely low growth rates precipitated a short-run financial stress of 
the pension system” felt “a sense of urgency for reform” (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2003, 42) and 
therefore shifted the deadline for the commission’s reports to coincide with party conference 
preparations on June 1 (Collier 2004).  Thus it was systemic “instability, made visible by the 
deeper than expected recession in 2002, precipitated the “creation of the “sustainability reform 
commission” (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2005). 
While incurring the anger of Schroeder (and the threat to shut down the commission) for 
publicizing information and debates, the Rurup commission (as well as the CDU’s shadow 
commission, the Herzog commission) suggested several unpopular proposals, including an 
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increase in the normal retirement age (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2005), a demographic index that 
would adjust pensions based on the dependency ratio.       
 All in all the Agenda 2010 reforms planned, would reduce “aging related fiscal pressure” 
(increase in aging costs) by 2050 by about 4 percent of GDP (IMF 2006).   When Schroeder 
presented Agenda 2010 to the German Bundestag on March 14, 2003, he highlighted that the 
changes were to “ensure social security”. However, the main focus and purpose of the reform 
was primarily short-run economic and budgetary change. As Schroder put it:  
“Non-wage labor costs have risen to a level that is almost unbearable for employees. And for 
employers, these costs are an impediment to creating new jobs. Investments and spending on 
consumer goods have declined drastically, not least because during the past three years 
approximately 700 billion Euros were literally obliterated on the German stock markets. In this 
situation, politics must take action to restore trust…the federal government is convinced that it 
must prioritize and implement certain measures – to stimulate economic growth and consolidate 
the budget, to create jobs and boost the economy” (GHDI 2018) 
 
The plan was presented as a complementary supply and demand side solution. On the demand 
side, the government would indeed invest 26.7 billion Euros, but arguing that “without structural 
reform, any boost in demand will fizzle out”, the government proposed to complete this with 
supply side measures such as reduced social costs, lower taxation, and decreased market 
regulation.  This included to “modernize the social security system”. While much of Agenda 
2010 was focused on changes to the unemployment system (the Hartz reforms), the government 
also engaged in pension retrenchment, and “with an eye on Germany’s international 
competitiveness” (Allianz 2005), aimed to cap the contribution rates at 20 percent to 2020 and 22 
percent to 2030. “At the announcement of Agenda 2010, the German government sought to 
stimulate the market, reduce labor costs. Schroeder stated in March 2003, “There are sometimes 
measures that must be pushed through, which arouse little enthusiasm for me or for others. The 
must nonetheless be undertaken” (Vail 109).               
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 The reforms caused a major internal division. Trade union party members called Agenda 
2010 reforms “scandalous” and “immoral” and IG Metall leadership called the changes 
“completely incomprehensible and superfluous” (Funk 2003b). The SPD party experienced 
major internal rupture from this shift, and Schroeder, who had been the figurehead at the 
forefront of the Agenda 2010 stepped down in February 2004. In fact, the damage from Agenda 
2010 in general was so severe to the party, that it led to the growth of a “third” party, the “Left” 
Party (Die Linke), which swept up the votes of those frustrated by the social program of the 
Social Democrats. The left has taken much effort to regain a welfare-friendly image. Even the 
2009 election was affected, becoming the worst result for the Social Democratic party since 
World War II. Support dropped from 35 percent in 2005 to only 23 percent of the vote by 2009, 
very different from the party’s vote share throughout much of the 1960s through the 1990s, 
safely over 35 percent (Spiegel 2013b). 
Case #2: Germany in the Late 2000s 
Continued Need for Pensions Reform….             
Whereas in the previous case the left government pushed for retrenchment given constrained 
options during a financial-economic downturn, in the latter part of the 2000s, the more right-
leaning Christian Democratic Union refrained from advocating cutbacks. Granted, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the absence of reform was due to the more stable position of the 
pensions system, as the aforementioned reforms reduced stress on the pension system (e.g. 
implicit pension debt dropped from 143 percent of GDP to 118 percent of GDP) (Beltrametti and 
Della Valle 2011). Nevertheless, in the late 2000s, Germany’s pension system was still in a 
vulnerable state. As the IMF (2006) country report emphasized, “notwithstanding the progress 
made, given Germany’s projected demographics, long-run debt sustainability is not yet assured 
and further adjustment in entitlement and other programs will need to be an essential part of the 
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menu to address future fiscal pressures” (IMF 2006, 26) . A country with one of the most rapidly 
ageing populations among European Union countries, the end of the “golden age of welfare” 
(Esping-Andersen 1994) had indeed brought a challenging outlook on the health and future of 
the pension system. With a relatively generous pension system compared to other OECD 
countries, Germany’s pensions are unsurprisingly the largest social item in the budget, and the 
country overall pension spending was still at 10.1 percent of GDP, which is nearly 2 percentage 
points above the average spending of the OECD (8.2 percent) (Börsch-Supan 2003; OECD 
2018).             
 Furthermore, unlike other countries that have shifted toward funded systems, Germany’s 
pension system still operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, making it vulnerable to demographic 
imbalances (i.e. a “graying” population). For instance, even after and additional cost-saving 
increase in the retirement age in 2007 (a holdover reform proposed in the Rurup commission), 
reports from the largest insurance company in the world, Allianz, warned that Germany’s 
pension system was still in long-run danger. Examining levels and dynamic changes in three 
areas (demographics, pension system, and public finances), Allianz rated Germany 6 out of 10 
for need of further cost-saving reforms, and ranked it only 25th from the top most stable pension 
systems (Allianz Pensions Sustainability Index 2014). The demographic troubles were 
compounded by the onset of the late 2000s financial downturn, which, although Germany 
weather much better than other European countries. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, there were still 
calls for reform. German EU Commissioner Gunther Oettinger warned, “We have to talk about 
70 as the new retirement age… we have to prepare people for a longer working life” (DW 
2014b).  The International Monetary Fund echoed these statements, likewise suggesting that 
Germany increase its retirement age further, and several Social Democratic leaders joined the 
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bandwagon, voicing criticism against any possibility of a retirement age decrease (Economist 
2014).  
The German leadership itself had repeatedly highlighted the need for pension 
retrenchment across Europe (albeit directing its pressure toward financially unstable EU 
countries) and criticized France for the same type of long-term worker retirement age decrease 
that Germany would soon enact. "Europe now has roughly 7 percent of the global population, but 
nearly 50 percent of the world’s social spending," CDU leader and Chancellor Angela Merkel 
reiterated only months earlier (Spiegel 2013), a position that had the press echoing political 
nicknames reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher (e.g. "Frau Germania", "Iron Lady" and "Maggie 
Merkel") (Independent 2010). Even the left-wing press stated, that while Merkel had put much 
focus in her last term on issues of international policy, the time was now to turn toward domestic 
policy, “Important tasks need to be addressed: reform of old age nursing insurance, the pension 
system, education. Things can’t stay as they are for another four years” (Berliner Zeitung 2013).  
The call for reform in general and for cost-saving measures like an increase the retirement age to 
69 or 70 seemed to be on the horizon (Loeb 2012). Yet it is in precisely this context that the 
German government increased benefit eligibility, ratcheting up expenditures by 60 billion Euros 
until 2020 (The Local 2014).  
…Under a More Right-Leaning Government…  
Not only was Germany still in a vulnerable state concerning the long-term health of pensions, it 
was in the late 2000s under Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leadership, with Angela Merkel 
as Chancellor. Granted, the CDU does not fit snugly in either left or right category of the 
partisanship rubric. Christian democratic parties, such as the CDU have a unique platform that 
differentiates them from more liberal and more social democratic ones, namely a policy mélange 
focusing on family, a “commitment to society as an organic whole”, an “emphasis on 
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conservative social and cultural values”, an observance of social capitalism mixed with a 
dedication to transnational reconciliation (Bale and Szczerbiak 2008). Thus if the CDU had to be 
categorized as either center-left or center-right on welfare politics issues, its precise positioning 
would be (and has been) debated. On the one hand, the CDU as a Christian Democratic party, 
might be classified along with more welfare-positive parties like Social Democrats (     ), given 
their adherence to conservative social welfare tenets and the existence of a Catholic “social 
wing” linked to the labor association, the Christian Democratic Employees Association (CDA).   
 Yet on the other, they could be (and have been) simultaneously grouped with “right” 
parties, given their relative liberal leaning in the Bundestag (see Allan and Scruggs 2004 as well 
as Swank’s Comparative Political Party Dataset), due to the existence of a conservative as well 
as an economically liberal wing within the party. Hausermann (2010) for instance, classifies the 
CDU with the more liberal FDP as a party that tends to stand against traditional expansionary 
insurance, targeting, and recalibration pension measures, but for capitalization reforms (78), 
given its “high-skilled insider” capital accumulator base (66).     
 The categorization of the CDU towards the right side of the spectrum is understandable, 
as it does have some history of retrenchment. Despite an early dedication to expanding benefits, 
by the mid-1990s, the party started to engage in cutbacks across various welfare policies, 
including highly popular sickness and pensions programs. For instance, in partnership with the 
liberal party and in the context of a financially challenging unification process, the CDU reduced 
sickness replacement rates from 100 to 80 percent of wages, triggering mass public protest and 
SDP blame. It then further slashed benefits in 1997, bringing the pension replacement rates from 
70 to 64, restricting eligibility and increasing the age for full benefits (Kistchelt 2001, 295). 
Retrenchment measures carried through into the mid-2000s when the CDU backed the increase 
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in the retirement age from 65 to 67. Given these latter positions of the CDU as a more liberal 
partner, one might predict that in the context of pension vulnerability the party would push for 
more cost-saving measures. Such a party does exist in Germany, the liberal Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) party, however it is marginalized and weak within the system. Granted, the party is 
a potentially viable political player at elections (and occasional coalition partner of the CDU), 
however it often only gains around 5 to 10 percent of the vote. At the German 2013 legislative 
election, which preceded the reform, the FDP had its least successful result to date, winning only 
4.8 percent of list votes, narrowly missing the five percent threshold needed to gain seats. Nor 
did the party win any direct seats, meaning that for the first time in its history, the FDP had no 
representation in the Bundestag. 
…Yet a Weak Downturn… 
Despite the still vulnerable pensions system and the presence of a right-leaning party, Germany 
did not see reform during the late 2000s downturn.  Unlike the early 2000s downturn, which was 
marked by two full years of recession (2002 and 2003), the downturn in the late 2000 was rapid 
and did not, as in many other countries, result in a double dip recession.  Furthermore, while 
sources on level of Maastricht treaty deficit vary slightly (with the German Bundesbank pegging 
Maastricht deficits at just slightly over the three percent threshold) (Deutsche Bundesbank 2018), 
the Federal Ministry of Finance records the deficit at around two percent of GDP 
(Bundesfinanzministerium 2017). This, in contrast to a solid violation of Maastricht treaty 
limitations on both deficit and debt levels in the early 2000s downturn shows there was a major 
difference in financial health between the earlier and later scenarios.    
 Without the push to immediate spending, the government (as well as the opposition) 
instead sought to reassert themselves as welfare state defenders. The Social Democratic party, 
for instance, solicited the opinions of its members as well as 40,000 non-members, and created a 
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strongly “social justice”-oriented platform for the 2013 elections, focused on fairness and 
equality. It argued for minimum wage at 8.50 Euros, affordable housing, and a decrease in the 
retirement age, a proposition supported by 70 of the German public (DW 2013, Chicago Tribune 
2014). As the press put it, “the SPD has shifted sharply to the left in recent years in a bid to lure 
back the millions of voters who abandoned the party in disgust following its bold but unpopular 
“Agenda 2010” welfare cutbacks and labor reform” (Speigel 2013c). Though the SPD was 
punished at the polls in 2005 (and later in 2009), allowing Angela Merkel to became Chancellor 
in a grand coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD), the result was still not what the Christian Democratic 
party had hoped. “Social wing leaders and even conservatives blamed its showing on voter 
backlash against a manifesto seen as ‘coldly neoliberal’”. In the party’s “Basic Programme” 
‘freedom’ as a main principle espoused at Leipzig, was now demoted “back down to parity” with 
‘solidarity’ and ‘justice’” (Clemens 2009).        
 The CDU, led by Angela Merkel, took on an (old) tactic once again to promote the voice 
of the social-wing “in order to make it back over 40 percent” (Clemens 2009). In fact, in the 
absence of the fiscal-economic pushing leaders toward retrenchment, the party sought to “steal 
the thunder” and out credit-claim the left. “This is about tactics…This is about preparing for the 
elections” (Langguth 2009 in Dempsey 2009).  During the 2013 election, Christian Democrats 
sought to promote itself as a credible supporter of the welfare state. Given the absence of a push 
toward social welfare austerity, the CDU was “borrowing liberally from an agenda more usually 
associated with its center-left Social Democrat rivals” (NYT 2013) and commentators saw the 
CDU as taking on their own “third-way”: trusting in a solid conservative core, and 
“accommodating social democratic policies to take the political edge away” (The Guardian 
2013).  Its election manifesto promoted increased child subsidies, increased pensions for women 
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(especially promoted by the Bavarian sister party CSU) (DW 2013b), and better benefits for 
lower-earners (NYT 2013). Interestingly, while “the Green Party, women’s organizations and—
to a lesser extent-the SPD” have been the “clearest-cut advocates of recalibration and gender 
equality in pension insurance” (Hausermann 2010), in this case it was the Christian Democrats 
that firmly advocated recalibration as part of their platform. Berlin Social Research Center 
Manifesto Data (see Merz and Regel 2013) show how, unlike the early 2000s downturn neither 
party shifted rightward during the late 2000s downturn. The September 22, 2013 election saw 
that the CDU gained about 42 percent, the SPD 26 percent, the Left Party at 8.6 percent and the 
Greens 8.4 percent. The FDP, as previously mentioned did not reach the 5 percent threshold, nor 
did the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the new (but very rapidly growing) far-right party. This 
left the CDU in a position where they had to form a coalition.  
An Agenda of Credit Claiming  
After a brief unsuccessfully courting of the Greens, Merkel began official negotiations with the 
SDP in a 15 member negotiation on October 23, 2013 (Zeit 2013). During a 17-hour session, the 
terms of the coalition were hammered out in an agreement entitled “Shaping Germany’s Future 
(BBC 2013), which included three major themes, finances, safeguarding wealth, and, 
unsurprising, social security (CNN 2013). While the Social Democrats also had included in their 
campaign a proposal to increase revenue through new taxes, they were willing to drop this 
provision to satisfy the CDU’s demand not to create any new taxes or debts. However, the Social 
Democratic party adhered to the campaign promise to decrease the retirement age to 63 for those 
who had worked for 45 years (since age 18), and in return were willing to allow for a FLEXI 
pension option that would give older workers the choice, but not the demand, to retire later. 
Furthermore they also conceded a number of other CDU/CSU’s demands including increasing to 
two pension points (instead of one) child-rearing credits for mothers with children born before 
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1992. The coalition deal also included other welfare expansions as well, increasing disability 
benefits for those who take early retirements, making the supplementary period more generous 
(Focus 2013).           
 Granted, not everyone within the CDU was pleased with these mild compensatory 
reforms. The economic wing in particular, believed Angela Merkel had “pandered too much to 
the SPD”.  Before a final vote, a minority within the MPs, 50 out of the 311 MPs in the 
conservative CDU/Christian Social Union bloc privately voiced concern about the policy (FT 
2013). Some were more public, especially members from the employers’ unions "I find that 
disastrous," Ulrich Grillo, head of the BDI Federation of German Industries said, a day before 
the parliamentary vote. "It's all the opposite of what we should be doing." The Federation of 
German Employers' Associations in the Metal and Electrical Engineering Industries, 
Gesamtmetall, added “This is money that we could invest more wisely in our education system, 
in our infrastructure, or in paying off our national debt” (DW 2014c). CDU representatives in the 
economic-wing responded similarly. “Other countries now tell us, ‘You preach water but drink 
wine,’ ” said Mr. Lauk, president of the CDU’s economic council. “The General Secretary of the 
CDU economic council, Wolfgang Steiger stated "The CDU/CSU and SPD are not acting in the 
here and now and for the future of the country" (Welt 2014). When the proposal to decrease 
retirement did make it to debate, the idea was shot down by many as ridiculous. While Germany 
did indeed have 31 billion dollars of pension reserves at the time, the Labor Ministry estimated 
that the cost of the reform which did eventually pass, would cost 4.4 billion euros ($6 billion) the 
first year alone and a total of about 160 billion euros by 2030, far more than the reserves allowed 
(DW 2014a).  Green party chair Katrin Göring-Eckhardt scoffed, "What haystack are you 
planning to turn into gold to eventually be able to pay for all this?" You're plundering the 
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pension fund, and then, starting in 2019, people's payments and taxes will rise." (DW 2014a). 
 Merkel responded with an attempt to balance the factions: "We are a people's party, and 
within this there is always the economic wing and those who lean more towards the social side. 
As chair of the party and chancellor it is my job to combine economic good sense with social 
justice" (Expatica 2014). In the end of the vast majority of these more fiscally conservative 
members were placated by the more fiscally conservative aspects of the plan (e.g. no new debt 
and no new taxes)63  and the coalition agreement was officially signed on November 27 by 
Chairman Merkel, SPD Chairman Sigmar Gabriel, and CSU Chairman Horst Seehofer (AICGS 
2014). “Vital for the coalition’s credibility” (FT 2013), as one representative put it, the 
retirement age bill passed easily in the parliament on May 19, 2014, with 460 in favor, 64 
against, 60 abstained, and 47 absent (Spiegel 2014; Bundestag 2014a). In the end, out of the 311 
members from the CDU/CSU, only 9 rejected the bill, 2 abstained and 18 were absent. In fact, 
the vast majority of the “no” vote came, not from the CDU, but from the Greens (55 out of the 63 
members voted against the bill) criticizing it for violating intergenerational fairness and placing 
the burden of cost on the younger generation (represented strongly within the Green party). No 
member of the SPD or the Left voted against the bill.     
 The parties were both quick to promote and credit claim for these minor welfare 
expansions. The Social Democratic Labor Minister Andrea Nahles called it a “fair 
acknowledgement of the job of child-raising done by women above all and of the hard years of 
service rendered by those in long-term employment.” (Deustchland.de 2014). The CDU called it 
“just” and especially touted its new benefits for mothers (Economist 2014), prompting the press 
to remark that the “SPD resents Ms. Merkel for stealing its clothes”. Within the CDU, Karl 




Schiewerling, stated in the Bundestag that the pension reform package brings, “more justice for 
millions of mothers, recognition of life achievement, better social security in the event of 
reduced earning capacity, support, the ability to resume occupational activity after illness, new 
perspectives on the transition from the working life into the resting phase: those are the contents 
of the jointly negotiated pension package. It is a good pension package. We are helping many 
people. Therefore the CDU / CSU parliamentary group will also agree” (Bundestag 2014b). 
Furthermore, with an on-looking and approving Merkel, the parliamentary floor leader the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Volker Kauder, declared the reform a “booming 
accomplishment” (citation). “Merkel agreed to SPD calls for federal minimum wage laws by 
sector, if not across the board” and increased unemployment benefits for long-term workers.  
Conclusions 
This chapter showed that under an intense downturn on both fiscal and economic parameters, the 
social democratic SPD party was pushed to engage in more fiscally liberal policies, whereas 
under a less intense downturn, the more conservative CDU-led coalition refrained from doing so 
and instead engaged in credit claiming tactics.  Responding to public demands to increase 
employment levels, the Schroeder government turned to reduce taxation and suppression of 
contribution rates to spur growth. One means of financing these cutbacks was through reducing 
the debt burden brought on by pensions costs. In contrast to this earlier example, the late 2000s 
downturn was mild by comparison in both depth and duration and did not produce the impetus to 
cutback the welfare state. Instead, the Christian Democrats took on the role often embraced by 
Green parties across Europe (i.e. recalibration and targeting pension expansions for women) and 
both parties of the coalition engaged in credit-claiming for lowering the retirement age for long-
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Introduction 
After the atrocities of the Second World War, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
set of 30 basic human rights with the goal of protecting citizens from oppression and injustice. 
Among these, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserted that “everyone has the right 
to a standard of living…including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social 
services…and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (United 
Nations 2010). 
In the decades that followed, national economies across Western Europe and North 
America grew and these countries began to make this vow a reality. Rich industrialized states64 
channeled funds into welfare programs65 (Wilensky 1975). These programs widened in coverage 
and deepened in generosity. In many advanced industrialized countries, the coverage rate grew 
from a small fraction of the workforce to the vast majority of the population (e.g. 90 to 100 
percent in most countries by 1970) and replacement rates for many programs jumped to 50 
percent or more (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2013). The programs thus began to subsume a large 
portion of spending, with social expenditure as a whole approaching 15 percent of GDP across 
the OECD by 1970 (OECD 2013). In their development, these programs gathered so much 
public support and became so entrenched that by the 1970s welfare state cutbacks are said to 
have become a “third rail” issue: politicians who “touch” it (i.e. make cuts) risk political “death” 
                                                     
64 All wealthy countries currently have some form of social protection system. Nevertheless, inequality continues to 
exist in these countries and benefit generosity varies (Esping-Anderson 1990). 
65 According to Pierson (2006) “economic growth was the seemingly the irreplaceable foundation of the traditional 
welfare state. It was the basis of Keynesian policies to induce capital investment, the stimulus to support economic 
activity at all levels, securing full employment and the fount of resources for increased expenditure on health, 




(i.e. loss of the next election) (e.g. see Taylor-Gooby 1985, Pierson 1996, Myles and Pierson 
2001, and Brooks and Manza 2007).   
Defining Unpopular Retrenchment 
Yet, politicians have grasped the third rail, pushing through retrenchment to programs like 
private sector workers pensions and broad sickness benefits programs even though the public 
opposed it. This trend has occurred across essentially all OECD countries in the past 40 years. 
This dissertation has sought to provide insight into the question of the conditions under which 
politicians grasp the “third rail of politics”—i.e. make highly unpopular retrenchments, when 
doing so can (and often does) get them voted out of office. To investigate this question, it was 
essential to begin this dissertation with a sound definition of unpopular retrenchment. This is 
important as the literature either tends to avoid defining the term or simplifies the concept. For 
instance, based on public opinion polls that show that social programs are highly popular, 
scholars therefore assume that cutbacks to such programs must therefore be unpopular. 
Alternatively, looking across social categories, scholars point to the popularity of a single 
program, i.e. pensions, therefore assuming that all cutbacks to such a category must also be 
unpopular. This chapter seeks to break down the assumption by looking at public opinion polls 
of individual reforms (which can affect constituencies differently)—rather than social welfare 
benefits taken as a whole.          
 Chapter two also recognizes that the way a poll is phrased or the conditions under which 
it is asked may sway a respondent’s answer. Retrenchments that seem unacceptable under one 
framing, may appear acceptable under another (Gilens 1999). Cutbacks that may be unthinkable 
when economies are functioning more smoothly, may become more acceptable when a 
budgetary deficit and/or recession hits. To identify those reforms that are demonstrably 
unpopular, the chapter sets a higher standard for what counts as an unpopular reform. In short, an 
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unpopular reform is one in which at least a majority of respondents reject retrenchment 
regardless of the way the question is framed and regardless of the OECD country polled.  The 
chapter looked at public opinion polls across three divergent national contexts, and found that all 
reforms, at first glance seem to pass a preliminary test of unpopularity. However, when put to the 
more stringent test, publics across the OECD are willing to see stricter eligibility and even some 
benefit reduction for unemployment benefits. These examples seem to suggest that it is not the 
popularity of the program itself that matters per se, but rather the degree to which the 
retrenchment targets a majority of the population. Reforms that appear to target a minority of the 
population (e.g. means-test beneficiaries, or civil servants) may become acceptable under certain 
framings and across certain countries. However, cutbacks that affect majorities appear to be 
highly unpopular regardless of the context (e.g. recession, varied framing, across time and 
countries). While Chapter 2 investigated the case of pensions, it is also likely that sickness 
benefits cutbacks that affect the majority of the population should therefore also be unpopular, 
whereas means-tested benefits are not necessarily so.      
 While the idea of unpopular retrenchment has been making headway in the literature 
(Kitschelt 2001), only recently has not unpopular retrenchment gained  a foothold (Vis 2010). 
However, these studies have not more rigorously identified what counts as an unpopular 
retrenchment. This is essential, as, for instance as for instance, Vis (2010) finds that crisis 
matters, however unemployment cutbacks are often categorized as unpopular reform. These 
reforms, however, in the context of this study, would not be considered unpopular reform. 
Furthermore, studies (e.g. Schumacher, Vis, Van Kersbergen 2013) that report a partisan effect 
in terms of punishment at the polls also include these potentially more “partisan-driven” 
measures of welfare state change, rather than widespread and highly unpopular cutbacks that 
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affect individuals on both “sides of the aisle”.      
 While the first chapter focused on the “unpopularity” aspect of the dependent variable, 
the next chapter (Chapter 3) looks at the “retrenchment” side of this factor.  Again, while studies 
often devote only minimal time to elaborating on the dependent variable, it is especially 
important in this context, because what has been taken as “reform” and “retrenchment” are terms 
that have been defined and measured in various ways, all of which may affect the outcome of the 
study. This is the crux of the “dependent variable problem” (Clausen and Seigel 2004, 4) in the 
study of the welfare state, in which insufficient attention has been paid to defining the dependent 
variable, with scholars noting that the welfare state is retracting or that significant reform is 
occurring, but not necessarily quantifying the change. This chapter seeks to engage in an 
examination of common conceptualizations of retrenchment, starting with measures of social 
expenditure and moving on to the more commonly used welfare state entitlements research on 
replacement rates.  The chapter then notes that while research has provided a good basis for 
assessing welfare efforts and benefit implementation, there is still a need for further analysis of 
comprehensive data on reform instances. Thus, it engages in this task by examining instances of 
unpopular pensions reform.  After defining unpopular reform instances for pensions, this chapter 
therefore shows how it amalgamates existing partial-coverage sources of qualitative data, into a 
comprehensive dataset of unpopular pension reforms between 1990 and 2015 in 18 countries.  It 
then provides descriptive statistics, showing the frequency of pensions reforms, as a whole and 
also by type.  The chapter shows that indeed “significant” reform has occurred; nearly 100 
reforms have occurred over the period, with an average of one major reform per political term.   
Determinants of Unpopular Reform 
Having defined the dependent variable, the dissertation then moves on to Chapter 4, in which it 
seeks to establish, in a large N setting, the determinants of unpopular pension retrenchment in 18 
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OECD countries between 1990 and 2015. To do so, it examines several (often competing) 
hypotheses: focusing on acute recession and budgetary downturn and the effect of partisanship. 
The results support for the “problem pressures” literature, however, in a modified way. Rather 
than economic pressures affecting the welfare state in a linear or gradual way, the chapter finds 
that it is that acute fiscal-economic downturn increases the likelihood that countries will 
experience a crisis, and therefore reform their welfare state system. Furthermore, the pressure of 
acute fiscal-economic downturn in creating crisis affects both left and right, pushing parties of 
either partisan stripe to retrench. Chapter 4 supports scholars such as Hennessy (2014), who 
argue that economic signaling matters and that pressures from the fiscal constraints of the 
European Union may affect the likelihood of reform. However, this analysis, suggests that it may 
not be mainly membership in the European Union (which is an operative variable in Hennessy’s 
2014) analysis, but rather critical fiscal and economic thresholds, which apply across countries 
within and outside the European Union. Methodologically, the present study contributes by 
broadening the sample size of the study, from Hennessy’s (2014) analysis, which looks at 
(maximum) a single reform case in each year between  1980 and 2002, in a set of 16 European 
countries, to nearly 100 reforms over the period of 1990 to 2015 period. This study seems to 
contradict the outcomes of another study of budgetary deficit on reform likelihood (Brooks 
2005).   
 Chapter 5 chapter is a case study that elaborates on this relationship between fiscal-
economic downturn, crisis, and welfare state retrenchment. It provides evidence that fiscal-
economic downturn not only provokes political determination to take action, but the co-
occurrence of major economic downturn and fiscal stress restrains the options available to 
politicians, pushing them toward fiscal consolidation. In particular, it looks at the case of France 
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in the late 2000s fiscal-economic downturn, showing that it was this acute change that caused a 
crisis for the right, pushed them to retrench the pensions system, via increases to the minimum 
and standard retirement ages. Though the center-right president and party were encouraged by 
the employer’s union to increase the retirement age, they reiterated right up until the crisis their 
resistance to increasing the age, despite the vulnerability the pension system, the calls for reform 
by the national pension advisory board, and the employers unions. However, the late 2000s 
fiscal-economic downturn, in the form of a recession (that slowed growth, increased 
unemployment and ultimately undermined the basis financial status of the country (putting its 
AAA rating in jeopardy), and placing it outside the EU deficit limits. President Nicholas Sarkozy 
and the UMP party sought to signal to investors the country’s ability to finance debt, however, 
with a lagging economy, “growing out of” the debt crunch was not an option. Thus, the party 
was pushed to turn to alternative options, including fiscal consolidation.     
 Seeing at the system was highly vulnerable already, the needs of the Social Security 
system ballooned after the fiscal-economic downturn. This made the pension system, which 
made up a large portion of the budget, a target for reform to signal efforts to structurally reform. 
As a result, the right increased its calls for retrenchment through an increase in the retirement age 
from 60 to 62 and the full retirement from 65 to 67, moves, which were highly unpopular. 
Though the majority of the French public rejected the reform, and millions publicly protested, 
the reform passed quickly. The case also demonstrates that partisanship may not have made the 
difference for retrenchment occurrence, as the Socialist Party shifted “right-ward” shift as well, 
advocating instead of a retirement age increase, for a contribution length increase. Once the 
center-right UMP was ousted from office almost immediately following reform, the Socialist 
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Party kept the vast majority of the reform structure in place, altering it only partially, through a 
decrease in the retirement age for long-term workers.  
 The subsequent chapter (Chapter 6) compares the situation and reaction of Germany to 
the early 2000s downturn with the lack of pension retrenchment in the late 2000s downturn. The 
early 2000s was a major downturn marked by both economic stress (heightened increase in the 
unemployment rate and a recession) and budgetary pressures (violation of European Monetary 
Union fiscal standards). Under these conditions, the Social Democratic Party proposed unpopular 
pension reform measures (the “Rurup reforms”) as part of a larger effort (Agenda 2010) to create 
economic competitiveness through the lowering of non-wage related costs of business. As in the 
case of France above, the downturn created not only need for reform by creating “crisis 
awareness” among the public (reflected in public opinion polls) (Petersen 1996), but also the 
simultaneous occurrence of fiscal strain restricted the options available to the government, as 
large-scale fiscal stimulus under conditions of high debt obligations would have sent a 
detrimental signal to investors. In contrast, the late 2000s downturn, while creating a crisis 
situation for other countries in the Eurozone, left Germany relatively unscathed and the country 
economically rebounded quickly. As a result, while there was budgetary strain, there was more 
economic “room to move”.  Thus, despite continued pension vulnerability (and an unsustainable 
long-term trajectory for pensions), the Germany did not engage in unpopular pensions 
retrenchment. Instead, Chancellor Angela Merkel and the CDU helped pass a minor eligibility 
expansion, decreasing the retirement age for long-term workers to 63, and endorsed (and won) 
further expansion in the welfare state including pension benefits for mothers. This chapter seeks 
to provide a more comprehensive view through a comparison of the fiscal-economic moment 
that pushed the German government into reform in the early 2000s but not in the late 2000s. 
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Whereas other authors have focused on Agenda 2010 through other lenses, e.g. “passive 
revolution” (Bruff 2010), or how veto players stifled some degree of reform (Streeck and 
Trampusch 2005), this chapter seeks to show how the intensity of Germany’s downturn and the 
crisis that pushed politicians toward the retrenchment that did nevertheless occur. Others such as 
Vail (2010) have also examined economic adjustment in France and Germany, however from a 
different lens, that looks also mainly pre-great recession reforms, and incorporates anti-poverty 
programs. While with a different social policy focus, this dissertation supports his claim that the 
age of a frozen social policy environment has passed. The study broadly draws on and expands 
on the argument of Camerra-Rowe (2004), who argues that Schroeder’s Agenda 2010 was an 
attempt to prove to the public that it could weather the harsh economic realities and “pass 
policies that will not bankrupt the country” (21). The present study highlights the force of the 
two pressures fiscal and economic acting in confluence in that case, created major strain for the 
left, and furthermore that thesame pressure was absent in the late 2000s crisis, removing a major 
impetus for retrenchment.  
Finally, what these cases have displayed is that whereas crisis is often seen as an 
opportunity structure opening for eager politicians to justify preferred reforms,  in the context of 
highly unpopular private sector pension retrenchments, neither party is waiting eagerly to make 
these cutbacks. Rather than providing an opportunity for reform in this area, crisis following 
from a major fiscal-economic downturn produces more of a narrowing of room to maneuver66, 
pushing avoidant leaders to consider austerity options they would have preferred to avoid. 
                                                     




The dissertation has shown that fiscal-economic downturn is one major factor that increases the 
likelihood of reform, through the mechanism of creating a crisis moment, when previously held 
assumptions need to be assessed. It is important to point out that crisis is necessary for a 
retrenchment, however fiscal-economic downturn does not deterministically create a crisis for 
countries, nor is it only means of creating crisis. Future research could elaborate on potentially 
mitigating factors, such as corporatism, which in theory might preclude the need for crisis, 
seeing as not all decision-makers in tri-partite arrangements are elected officials67 or as 
Hausermann (2010) argues, these corporatist arrangements might provide more opportunities for 
various actors (unions and employers associations) to engage in piecemeal retrenchment in 
traditional private-sector workers pensions, while simultaneously advocating for the expanding 
of their own constituents who are in new risk groups (a compensatory effect).   
While the current research has displayed the importance of problem pressures for welfare 
state retrenchment, further research could elaborate in a number of interesting and novel ways. 
On the side of the dependent variable, additional European Commission-sponsored research is 
now emerging on comparative reform measures to several programs. To investigate the 
frequency of unpopular measures, these data could be re-coded from their current classification 
by “magnitude” to “unpopularity” and their frequencies and determinants examined over time. 
On this note, research could also expand the data beyond the standard set of OECD countries to 
examine reform elsewhere in the developed world, or could move beyond pensions research to 
look at other unpopular cutbacks in sickness benefits. Furthermore, research hints that 
compensatory increases that tend to co-occur with retrenchment (and may in some cases be only 
one-off mechanisms), can influence the passage of the cutback. While beyond the scope of this 
                                                     
67 Thanks to Dr. Scruggs for pointing this out. 
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research, it would therefore be useful to get a sense of standard increases in tandem with 
cutbacks. While some research has begun to do this, it would be useful to separate the effects 
instead of averaging them. The research could also look at other aspects of reform that may not 
fall into the “unpopular” category, but nevertheless may be useful in understanding reform 
likelihood. These could include shifts toward funded pillars, contribution and tax rate changes, 
and also reform measures occurring within unemployment and means-test programs.  
Works Cited: 
Brooks, Clem. and Jeff. Manza. 2007. Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public 
Opinion in Democracies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bruff, Ian. 2010. “Germany’s Agenda 2010 Reforms: Passive Revolution at the Crossroads.” 
Capital and Class. 34(3): 409-428. 
Esping-Andersen, G.  1990. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2001. “Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do 
Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?” In The New Politics of the Welfare State. Ed. Paul 
Pierson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Myles, J. and P. Pierson. 2001. “The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform.” In 
The New Politics of the Welfare State ed. Paul Pierson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp 305-
33. 
 
OECD. 2013. “SOCX Database” http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm (June 1, 2013).  
Petersen. E. 1996. “Den Samfundspsykologiske udvikling 1982-1986-1988-1990-1994” in  
Danskernes trivsel, holdninger og selvansvarlighed under ‘opsvinget”. Eds. Petersen, E et al., 
Aarhus: Department of Psychology/Aarhus University Press.  
 
Pierson, P. 1996. “The New Politics of the Welfare State” World Politics 48(2): 143-179. 
 
Pierson, Christopher. 2006. Beyond the Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of Welfare 
Penn State University Press. 
 
Schumacher, Gijs; Vis, Barbara; Van Kersbergen, Kees. Political Parties' Welfare Image, 





Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef Jahn, and Kati Kuitto. 2013. “Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2. 
Version 2017-09.” University of Connecticut & University of Greifswald. 
 
Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef Jahn and Kati Kuitto. 2013.“Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data 
Set 2, Version 2013, 08. Codebook. 
 
Streeck, Wolfgang and Christine Trampusch. 2005. “Economic Reform and the Political 
Economy of the German Welfare State,” German Politics, 14(2):174-195. 
 
Taylor-Gooby, Peter. 1985. "Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare". Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London.  
United Nations. 2010. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (Feburary 11, 2011).  
 
Wilensky, Harold. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.   
 
